November 16, 2026, opinions

Designated for publication

  • Tuttle v. Gallegos, 25-20132, appeal from S.D. Tex.; and denial of rehearing en banc
    • Clement, J. (Jones, Clement, Richman) (oral argument) (substituting original panel opinion on June 29, 2026, with same disposition), qualified immunity
    • En banc rehearing denied (favoring rehearing: Elrod, Graves, Higginson, Willett, Douglas, JJ.; opposed to rehearing: Jones, Smith, Stewart, Richman, Southwick, Haynes, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson, Ramirez, JJ.), Graves, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing (joines by Elrod, Higginson, Douglas).
    • Reversing denial of qualified immunity summary judgment to officer defendant.
    • On January 28, 2019, a squad of Houston Police Department officers executed a no-knock search warrant at the Harding Street residence of Dennis Tuttle and Rhogena Nicholas. The warrant was procured through false claims by Officer Gerald Goines, who fabricated a confidential-informant drug purchase. During the raid, a gunfight erupted; multiple officers were shot, and both Tuttle and Nicholas were killed. Officer Felipe Gallegos, who was initially positioned outside, fired shots that killed Nicholas and later fired the final two fatal shots at Tuttle. Plaintiffs’ expert concluded that Nicholas was unarmed and not standing over a wounded officer, and that Tuttle’s hands and arms were so severely wounded by seven prior gunshots that he was incapable of holding a weapon when Gallegos fired the last two shots.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine to review factual disputes, including body-worn camera video evidence; (2) whether the district court’s finding that Officer Medina’s location was a material fact dispute was correct; (3) whether Gallegos was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim for the shooting of Nicholas; and (4) whether Gallegos was entitled to qualified immunity for the final two shots that killed Tuttle.
    • As to Nicholas, the court assumed Plaintiffs’ version of events—that Medina was already outside the house—but found that fact immaterial because it was undisputed that Officer Lovings remained wounded in the doorway, feet from Nicholas. In the context of an intense, rapidly evolving gunfight with multiple officers down, the court held that an objectively reasonable officer would have perceived Nicholas’s proximity to a wounded officer as posing a threat of serious physical harm, justifying deadly force. The court noted: “None of the above cases involved a gunfight where multiple officers had been shot, including one who was wounded within feet of a suspect who was aware that officers were executing a search warrant. This scene was far more tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”
    • As to Tuttle, even assuming his hands and arms were incapacitated, the court found no evidence that Gallegos could have known that, because Tuttle had his back to the door and continued moving after being shot. The court emphasized that “the Fourth Amendment’s excessive force jurisprudence does not require police officers to diagnose a suspect’s medical condition during an active gunfight in which officers had been shot.” The court also stressed that Tuttle never surrendered or gave himself up, and that four officers had been shot in the moments leading up to the final shots.
    • Throughout, the court applied the Supreme Court’s instruction from Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025), that reasonableness must be assessed holistically, including “facts and events leading up to the climactic moment,” replacing the prior “moment-of-threat” doctrine. The court concluded: “The safety and comfort of our chambers invite a temptation to second-guess police officers and to reimagine, with the benefit of hindsight, how an officer should have responded here. We resist that temptation.”
    • Dissent from Denial of Rehearing En Banc: As to Nicholas, Judge Graves contended that under Plaintiffs’ version of events, Nicholas was unarmed, seated on a couch, not resisting, and Gallegos shot her without warning when she posed no threat. Judge Graves wrote: “Simply being near an officer does not justify the use of deadly force,” criticizing the panel for failing to identify any threatening action by Nicholas. He noted that the panel’s cited precedents all involved suspects who appeared to reach for weapons, a critical distinction absent here.
    • As to Tuttle, Judge Graves contended the case was analogous to Mason v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 806 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2015), where a jury could find that a suspect was clearly incapacitated before the officer’s final shots. Judge Graves emphasized that Tuttle had sustained devastating injuries to both arms and hands, was dropping to the ground with his back to the door, and was fatally shot in the back of the head twenty seconds after the prior shot. Judge Graves quoted Mason: “‘Shooting a clearly incapacitated suspect is inconsistent with Garner‘s command that deadly force is unconstitutional when a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others.'”
    • Judge Graves concluded that the panel’s opinion “ignores that balance in favor of an absolute shield for officials over accountability where it is due,” and that “this case involves disputed facts that are material, and a clearly established constitutional right has been violated on the facts alleged,” warranting trial.
  • Annie M. v. Aledo Independent School District, 25-10824, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • Duncan, J. (Richman, Duncan, Oldham), Oldham, J., dissenting (oral argument), Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, Americans with Disabilities Act
    • Substituting for August 28 panel opinion that had affirmed summary judgment for school district on all claims, affirming summary judgment dismissal of IDEA claim and reversing summary judgment on ADA claim, and remanding.
    • Annie M. is a five-year-old child with Down syndrome who suffered a cardiac arrest during open-heart surgery as an infant, leaving her parents uncertain about her developmental trajectory. When Annie turned three, her mother contacted Aledo Independent School District (“AISD”) to enroll her in special-education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). AISD’s diagnostician proposed a Full and Individual Initial Evaluation (“FIE”) that included both informal play-based cognitive assessments and formal IQ tests (the ECAD and WPPSI). Annie’s mother objected to the formal IQ tests, physically crossed them off the notice of evaluation, and stated she “consent[ed] to the rest of the form.” AISD interpreted this as a refusal to consent to the FIE and declined to proceed with the evaluation. An administrative hearing officer ruled that AISD’s proposed evaluation was appropriate and that the parents had failed to meet their burden. The parents then sued in federal court under the IDEA and the ADA; the district court granted summary judgment to AISD on both claims.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the IDEA permits parents to give “partial” consent to a school district’s proposed initial evaluation—i.e., to accept some assessments while rejecting others—and still trigger the district’s obligation to evaluate the child and provide a FAPE. (2) Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the parents’ ADA claim on the grounds that Annie had not been evaluated for a disability and that there was no evidence of intentional discrimination.
    • On the IDEA claim, the court held that the statute’s text requires parental “consent” to a proposed FIE—”full stop”—and says nothing about “partial” consent. The court explained that the IDEA’s structure places the onus of designing an initial evaluation on the school district, which has broad latitude in selecting assessment tools, and that “[n]othing in the IDEA’s structure suggests that parents may, by selective consent to a proposed FIE, require a district to conduct an initial evaluation using only the assessment tools the parents prefer.” The evidentiary record also undermined the parents’ position, as the hearing officer found—based on uncontradicted testimony—that evaluators typically cannot determine which assessments are needed until they interact with a child, and that the informal DAYC-2 alone might not yield sufficient cognitive data. The court further found that AISD made “reasonable efforts” to obtain consent, noting multiple communications, a revised evaluation notice, and an in-person meeting. The district court had summarized AISD’s diligence: “This case is an excellent example of what is legally required by the school district and the parents[‘] right to consent or refuse consent, but not dictate or limit areas in which the district can evaluate for a suspected disability.”
    • On the ADA claim, the court held that the district court erred on both of its stated grounds: the ADA does not require a child to undergo IDEA-specific testing to qualify as “an individual with a disability”—only that she have “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more [of her] major life activities.” Additionally, proof of intentional discrimination is required only for monetary damages, not for equitable relief, which the parents sought.
    • Judge Oldham dissented, contending that the IDEA establishes a “cooperative regime” between parents and schools and that the consent provision should be read on an “activity-by-activity basis,” permitting parents to consent to particular evaluations so long as all areas of suspected disability are covered. He wrote: “Under the majority’s reading, the District could force Annie’s parents to consent to unquestionably spurious psychological ‘assessments’ while at the same time assuring the parents those tests would not be used. That reading runs contrary to the cooperative scheme that IDEA establishes.” He further contended that Annie should prevail on both her ADA discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims, noting that “Aledo cannot show how removing two tests the school’s own expert said were unnecessary would impose significant costs, ‘fundamentally alter’ the District’s services, or impose a burden on the District at all.” Judge Oldham closed with a historical warning against “dubious or pseudo-scientifically rationalized interventions” imposed on disabled individuals, arguing: “I read IDEA and the ADA to end the unquestioning scientism of yesteryear.”
  • Poor Boy Tree Service Inc. v. City of Winnfield, 25-30624, appeal from W.D. La.
    • Stewart, J. (Stewart, Higginson, Ho) (oral argument), breach of contract, unjust enrichment
    • Affirming in part and vacating in part claims against city for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
    • After Hurricane Laura made landfall in Louisiana on August 27, 2020, as a Category Four hurricane, Ty Bewley, the owner of Poor Boy Tree Service, Inc. and Mobile Help 4U, Inc. (collectively, “Poor Boy”), traveled to the City of Winnfield to offer cleanup and recovery services. Poor Boy communicated with City employees via text message and began performing cleanup work without a written agreement. Poor Boy subsequently submitted invoices totaling more than $1.1 million for the work performed. City officials, including then-Mayor George Moss, acknowledged the invoices but never remitted payment. Poor Boy filed suit to collect on an open account under Louisiana law. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing no valid contractual relationship existed. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims, finding that the mayor lacked authority to bind the City without board of aldermen approval under the Lawrason Act, that no open account relationship existed, and that unjust enrichment was unavailable because the law provided another potential remedy.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the mayor of a Lawrason Act municipality could bind the City to an oral contract without board of aldermen authorization, and whether any exception—including ratification, the governor’s emergency proclamations, or the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (“LHSEADA”)—permitted the mayor to bypass that requirement; (2) whether the parties’ dealings constituted an open account under Louisiana law; and (3) whether the district court erred in denying leave to amend to add an unjust enrichment claim.
    • The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the mayor lacked capacity to bind the City to an oral contract. It vacated the grant of summary judgment on the open account claim and remanded for reconsideration under Louisiana Supreme Court precedent. It also vacated as premature the district court’s determination that Poor Boy could not pursue unjust enrichment.
    • On the oral contract, the court reaffirmed the longstanding Louisiana rule that under the Lawrason Act, “a Mayor acting alone is without power to execute a contract incurring a debt on the part of his city or town. He can act only with and under the authority, usually evidenced by a resolution or ordinance, of the Board of Aldermen.” Poor Boy pointed to no evidence that the board authorized Mayor Moss to enter a contract. As to ratification, the court found no evidence satisfying the narrow Smith v. Town of Vinton exception because Poor Boy failed to show that any member of the board of aldermen was aware of the mayor’s commitments. On the emergency-powers argument, the court held that the LHSEADA’s grant of emergency authority to the mayor did not allow him to suspend the Lawrason Act—a separate state law—and that contracting with an outside company was not utilizing the “available resources of the municipality.”
    • On the open account claim, the court found that the district court relied on Cambridge Toxicology Group, which required a history of dealings between the parties, but this requirement was expressly overruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Frey Plumbing Co. v. Foster, 996 So. 2d 969 (La. 2008), which held that the open account statute “must be applied as written” and imposes “no requirement that there must be one or more transactions between the parties, nor … any requirement that the parties must anticipate future transactions.” Because the parties had not raised Frey Plumbing below, the court vacated and remanded for reconsideration under the correct standard.
    • On unjust enrichment, the court held that the district court’s denial was premature. Under Louisiana law, unjust enrichment is subsidiary and unavailable when another remedy exists, but because the open account claim was being remanded, it could not yet be determined whether Poor Boy had another available remedy. The court noted Louisiana authority holding that “it is not the success or failure of other causes of action, but rather the existence of other causes of action, that determine whether unjust enrichment can be applied.”

Unpublished decisions

  • United States v. Alvarez, 26-10031, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Southwick, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence on firearm conviction.
    • Juan Alvarez pleaded guilty to stealing a firearm from a federally licensed dealer’s business inventory in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u). On appeal, he argued for the first time that the district court erred by applying the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) sentencing enhancement for possession of firearms in connection with another felony offense. He also moved for a stay pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Beaird v. United States, No. 25-5343.
    • The court held that Alvarez’s argument was foreclosed by the guidelines commentary and binding precedent in United States v. Armstead, 114 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Vargas, 74 F.4th 673 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc).
  • Sentry Select Insurance Co. v. National Trans, Inc., 26-10649, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Graves, Ramirez) (no oral argument), insurance
    • Affirming entry of default judgment against only two defendants in insurer’s declaratory judgment action.
    • Sentry Select Insurance Company brought a federal declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it had no coverage obligations under a policy issued to a transportation company for motor vehicle accidents involving its driver. After default judgment was entered against all four defendants, the district court’s final judgment expressly bound only two of them—the transportation company and its driver—and did not name the two other individual defendants (Helms and Espinal). Sentry moved under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment to include the two individuals; the motion was denied. On appeal, Sentry argued (1) Texas declaratory judgment law required binding all properly joined parties, and (2) the district court’s omission created ambiguity that threatened the judgment’s res judicata effect.
    • The court held that because Sentry sought relief only under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201) and not the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act, and because under Erie principles the Texas statute is procedural and inapplicable in federal court, the district court committed no legal error. On the Rule 59(e) motion, the court found no manifest error of law or abuse of discretion, noting that res judicata is an affirmative defense and Sentry identified no “plain and indisputable law” requiring a court to draft a judgment in anticipation of a future res judicata inquiry.
  • Romano v. The Methodist Hospital, 26-20151, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Ho, Wilson) (no oral argument), Age Discrimination in Employment Act, employment discrimination, forfeiting argument
    • Affirming summary judgment dismissal of employment discrimination claims.
    • Angela Romano sued Houston Methodist under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging race and age discrimination. Houston Methodist moved for summary judgment on the threshold ground that it was not Romano’s employer. The central appellate issue was whether Romano had forfeited her argument that Houston Methodist was her “employer” by failing to raise or rebut the argument in her summary judgment response before the district court.
    • Reviewing de novo, the Fifth Circuit held that Romano forfeited the employer-status argument by not addressing it before the district court when summary judgment was under consideration, citing Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393 (5th Cir. 2021). Because Romano forfeited a threshold element of both her Title VII and ADEA claims, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Houston Methodist.
  • United States v. Carrillo, 26-50289, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Graves, Wilson, Ramirez) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing, appeal waiver
    • Dismissing appeal of sentence on conviction of drug charges, based on appeal-waiver.
    • Pablo Carrillo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and then appealed his sentence, arguing for the first time on appeal that the district court erred in designating him a career offender. The Government moved to dismiss based on an appeal waiver in Carrillo’s plea agreement. Carrillo countered that the plea agreement should be rescinded under the contract doctrine of mutual mistake, contending that both parties mistakenly believed he qualified as a career offender.
    • The Fifth Circuit found the appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary and applied to the circumstances at hand. Relying on United States v. Cobos, 255 F. App’x 835 (5th Cir. 2007), the court rejected the mutual-mistake argument, reasoning that Carrillo’s non-binding plea agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) reflected his understanding that the district court had sole discretion over sentencing, and therefore any misunderstanding about his career-offender eligibility did not go to an essential term of the agreement.
  • Mayen-Cardona v. Blanche, 26-60212, petition for review of BIA order
    • per curiam (Clement, Haynes, Ramirez) (no oral argument), immigration
    • Denying Honduran citizen’s petition for review of BIA order dismissing her appeal from an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). She challenged several of the IJ’s and BIA’s factual determinations. The key issues were whether the administrative record compelled a finding of nexus between her alleged harm and a protected social group (for asylum and withholding) and whether it compelled a finding that she would more likely than not be tortured with government acquiescence if returned to Honduras (for CAT).
    • Applying the highly deferential substantial-evidence standard, the court held that the record did not compel the conclusion that a nexus existed between Mayen-Cardona’s alleged harm and a protected social group, which was dispositive of both her asylum and withholding of removal claims. The court also agreed with the BIA that the record did not compel a finding of likely torture with government acquiescence sufficient for CAT relief.