November 18-19, 2026, opinions

Designated for publication

  • United States v. Deare, 24-30241, appeal from W.D. La.
    • per curiam (Haynes, Ho, Oldham) (oral argument), Ho, J., concurring; Oldham, J., concurring (joined by Ho, J.); Haynes, J., dissenting; criminal, Second Amendment
    • Vacating conviction on conspiracy to deal firearms without a federal license, and remanding.
    • Jeremiah Deare was indicted for conspiracy to deal firearms without a federal firearms license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) and for making false statements regarding licensed firearms dealers’ records. He moved to dismiss, broadly challenging the constitutionality of the licensure and record-keeping requirements. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Deare on all counts; he was sentenced to 97 months’ imprisonment.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the commercial sale of firearms, and whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)’s federal licensing and record-keeping requirements are consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.
    • The court held that the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the sale of firearms, citing Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 127 F.4th 583 (5th Cir. 2025), for the proposition that “the right to ‘keep and bear arms’ surely implies the right to purchase them.” The government conceded at oral argument that the Second Amendment applies to commercial firearm sales. The court vacated the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings.
    • Judge Ho wrote separately to emphasize that constitutional rights apply regardless of whether they are exercised commercially. He drew a parallel to the First Amendment, arguing: “By that logic, the First Amendment doesn’t mention sellers, so presumably booksellers aren’t covered by the First Amendment, either. But that can’t be right.” He agreed with Judge Oldham that United States v. Peterson, 161 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2025), is “not only mistaken” but “involves a different statutory scheme in any event, and therefore does not govern this case.”
    • Judge Oldham wrote extensively to explain why Peterson was wrongly decided and should be overruled. He argued that restricting the sale of firearms “obviously ‘infringe[s]’ the right to keep and bear arms,” burdening both the seller’s property rights and the buyer’s right to acquire arms. He sharply criticized Peterson‘s reliance on Bruen footnote nine, noting that “[n]either the word ‘presumption’ nor any variant of it appears anywhere in this footnote.” He colorfully warned against extending Peterson to § 922(a): “We’d have moved from football to baseball to ballroom dance.” He directed the district court on remand to be guided by Elite Precision Customs LLC v. ATF, 191 F.4th 733 (5th Cir. 2026), which enjoined enforcement of certain provisions of § 922(a).
    • Judge Haynes dissented, stating: “I do not think that the sellers of guns are covered by the Second Amendment (which doesn’t mention sellers).” She distinguished the Second Amendment from the First, noting that the First Amendment “states ‘freedom of speech’ and lists people in general which is quite large whereas the Second Amendment says ‘the right of people to keep and bear Arms’ not mentioning selling Arms or all situations.” She would have affirmed, finding nothing showing “the rules for the sellers in this context are inappropriate and, therefore, unconstitutional.”
  • Texas Chemistry Council v. EPA (consolidated with American Public Health Ass’n v. EPA), 24-60193, c/w 24-60281, petition for review of EPA order
    • Engelhardt, J. (Clement, Southwick, Engelhardt) (oral argument), standing, Toxic Substances Control Act, administrative law
    • Dismissing petitions for review of EPA rule under the TSCA, for lack of standing.
    • EPA issued a final rule banning several uses of chrysotile asbestos under the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), finding that exposure can cause lung cancer, mesothelioma, and other diseases. Three groups of petitioners challenged the rule: Industry Petitioners (chemistry trade councils) argued the ban went too far; the United Steel Workers union (“USW”) argued EPA failed to impose interim worker protections; and Advocacy Petitioners (public health organizations, firefighter unions, and researchers) argued EPA did not go far enough.
    • At issue on appeal was whether any petitioner had Article III standing to challenge the EPA rule, including whether petitioners adequately briefed standing in their opening briefs and whether the “self-evident standing” exception applied.
    • Industry Petitioners devoted only a single paragraph to standing in their opening brief and failed to identify their members, explain how members were injured, or cite the legal standard. The court rejected their claim that standing was “self-evident,” noting the administrative record did not establish who their members were “at the commencement of the suit.” The court declined to consider post-argument evidentiary submissions, holding that “[r]equiring the petitioner to establish its standing at the outset of its case is the most fair and orderly process.”
    • USW addressed standing only in a single footnote in its opening brief, which the court found forfeited under well-established precedent that “arguments appearing only in footnotes are ‘insufficiently addressed in the body of the brief.'” USW also “never told us who any of its members are,” providing no “concrete evidence” sufficient for the court to determine standing.
    • Advocacy Petitioners made the most effort but still fell short. The firefighter union (IAFF Local F-253) alleged only that asbestos-containing materials “may be present” during fires, which the court found was “vague conjecture” insufficient to show “certainly impending harm.” APHA similarly offered only speculative assertions that members “may be exposed.” ADAO failed to demonstrate the “indicia of membership” required for associational standing and did not show concrete, particularized harm.
  • Cuevas Machine Co. v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 25-60198, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • Wilson, J. (Elrod, Smith, Wilson) (oral argument), construction law
    • Affirming dismissal of suit to foreclose on construction liens.
    • Cuevas Machine Company sued Calgon Carbon Corporation to foreclose on two construction liens totaling $1.23 million for fabrication and machining services at Calgon’s filtration plant. The liens did not specify “the last date the labor, services or materials were supplied to the premises” as required by Mississippi Code § 85-7-405(1)(b). Cuevas attached dated invoices, but the dates were ambiguous—it was unclear whether they reflected when services were provided, when invoices were generated, or something else entirely.
    • At issue on appeal was whether dated invoices attached to a construction lien that do not plainly indicate the last date labor, services, or materials were supplied can satisfy Mississippi’s statutory lien requirements.
    • The Fifth Circuit had previously certified this question to the Mississippi Supreme Court, which answered in the negative: “the attachments do not nonetheless satisfy the requirement that an enforceable lien ‘specify the date the claim was due’ under Section 85-7-405(1)(b).” Bound by the Mississippi Supreme Court’s “definitive and authoritative answer,” the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Cuevas’s complaint with prejudice.
  • NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Fitch, 25-60348, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • Wilson, J. (Richman, Engelhardt, Wilson) (oral argument), First Amendment, preliminary injunction
    • Vacating preliminary injunction of Mississippi statute requiring age verification and other protections for children’s internet participation, and remanding.
    • Mississippi enacted the Walker Montgomery Protecting Children Online Act, named for a 16-year-old who committed suicide after being targeted by online sextortion predators. The Act requires covered internet platforms to verify users’ ages, obtain parental consent before allowing minors to hold accounts, and implement strategies to mitigate minors’ exposure to listed harms. NetChoice, a trade association representing internet companies including Reddit, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, X, Snapchat, Pinterest, Nextdoor, and Dreamwidth, challenged the Act on First Amendment grounds. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), the Fifth Circuit vacated an earlier facial-challenge injunction. On remand, NetChoice amended its complaint to assert an as-applied challenge, and the district court issued essentially the same blanket injunction blocking the entire Act as to nine member platforms.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the district court properly granted a preliminary injunction on NetChoice’s as-applied First Amendment challenge, and whether the injunction was appropriately tailored.
    • The court held that the district court erred because it “did not perform the fact-intensive analysis necessary to substantiate why the Act is unconstitutional as applied to each member website” and “did not tailor injunctive relief to each member website.”
    • The court emphasized that an as-applied challenge requires “a developed factual record” and the plaintiff must demonstrate how the statute actually impinges on the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected conduct with specificity—”member-by-member, function-by-function, and statutory section-by-section.” Using X (formerly Twitter) as an example, the court noted that beyond its flagship feed, X maintains direct messaging, advertising, shopping, and AI features—yet “which of these functions are implicated by the Act, or how—or even whether—the Act regulates them, is unsubstantiated.” The same was true for six other platforms for which there were no declarations at all.
    • The court found that NetChoice’s evidence—four declarations consisting largely of “general contentions”—fell “well short of the particularized facts necessary” for as-applied relief. The district court’s blanket injunction blocking enforcement of “any provision of the Act” as to nine platforms was “tantamount to facial relief,” which “was not warranted on the record before the court.” On remand, the district court must conduct a platform-and-function-specific analysis, with NetChoice bearing the burden to substantiate its claims as to each member, each function, and each statutory section.

Unpublished decisions

  • SWT Global Supply, Inc. v. FDA, 21-60762, c/w Cloud House, L.L.C. v. FDA, 21-60777, c/w Paradigm Distribution v. FDA, 21-60778, c/w Vaporized, Inc. v. FDA, 21-60779, c/w SV Packaging, L.L.C. v. FDA, 21-60801, petitions for review of FDA orders
    • per curiam (Elrod, Wiener, Wilson) (oral argument withdrawn), administrative law
    • Granting petitions for review of FDA marketing denial orders.
    • At issue on the petitions were whether the FDA’s “comparative-efficacy standard” for evaluating non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarette marketing applications constituted a substantive rule that the agency was required to adopt through notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. The consolidated cases returned to the Fifth Circuit after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the earlier judgments, and remanded in light of FDA v. Wages & White Lion Investments, LLC, 604 U.S. 542 (2025).
    • Following the court’s recent decision in NicQuid, LLC v. FDA, 188 F.4th 790 (5th Cir. 2026), the panel held that the FDA’s comparative-efficacy standard is a substantive rule that required notice-and-comment rulemaking, which the agency failed to undertake. The petitions for review were granted, the MDOs were vacated, and the matters were remanded to the FDA for further proceedings.
  • Reese v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 25-11021, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Richman, Duncan) (no oral argument), res judicata, foreclosure
    • Affirming dismissal on res judicata grounds.
    • Whether the district court erred in dismissing the Reeses’ civil action as barred by res judicata, including whether the parties in the two cases were in privity, whether the lawsuits shared the same nucleus of operative fact, and whether leave to amend or a hearing should have been granted.
    • The court found the newly added defendants had substantive legal relationships with the original defendants, satisfying privity under Taylor v. Sturgell. Both actions concerned the same loan, foreclosure, and post-foreclosure relief, so the nucleus of operative fact was the same. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend or declining to hold a hearing.
  • United States v. Gonzalez, 25-40172, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • Martinez v. University of Texas at Austin, 25-50181, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Haynes, Duncan, Ramirez) (oral argument), Duncan, J., dissenting; qualified immunity, employment, § 1983, appellate jurisdiction
    • Affirming denial of qualified immunity on disparate treatment claims, reversing as to co-plaintiff’s promotion-based disparate treatment claims, reversing as to disparate treatment claim asserted under § 1983, and dismissing appeal as to Title VII claims for lack of jurisdiction.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the former president of the University of Texas at Austin (Jay Hartzell) was entitled to qualified immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims (premised on § 1981) brought by two Hispanic professors alleging race-based disparate treatment in pay, promotions, and endowments, and retaliation for their advocacy and DOL discrimination complaints. Key sub-issues included whether the professors plausibly alleged the president’s personal involvement, whether the disparate treatment and retaliation claims were adequately pled, and whether the asserted rights were clearly established.
    • The court affirmed denial of qualified immunity as to Martinez’s disparate treatment claims for pay and promotions, Zamora’s disparate treatment claims for pay and endowments, and both professors’ retaliation claims insofar as they relied on the discrete act of the president disbanding the equity review committee.
    • The court reversed as to Zamora’s promotion-based disparate treatment claim because Zamora never alleged he applied for a promotion.
    • The court also reversed to the extent the district court recognized a disparate impact claim under § 1983, because § 1981 reaches only purposeful discrimination.
    • The appeal as to the University’s Title VII claims was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
    • Judge Duncan dissented on four grounds:
      • First, he contended that under Oden v. Oktibbeha County and Felton v. Polles, Hartzell could only be sued in his official capacity under § 1981, not individually. He wrote: “That is game, set, and match for the individual claims against Hartzell.”
      • Second, even assuming individual liability were possible, the complaint showed Hartzell was “but one actor in a multilayered university bureaucracy” and plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged he was “essentially the same” as the University.
      • Third, the complaint failed to allege Hartzell’s “personal involvement” in discriminatory decisions, as “most merely allege Hartzell’s inaction (‘not responding,’ ‘not mentioning,’ ‘not announcing’).”
      • Fourth, the majority defined the clearly-established-law inquiry at too high a level of generality, noting the Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts … not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”
  • United States v. Weaver, 25-60269, appeal from N.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, Miranda
    • Affirming conviction, rejecting Miranda challenge.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the defendant implicitly waived his Miranda rights during a police interrogation, on remand from the panel’s earlier partial remand directing the district court to reconsider the waiver question.
    • The district court correctly determined that Weaver voluntarily spoke with the police and implicitly waived his Miranda rights, and the panel found no error in that determination.
  • United States v. Bell, 25-60709, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Richman, Higginson) (no oral argument), criminal, sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions
    • Affirming murder and firearms convictions.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a jury conviction for second-degree murder and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and whether the district court failed to give a “heat of passion” manslaughter instruction.
    • Bell’s arguments were skeletal, conclusory, and failed to cite the record or supporting legal authority. His premeditation argument was a “nonstarter” because premeditation is not an element of second-degree murder, and the record showed the heat-of-passion instruction was in fact given. The court issued a sanction warning to appointed counsel Tommie Lee Stingley, Jr., for filing a deficient initial brief that failed to fulfill his “role as advocate.”
  • United States v. Wislar Sanchez, 26-10098, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Higginson, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • Reyna v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 26-10238, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Southwick, Douglas) (no oral argument), vexatious litigant
    • Dismissing as frivolous appeal from dismissal for violation of prefiling injunction.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the pro se plaintiff could proceed in forma pauperis on appeal of a dismissal based on a prefiling injunction imposed by the Western District of Texas, including challenges to the propriety of that injunction and to the district court’s treatment of his supplemental filings.
    • The court noted a prior sanction warning had already been issued to Reyna and warned again that future frivolous, repetitive, or abusive filings would result in sanctions including dismissal, monetary penalties, and filing restrictions.
  • United States v. Perez, 26-10305, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Willett, Duncan, Engelhardt) (no oral argument), criminal, supervised release
    • Affirming revocation of supervised release.
    • At issue on appeal was whether 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), which mandates revocation of supervised release and imprisonment for certain violations, is unconstitutional under United States v. Haymond for denying the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
    • The argument was foreclosed by United States v. Garner, 969 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2020), which held that Haymond does not render § 3583(g) unconstitutional. The defendant conceded the issue was raised solely to preserve it for further review.
  • United States v. Vasquez Brito, 26-10363, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Haynes, Graves, Ramirez) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming conviction and sentence for illegal reentry.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the sentence imposed following a guilty plea for illegal reentry after deportation was substantively unreasonable because the district court relied on offense-type characteristics rather than an individualized assessment.
    • Reviewing for plain error, the court found that the defendant’s failure to meaningfully address the third and fourth prongs of the plain-error standard was fatal to her claim.
  • Green v. Residential Acceptance Corp., 26-30149, appeal from M.D. La.
    • per curiam (King, Higginson, Douglas) (no oral argument), foreclosure
    • Affirming dismissal of various claims arising from residential mortgage.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the pro se plaintiff stated a claim for any of seven causes of action—extortionate credit transactions, FDCPA, FCRA, TILA, fraudulent conversion, misrepresentation, and breach of contract—arising from a residential mortgage, and whether the district court erred in denying post-judgment leave to amend.
    • The court found each claim failed: the extortionate credit transaction statutes are criminal and provide no private right of action; the defendants were lenders or servicers, not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA; the FCRA claim lacked allegations of inaccurate information furnished to a credit agency; no facts showed a TILA violation given the plaintiff’s own closing disclosure; the conversion claim was unsupported; the misrepresentation claim was contradicted by the alleged facts; and no breach of contract was pleaded. The proposed second amended complaint was futile.
  • Buesing v. Layton, 26-40145, appeal from E.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Richman, Haynes) (no oral argument), Haynes, J., noting she “simply confirms in dismissal”; prisoner suit
    • Dismissing as frivolous appeal from dismissal of state prisoner’s § 1983 claim.
    • At issue on appeal was whether a prisoner stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs after breaking his arm while in custody, based on alleged delays in hospital transport and inadequate subsequent treatment.
    • There was no indication the defendants were subjectively aware of a substantial risk of further injury from the few-hour delay in emergency room admission, and continued treatment after the injury meant any disagreement amounted to at most negligence, which does not impose § 1983 liability. Both the district court dismissal and this appellate dismissal count as strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), giving Buesing two strikes.
  • United States v. Hurtado-Tejeda, 26-50027, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Davis, Stewart, Duncan) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence for illegal reentry.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the district court procedurally erred in failing to explain its reasons for an upward variance from the Guidelines, whether the above-Guidelines 48-month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively unreasonable, and whether the court plainly erred by imposing supervised release on a removable alien without an individualized finding.
    • The district court cited appropriate § 3553(a) factors and gave case-specific reasons, its reasoning was clear and allowed effective review, and the imposition of supervised release was supported by individualized findings.
  • United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 26-50204, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Barksdale, Graves, Higginson) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming 21-month sentence on illegal reentry.
    • At issue on appeal was whether an above-Guidelines 21-month sentence for illegal reentry by a previously deported alien after a felony conviction was substantively unreasonable.
    • There was no abuse of discretion; the district court considered all relevant information—including the defendant’s criminal history, quick return after removal, and “lack of respect for our laws”—and rejected his arguments for a lesser sentence. The court noted it has upheld far greater variances.
  • United States v. Estrada-Sambrano, 26-50271, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Willett, Duncan, Engelhardt) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.