Designated for publication
- United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ventavia Research Group, L.L.C., 24-40564, appeal from E.D. Tex.
- Willett, J. (Elrod, Richman, Willett) (oral argument), Willett, J., concurring in his own majority opinion; Elrod, C.J., concurring; intervention, qui tam, False Claims Act
- Affirming intervention of government into False Claims Act case, dismissal with prejudice as to plaintiff and without prejudice as to government, and dismissal of retaliation claim.
- Brook Jackson was hired by Ventavia Research Group as a regional clinical-trial director for Pfizer’s Phase III COVID-19 vaccine trial. Her tenure lasted roughly two weeks, during which she developed concerns about protocol deviations and regulatory violations at Ventavia’s trial sites. Jackson reported her concerns internally and eventually to the FDA; the same day she contacted the FDA, Ventavia terminated her for not being a “good fit.” Jackson filed a qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that Pfizer’s submissions to the FDA contained fabricated or manipulated data and that the Emergency Use Authorization for Pfizer’s vaccine would not have been granted absent the alleged fraud. She also brought a separate FCA retaliation claim against Ventavia. The Government initially declined to intervene during the seal period but later moved to intervene and dismiss Jackson’s lawsuit, arguing her claims lacked merit, conflicted with federal public-health policy, and would impose heavy litigation burdens.
- At issue on appeal was (1) whether the Government properly intervened after initially declining to do so, and what “good cause” standard applies under § 3730(c)(3); (2) whether the district court properly dismissed Jackson’s FCA claims under § 3730(c)(2)(A) and Rule 41; and (3) whether Jackson stated a viable FCA retaliation claim under § 3730(h).
- Reasoning — Intervention: The court held that Rule 24(b)’s requirements for permissive intervention do not apply to FCA intervention under § 3730(c)(3) because the Government is not a typical intervenor — it owns the fraud claim. Following the Supreme Court’s guidance in Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., the court concluded that “good cause” under § 3730(c)(3) is “a uniquely flexible and capacious concept, meaning simply a legally sufficient reason.” The Government’s stated reasons — that Jackson’s claims lacked merit, would impose substantial discovery burdens, and conflicted with public-health policy — readily satisfied this standard. The court rejected Jackson’s arguments that the Government was required to show “changed circumstances” or submit affidavits, noting that no such requirements exist in the statute.
- Reasoning — Dismissal of FCA Claims: Once the Government intervened, § 3730(c)(2)(A) authorized dismissal notwithstanding Jackson’s objections, subject only to notice, an opportunity to be heard, and bedrock constitutional constraints. The court applied Polansky‘s framework holding that Rule 41 governs such dismissals, and because the Government moved before any responsive pleading was filed, the highly deferential Rule 41(a)(1) standard applied. The court noted that a district court has “no discretion to deny dismissal absent a claim that the Constitution forbids it” or “absent some extraordinary circumstance.” Jackson received ample process — the motion was briefed extensively and the district court held a three-hour hearing. The court confirmed that § 3730(c)(2)(A) “only requir[es] a hearing on the briefs” and does not mandate an evidentiary hearing. Jackson’s various constitutional objections (First Amendment, separation of powers, equal protection, due process) were found unavailing. Dismissal with prejudice as to Jackson was proper because allowing her to simply refile would undermine the Government’s dismissal authority.
- Reasoning — Retaliation Claim: Jackson failed to plausibly allege protected activity because her complaints focused on protocol deviations and regulatory noncompliance, not fraud on the Government — and the FCA “does not serve as a general vehicle for policing regulatory noncompliance.” As the court explained, “‘[m]ere criticism of’ employer practices ‘without any suggestion that [the employee] was attempting to expose illegality or fraud … does not rise to the level of protected activity.'” Jackson also failed to plead that Ventavia knew she was engaged in FCA-related protected activity, and without either element, causation necessarily failed as well.
- After his 27-page majority opinion, Judge Willett authored a 23-page concurring opinions, concurring in the judgment but writing separately to raise “serious constitutional pause” about the FCA’s qui tam mechanism under Article II. He questioned whether Congress can “deputize private citizens to prosecute the Nation’s claims in the Nation’s name — all outside the Government’s control.” He identified three Article II grounds for concern: the Appointments Clause (a relator exercises “significant authority” yet is self-appointed by filing a sealed complaint, not appointed through constitutionally prescribed channels); the Vesting Clause (the “entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone,” yet a relator operates outside the Executive Branch); and the Take Care Clause (the President cannot oversee a relator who “need not follow DOJ policies, has no agency relationship with the Government, owes no fiduciary duty to it, and need not act in the best interests of the United States”). Judge Willett examined and rejected four common defenses of qui tam — retained government powers, historical pedigree, assignment theory, and the Property Clause — concluding that none fully answers the Article II objection. He noted that the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital (2001) is binding, but argued it “should not bind us forever,” given that the Supreme Court has since “sharpened its Article II doctrine” in cases like Seila Law, Arthrex, and Trump v. Slaughter. Particularly pithy: “She’s a private litigant with money at stake, not an Executive Branch official subject to supervision.” And: “Riley binds us today. Whether it binds us tomorrow is for the en banc court.”
- Chief Judge Elrod also concurred in full and wrote briefly to “acknowledge that my wise colleague Judge Willett, in a beautifully written concurrence, has raised some serious constitutional concerns with qui tam litigation.” She stated: “These concerns are no doubt en banc worthy. In a proper case, it may be time for our en banc court to revisit Riley.”
Unpublished decisions
- Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Murco Wall Products, Inc., 25-10958, appeal from N.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Stewart, Higginson, Ho) (oral argument), insurance, amendment
- Affirming that coverage under an insurance policy was triggered, affirming denial of motion to amend complaint, but reversing conclusion that duty to indemnify was triggered merely based on allegations in complaint; and remanding for further proceedings.
- Murco Wall Products, a Texas company that sold asbestos-containing products in the 1970s and 1980s, sought coverage for asbestos personal-injury claims from its excess insurers, Canal Insurance Company and Interstate Fire & Casualty Company, after Murco’s primary insurers became insolvent or exhausted their policy limits. The district court held that coverage under both excess policies was triggered upon a claimant’s exposure to or inhalation of asbestos, rejecting an “injury-in-fact” theory. The court further held that the insurers’ duties to indemnify Murco for defense costs were triggered when a claimant’s lawsuit alleged exposure during the policy period, rather than requiring established facts. The court also denied Murco’s motion for leave to amend to add declaratory relief claims.
- At issue on appeal was (1) whether excess insurance coverage was triggered at the time of asbestos exposure/inhalation or upon resulting injury-in-fact; (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Murco’s motion for leave to amend; and (3) whether the insurers’ duty to indemnify for defense costs was triggered by facts alleged in a complaint or only by facts actually established.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed that coverage was triggered upon asbestos exposure or inhalation, finding the policy language unambiguous. It affirmed denial of Murco’s motion for leave to amend, finding no abuse of discretion. It reversed the district court’s conclusion that the duty to indemnify for defense costs was triggered by allegations in a complaint, holding instead that the plain text of the policies required established facts proving a covered occurrence before the duty to indemnify was triggered.
- United States v. Prejean, 25-20364, appeal from S.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Wilson), Wilson, J., dissenting in part, (oral argument), criminal, sufficiency of evidence
- Vacating revocation of supervised release on finding of commission of aggravated robbery and possession of a criminal instrument, and remanding.
- Jarrod Prejean appealed from the revocation of his supervised release and imposition of 24 months’ imprisonment. The district court found three violations: (1) possession or unlawful use of a criminal instrument, (2) failure to notify his probation officer of an arrest, and (3) aggravated robbery. Violation 3 was classified as a Grade A violation, placing the policy-statement range at 33–41 months, and Prejean was sentenced to the 24-month statutory maximum.
- At issue on appeal was whether the government presented sufficient evidence, by a preponderance, to prove that Prejean (a) committed an aggravated robbery in Pflugerville on May 6, 2025, and (b) possessed a criminal instrument (a spring-loaded window punch/car charger) on June 24, 2025.
- On the aggravated robbery charge, neither the victim nor the eyewitness described anyone matching Prejean’s appearance, no physical evidence connected him to the scene, and the only link was a Cash App account name associated with a phone number used by a woman who rented one of the involved vehicles. On the criminal-instrument charge, the evidence showed the “spring-loaded window punch” was in fact a widely available car charger with safety features and was not “designed, made, or adapted” for use in an offense.
- Judge Wilson dissented, agreeing that the evidence was insufficient to prove aggravated robbery but disagreeing on the criminal-instrument finding. He contended that the government charged the vehicle itself—a rental car with its front plate removed, reverse-parked in front of a bank—as the criminal instrument adapted for “jugging,” not merely the window punch. He noted that Officer Darton explicitly identified “the vehicle, and its spring-loaded window punch” as the instruments at issue, and defense counsel chose not to contest the vehicle theory. Judge Wilson wrote: “A party that elects not to contest a theory squarely presented cannot call it ‘newly raised’ on appeal.” He concluded that “[r]emoving a rental car’s front plate is a plain example of adaptation” under Texas Penal Code § 16.01(b)(1) and would have affirmed the revocation.
- United States v. Lewis, 25-40716, appeal from E.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Barksdale, Willett, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, expert witness, Confrontation Clause, sufficiency of evidence
- Affirming conviction on drug and firearm charges.
- Deablo Deshon Lewis was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(B)) and using or possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). He was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment.
- At issue on appeal was (1) sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm-in-furtherance conviction; (2) whether certain testimony violated the Confrontation Clause; (3) whether a witness improperly gave expert and legal opinion testimony; and (4) cumulative error.
- The evidence was sufficient to support the firearm conviction: officers found two loaded firearms in the same dresser as drugs and identifying documents, and a co-conspirator testified to seeing Lewis armed while dealing drugs. Even assuming some testimony violated the Confrontation Clause, the overwhelming evidence of guilt on both counts meant Lewis could not show the errors affected his substantial rights. The officer’s testimony was largely permissible lay testimony based on firsthand investigative knowledge, and any improper portions did not affect substantial rights. The cumulative-error claim also failed given the substantial, unchallenged evidence of guilt.
- United States v. Fields, 25-51075, appeal from W.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Jones, Ho, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, search and seizure, sentencing
- Affirming conviction and sentence on drug conspiracy charge.
- Willie Damone Fields was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and moved to suppress evidence found during a protective sweep of his apartment at the time of his arrest.
- At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress, specifically whether the marijuana was found in plain view during the protective sweep; and (2) whether Fields was improperly sentenced as a career offender based on a prior Texas aggravated-robbery conviction.
- The district court’s finding that the marijuana was in an open box and discovered in plain view during the protective sweep was not clearly erroneous, and the incriminating nature of the contents was immediately apparent. On the career-offender challenge, Fields conceded it was foreclosed by United States v. Williams, 184 F.4th 757 (5th Cir. 2026), and sought only to preserve the issue for further review.
- First Service Bank v. Swarek, 25-60618, appeal from S.D. Miss.
- per curiam (Higginbotham, Smith, Ho) (no oral argument), breach of contract
- Affirming summary judgment in favor of bank in action to enforce loan guaranty.
- Thomas Swarek, proceeding pro se, appealed summary judgment in favor of First Service Bank on his guaranty of a $50 million loan. FSB had sold a 95% participation interest in the loan but retained title and enforcement authority; the borrower defaulted and FSB sought to recover the full outstanding balance of $54,928,751.83 from Swarek as guarantor.
- At issue on appeal was (1) whether FSB had authority to recover the entire debt despite having sold a 95% participation interest; (2) whether the judgment amount was properly calculated; and (3) whether the district court improperly relied on evidence submitted with FSB’s summary-judgment reply.
- The participation and servicing agreements established that FSB retained title and authority to enforce the full obligation, and Swarek identified no evidence creating a genuine dispute. Swarek’s challenge to the judgment amount was forfeited because he did not raise it before the district court. There was no abuse of discretion in considering the reply evidence because Swarek neither objected nor sought leave to file a surreply in the 52 days before the court ruled.
- In re Highland Capital Management, L.P. (Dugaboy Investment Trust v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.), No. 26-10012, appeal from N.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Richman, Haynes, Graves) (no oral argument), bankruptcy, recusal
- Affirming district court’s dismissal of appeal from bankruptcy court’s denial of recusal motion.
- Highland Capital Management, a hedge fund founded by James Dondero, filed for bankruptcy in 2019. Dugaboy Investment Trust, a Dondero entity, repeatedly sought recusal of Chief Judge Jernigan, alleging bias partly based on two books she published that Dondero claimed contained parallels to him and his business. After the bankruptcy court denied Dugaboy’s fifth motion to recuse, the district court dismissed Dugaboy’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
- At issue on appeal was whether the district court had jurisdiction over the appeal from the bankruptcy court’s denial of a recusal motion—specifically, whether the interlocutory recusal ruling could be “merged” with a prior final order (Rule 9019 settlement approval) to confer appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
- A denial of a motion to recuse is nonfinal and can only be appealed when merged with a final decision. Dugaboy knew it needed to raise the recusal issue in connection with a final order but failed to do so in a timely manner, waiting until after an adverse final order to file its fifth recusal motion. The district court did not err in finding it lacked jurisdiction.
- United States v. Chaney, 26-10227, appeal from N.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Davis, Stewart, Duncan) (no oral argument), criminal
- Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
- Stanford v. England Carrier Services, L.L.C., 26-10366, appeal from N.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Haynes, Graves, Ramirez) (no oral argument), civil
- Rule 47.6 summary affirmance in favor of defendant, with no description of claims or issues on appeal.
- Hurt v. Hunt County, Texas, 26-10377, appeal from N.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Higginbotham, Smith, Ho) (no oral argument), transfer of venue, personal jurisdiction, § 1983
- Affirming denial of transfer of venue and dismissal of claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.
- John Hurt, proceeding pro se, sued Hunt County, Texas officials and several New Mexico defendants, alleging they improperly maintained or disseminated warrant and criminal-record information that resulted in his arrest and detention in Texas. The district court dismissed the claims against the New Mexico defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and declined to transfer the claims to the District of New Mexico.
- At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to transfer the claims to the District of New Mexico under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a) and 1631; (2) whether Hurt alleged a prima facie basis for specific personal jurisdiction over the New Mexico defendants; and (3) whether the court should have conducted a claim-by-claim analysis or allowed jurisdictional discovery.
- The district court reasonably determined that transfer would not serve the interest of justice, as Hurt should have known from prior litigation that his claims belonged in New Mexico and was attempting to collaterally attack criminal proceedings there. Hurt failed to allege any purposeful contacts by the New Mexico defendants with Texas, and “[f]oreseeable injury alone is not sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction, absent the direction of specific acts toward the forum.” Jurisdictional discovery and amendment were properly denied because the lack of personal jurisdiction was clear.
- Clemons-Ali v. Tulino, 26-20195, appeal from S.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Jones, Graves, Wilson) (no oral argument), Family and Medical Leave Act, service of process, Rule 60
- Affirming dismissal of FMLA claims.
- Carey Clemons-Ali, an eight-year military veteran, was denied FMLA leave and then fired by the U.S. Postal Service after requesting leave to care for her husband, who had suffered a brain injury. She filed an FMLA action in federal court and proceeded in forma pauperis. Due to a court-caused address typo, notices were initially mailed to the wrong address for three months. After the address was corrected and the service deadline was extended, Clemons-Ali still failed to serve process; her case was dismissed without prejudice, and her Rule 60(b) motion to vacate was denied.
- At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court erred in dismissing the case for failure to timely serve process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief.
- Although the U.S. Marshals are tasked with serving process for IFP plaintiffs, ultimate responsibility remains with the plaintiff, and Clemons-Ali did not allege she did anything to effectuate or check on service. She received notice five days before the extended deadline but did not contact the court or request an extension. The court noted that “no grave injustice is done” because the dismissal was without prejudice, and the two-year statute of limitations for FMLA claims likely allowed her to refile.
- Moore v. Dowies, 26-30256, appeal from W.D. La.
- per curiam (Jones, Ho, Wilson) (no oral argument), qualified immunity, municipal liability
- Affirming summary judgment dismissal of claims against jail warden and municipal liability claims.
- Cedre Moore was arrested on an outstanding warrant for aggravated battery. While being processed into jail, he repeatedly refused commands to get off his cell phone and change into a jumpsuit. Warden Williams attempted a brachial stun that struck the hood of Moore’s jacket, and Lieutenant Dill pepper-sprayed him; Moore was given a chance to wash the spray off and consult a nurse. Moore later disclaimed any injuries but sued the wardens and the sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment excessive force), Monell, and state-law claims.
- At issue on appeal was (1) whether the wardens were entitled to qualified immunity on the individual-capacity excessive-force claims; and (2) whether the Monell claim against the sheriff survived summary judgment.
- The court found no reversible error and affirmed the summary judgment for all defendants, essentially for the reasons stated in the district court’s memorandum ruling.
- United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 26-50177, appeal from W.D. Tex.
- per curiam (Haynes, Graves, Ramirez) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
- Affirming sentence on conviction of illegal reentry.
- Cristian Samael Gomez-Herrera challenged the substantive reasonableness of his 12-month, above-guidelines prison sentence for illegal reentry. He argued the district court gave insufficient weight to the guidelines range and too much weight to factors already accounted for by the Sentencing Guidelines, including his minimal criminal history, quick return to the country, and post-plea conduct.
- Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court concluded that Gomez-Herrera did not show the sentence failed to account for a significant factor, gave weight to an irrelevant factor, or represented a clear error of judgment in balancing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.