November 17, 2026, opinions

Designated for publication

  • United States v. Keelen, 25-30111, appeal from E.D. La.
    • Richman, J. (Jones, Clement, Richman) (no oral argument), criminal, Second Amendment, Commerce Clause, sentencing
    • Affirming conviction of felon-in-possession, and affirming in part and vacating in part sentence.
    • Miguel Keelen, a convicted felon with prior drug and firearm offenses, pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 75 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. At the sentencing hearing, the district court orally pronounced several supervised release conditions and stated that Keelen “[s]hall comply with the standard conditions of supervised release including the following special conditions,” but did not explicitly identify the source document for those standard conditions. The written judgment was prepared using an outdated Administrative Office form (“AO 245B (Rev. 02/16)”), while the presentence report (PSR) used conditions virtually identical to a newer form (“AO 245B (Rev. 11/25)”), resulting in discrepancies between the oral pronouncements (which adopted the PSR) and the written judgment.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether Keelen’s conviction under § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment or the Commerce Clause; (2) whether the district court satisfied the oral pronouncement requirement for “standard” conditions of supervised release; and (3) whether conditions in the written judgment conflicted with those orally pronounced at sentencing.
    • On the constitutional challenges, the court declined to address Keelen’s Second Amendment and Commerce Clause arguments because he conceded they were foreclosed by circuit precedent and raised them only to preserve them for further review.
    • On the oral pronouncement issue, the court held that the district court’s reference to “the standard conditions of supervised release” was a sufficient “shorthand reference” to the conditions in the PSR, satisfying the pronouncement requirement under the en banc decision in United States v. Diggles. The court noted: “it blinks reality for a defendant and their counsel to say they did not understand, in a case like the present one, what the district court meant when it said the defendant ‘[s]hall comply with the standard conditions of supervised release.'” However, the court “admonish[ed] district courts to refer expressly to the source of ‘standard’ conditions of supervised release when adopting them at sentencing by reference,” warning that “[f]ailure to identify with clarity the document in which the ‘standard conditions’ are set forth leads to costly and time-consuming appeals.”
    • On the specific conflicts between the written judgment and oral pronouncement, the court agreed that two conditions in the written judgment (supporting dependents and avoiding places where controlled substances are sold) had no counterpart in the PSR and must be excised on remand. It further ordered that the written judgment’s residence/employment change-notification condition be modified to match the PSR’s more lenient 72-hour notice provision for unanticipated changes, and that a controlled-substance condition be narrowed to remove references to alcohol and paraphernalia that exceeded the oral pronouncement. The court found no conflict, however, with a written-judgment addition requiring the defendant to warn other residents that the premises may be subject to searches, calling it “consistent with the condition that his premises be subject to searches.”

Unpublished decisions

  • Mata v. Guerrero, 25-10526, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Elrod, Willett, Wilson) (oral argument), habeas corpus
    • Affirming denial of habeas relief.
    • Desirae Monique Mata, a Texas state prisoner serving two life sentences without parole for capital murder, sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Her convictions rested in part on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, Angie Brown, who described incriminating statements Mata allegedly made about the murders of John Allen and Jay Doyal. In 2018, five previously undisclosed letters surfaced in the trial of a codefendant, documenting Brown’s efforts to leverage her cooperation into a federal sentence reduction.
    • At issue on appeal is (1) whether the state court unreasonably rejected Mata’s Napue v. Illinois claim—that the prosecutor knowingly elicited false testimony from Brown about whether she had been promised a deal—and (2) whether the state court unreasonably rejected her Brady v. Maryland claim—that the prosecution suppressed the five impeachment letters.
    • On the Napue claim, the court found that Brown’s denial of a deal with the prosecutor’s office was truthful as to the narrow question asked, and a fairminded jurist could conclude the testimony was not false or misleading. On the Brady claim, the court assumed without deciding that the letters were favorable and suppressed, but held they were not material because the jury already had substantial reason to doubt Brown’s credibility on the same point; moreover, one of the suppressed letters actually cut against Mata’s theory by showing that the federal prosecutor had rebuffed Brown’s request for a sentence reduction. Under AEDPA’s deferential standard, the state court’s rejection of both claims was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
  • United States v. Hall, 25-20501, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Elrod, Southwick, Ramirez) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence based on career offender enhancement.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the district court committed plain error by sentencing David Michael Hall as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, based on a prior Texas robbery conviction that Hall argued was not a qualifying predicate offense.
    • Hall conceded that his arguments were foreclosed by the court’s recent decision in United States v. Williams, 184 F.4th 757 (5th Cir. 2026), which resolved the same issue against him.
  • In the Matter of Stanford (Stanford v. Vida), 26-10102, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Higginson, Douglas) (no oral argument), bankruptcy
    • Affirming judgment against debtor in a Rule 47.6 affirmance without description of the appeal issues.
  • Ellis v. City of Fort Worth, 26-10465, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Graves, Ramirez) (no oral argument), § 1983, vexatious litigant
    • Affirming dismissal of case and vexatious-litigant injunction.
    • Pro se litigant Eric Ellis sued the City of Fort Worth and two police officers. A magistrate judge recommended that Ellis be declared a vexatious litigant and required to obtain leave of court before filing additional complaints, citing his filing of ten cases in seventeen months. The district court adopted the recommendation, imposed a pre-filing injunction, and dismissed the case without prejudice. Ellis moved to vacate the injunction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), arguing due process violations.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the pre-filing injunction violated Ellis’s due process rights because he did not receive advance notice before the magistrate judge issued the recommendation; (2) whether the district court failed to apply the four-factor Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures test for vexatious-litigant injunctions; and (3) whether the injunction was impermissibly broad.
    • The court held that the magistrate judge’s recommendation itself provided Ellis sufficient notice and an opportunity to respond, satisfying due process. As to the Baum factors, the court noted that while courts must consider those factors, they need not “explicitly articulate findings on the record for each one,” and the recommendation adequately addressed Ellis’s litigation history and the burden his filings imposed. Finally, given Ellis’s “pervasive lawsuits,” the district-wide scope of the injunction was appropriate.
  • Xiaomi, Inc. v. Advanced Standard Communication, L.L.C., 26-10735, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Southwick, Duncan) (no oral argument), international discovery
    • Reversing grant of discovery to defendant in EU patent dispute.
    • Xiaomi, the defendant in patent infringement proceedings in the European Union’s Unified Patent Court (“UPC”), sought discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to obtain a 2022 Patent Purchase Agreement between ASC and ZTE Corporation. The district court granted the discovery after reviewing the magistrate judge’s recommendation as a dispositive order.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering § 1782 discovery, specifically with respect to the discretionary Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices factors governing such requests.
    • The court identified two legal errors. First, under Intel factor two (the foreign tribunal’s receptiveness), the district court wrongly demanded “authoritative proof” that the UPC would reject the discovery, rather than engaging with strong indications—consistent with the court’s recent Motorola decision—that the UPC had already disclaimed a need for the evidence at the current stage. Second, under Intel factor three (circumvention concerns), the district court refused to analyze ASC’s arguments at the necessary “level of granularity” and instead relied on the rejected theory that the UPC could “simply reject the fruit of any section 1782(a) discovery.” Upon rebalancing, the Intel factors weighed against ordering discovery at the present time, though the court noted that future developments could support a renewed application.