October 29, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • United States v. Harris, 25-60017, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • Higginson, J. (Smith, Higginson, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, appeal waiver
    • On remand from U.S. Supreme Court, dismissing appeal of conviction and sentence on basis of appeal waiver in plea agreement.
    • Rashon Harris pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and received a 240-month sentence. As part of his plea agreement, Harris waived his right to appeal. The Fifth Circuit initially dismissed Harris’s appeal based on that waiver, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded in light of its intervening decision in Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713 (2026). Hunter held that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when enforcing it “would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.”
    • At issue on remand was (1) whether Harris’s appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary, given that he pleaded guilty on the same day as his initial appearance on the re-filed charge; and (2) whether the district court’s application of a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury during flight from law enforcement constituted a “miscarriage of justice” under Hunter.
    • On the voluntariness question, the court found the waiver knowing and voluntary. Harris signed a clear, unambiguous plea agreement, confirmed at rearraignment that he understood its terms, and his “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Although he pleaded guilty on the same day as his initial appearance on the re-filed charge, he had originally been indicted on the same charge in October 2023, and the prosecution later re-filed a single count with his consent—so the timing did not raise concerns.
    • On the § 3C1.2 enhancement, the court held that the enhancement does not require actual harm: it “simply requires that the defendant be aware that his conduct creates a risk of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk grossly deviates from the standard of care a reasonable person would exercise.” Unlike the case Harris cited (Ibarra), the district court here had a factual basis—testimony from two officers and Harris himself—showing that Harris fled by driving through a residential yard where his juvenile nephew had recently walked. Though the court acknowledged the district court’s factual findings were “thin,” applying the enhancement was not a miscarriage of justice.
    • The court emphasized the Supreme Court’s admonition in Hunter that “‘[s]entencing is a complex affair . . . [in which] it is unfortunate but inevitable that mistakes will occur. Such standard-fare errors in misapplying sentencing law cannot cancel an appeal waiver.'” Even if the district court erred, the error would not constitute “the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute”—it would not exceed the statutory maximum, constitute a blatant constitutional error, or deprive Harris of “some minimum of civilized procedure.”
  • Motorola Mobility, L.L.C. v. Advanced Standard Communication, L.L.C., 26-10747, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • Jones, J. (Jones, Southwick, Duncan) (no oral argument), patent infringement, international discovery
    • Reversing order of discovery for patent infringement claims in European and German courts.
    • Advanced Standard Communication (“ASC”) purchased a bundle of telecommunications patents from ZTE Corporation and sued Motorola for patent infringement in the EU’s Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) and German federal courts. Motorola raised a FRAND defense and sought discovery of ASC’s unredacted Patent Purchase Agreement (“PPA”) with ZTE to help establish licensing terms. The UPC denied that request, finding Motorola had “not substantiated the facts which are intended to be proven” by the PPA and calling the application “unfounded.” A few weeks later, a federal magistrate judge in Texas granted Motorola’s application for the same discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, and the district court affirmed under a deferential clear-error standard.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court applied the correct standard of review to the magistrate judge’s § 1782 order (Rule 72(a) clear error vs. Rule 72(b) de novo); (2) whether the district court correctly weighed the four discretionary Intel factors, particularly regarding burden of proof on foreign-court receptivity and circumvention of foreign proof-gathering restrictions.
    • As a threshold matter, the court clarified that a § 1782 application “is a stand-alone case with discovery as the end goal” and is therefore the “functional equivalent” of a dispositive motion. A magistrate judge may only make recommendations on such matters, and the district court must review them de novo under Rule 72(b)—not for clear error under Rule 72(a). This resolved a split among district courts in the circuit.
    • On the merits, the court found that the district court committed legal error on Intel factor two (receptivity of the foreign forum) by requiring ASC to furnish “authoritative proof” that European courts would reject the discovery. The court held that the “authoritative proof” standard from Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp. applies only to claims of foreign statutory privilege—not to the discretionary Intel receptivity factor. Section 1782 “does not require [respondents] to prove a negative, i.e., that [foreign] courts . . . would under no circumstances be receptive.” Considering the evidence holistically, the UPC had already analyzed Motorola’s need for the documents “and held that it has none—at least not yet,” and both sides’ experts agreed that German courts would likely rule the same way. Quoting the Seventh Circuit, the court observed: “If, however, the documents become important later, the most sensible recourse is a renewed application to the [foreign] court.”
    • On Intel factor three (circumvention), the court found that while Motorola was “certainly not concealing its efforts,” it was “outright hoping for an end-run around what it perceives as a blockade to the evidence it wants.” Quoting the Third Circuit, the court warned that “[a]llowing § 1782 discovery at that juncture . . . would undermine finality, encourage parties to attempt to circumvent adverse foreign rulings, and generate inefficiency.” The court emphasized that “comity remains an ‘important . . . touchstone[]’ for a district court’s exercise of discretion” and that the lower court “gave short shrift to the potential clash between United States discovery and ongoing litigation in the respective forums abroad.” Reweighing the factors “shorn of errors,” the balance leaned against discovery at this time—Motorola could seek the discovery in European courts when those proceedings reach the appropriate stage, or renew its § 1782 application upon a significant change in circumstances.

Unpublished decisions

  • United States v. Afrika Roshawn Seals, 25-60590, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Richman, Higginson) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming conviction and sentence on drug and firearms charges.
    • Seals appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment (arguing he was not brought before a magistrate within 48 hours of arrest), the application of three two-level sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1), (b)(12), and 3C1.1, and the substantive reasonableness of his 292-month within-guidelines sentence.
    • The indictment established probable cause, eliminating the need for a preliminary hearing. The sentencing enhancements were supported by record evidence—including a shotgun found with cocaine, Seals’s control over premises storing narcotics, and his instruction to another person to destroy a cellphone. Seals failed to demonstrate that his sentence reflected a clear error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors.
  • United States v. Pedro Garcia Lopez, 26-10090, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Elrod, Wilson, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming conviction and sentence for illegal reentry.
    • Lopez appealed his conviction and within-guidelines sentence for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, arguing (1) the district court erred in convicting and sentencing him under the enhanced penalty provision of § 1326(b)(2) because his prior convictions resulted in deferred adjudication probation rather than aggravated felony convictions, (2) the term of supervised release was unreasonable, and (3) the recidivism enhancement in § 1326(b) is unconstitutional.
    • The court affirmed the conviction and sentence but remanded for reformation of the judgment to reflect a conviction under § 1326(b)(1) rather than (b)(2). While Lopez was correct that his deferred-adjudication probation did not qualify as an aggravated felony conviction, he failed to show the error affected his substantial rights on plain error review. The supervised release term was within the statutory range and based on individualized factors. The constitutional challenge to the recidivism enhancement was foreclosed by existing precedent.
  • Donaldson v. Hiland Dairy, et al., 26-10240, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Duncan, Ramirez) (no oral argument), employment discrimination, Title VII, magistrate recommendation
    • Dismissing for lack of jurisdiction appeal from magistrate’s report and recommendation to dismiss employment discrimination claims.
    • Pro se plaintiff Donaldson appealed from a magistrate judge’s order denying relief from the automatic stay and the magistrate judge’s report recommending dismissal of his Title VII employment discrimination complaint, seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The central jurisdictional question was whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear an appeal directly from a magistrate judge’s orders.
    • The court denied IFP, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and denied Donaldson’s motion for equitable tolling. Because Donaldson had not consented to proceed before the magistrate judge, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction, and a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is not a final decision of the district court appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
  • Warner v. City of Corpus Christi Police Department, 26-40198, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Davis, Stewart, Duncan) (no oral argument), civil, magistrate recommendation
    • Affirming dismissal of complaint.
    • Pro se plaintiff Warner appealed the dismissal of her amended complaint for failure to state a claim and argued the district court incorrectly overruled her objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation as untimely.
    • The court found that although the district court incorrectly deemed Warner’s objections untimely, the error was harmless because the court had also conducted a de novo review and independently found the objections meritless. Reviewing the dismissal de novo under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court affirmed, finding the amended complaint failed to state a claim.
  • United States v. Mario Alejandro Rivas Martinez, 26-50141, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Willett, Duncan, Engelhardt) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence on conviction of illegal reentry.
    • Rivas Martinez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry and was sentenced to 36 months in prison—above the advisory guidelines range of 18 to 24 months—and argued his above-guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable.
    • The district court sentenced above the guidelines based on Rivas Martinez’s criminal history, which it found was insufficiently reflected in the guidelines calculation. The court noted that a sentencing court is free to conclude that the guidelines range gives too little weight to certain factors, and there was no abuse of discretion.
  • Smith v. Terry (In the Matter of Douglas K. Smith), 26-50245, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Ho, Wilson) (no oral argument), bankruptcy
    • Affirming bankruptcy court judgment against debtor.
    • Debtor and appellant Douglas Smith brought yet another appeal from the bankruptcy proceedings below. By July 2025, Smith had filed 36 appeals; the Fifth Circuit had rejected all six that reached it, repeatedly finding his filings “procedurally improper and frivolous.”
    • The court found the present appeal, like its predecessors, procedurally improper and frivolous. The court issued a warning that any future frivolous, repetitive, or abusive filings challenging the bankruptcy court’s decisions would subject Smith to sanctions, including dismissal, monetary penalties, and filing restrictions.
  • United States v. Gilberto Mendoza-Yerbafria, 26-50279, c/w 26-50283, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Ho, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming convition and sentence for illegal reentry.
    • Mendoza-Yerbafria appealed his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry and his revocation of supervised release, arguing that the enhancement in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is unconstitutional. He acknowledged that his argument was foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
    • The Government’s motion for summary affirmance was granted and the judgment affirmed. The court confirmed the constitutional challenge was foreclosed by binding precedent, including United States v. Pervis and the Supreme Court’s recognition in Erlinger v. United States that Almendarez-Torres “persists as a narrow exception permitting judges to find only the fact of a prior conviction.”
  • Weathersby v. Boilermakers Union and Huntington Ingalls, 26-60230, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Jones, Ho, Wilson) (no oral argument), labor law
    • Affirming dismissal of hybrid claim against plaintiff’s employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and against his union for breach of the duty of fair representation. Plaintiff also challenged the denial of his motion to stay pending NLRB proceedings and the denial of leave to amend his complaint.
    • The court found that Weathersby abandoned his appeal by challenging only the time-bar ruling and not the alternative basis for dismissal—failure to state a claim. He failed to show abuse of discretion in the denial of the stay, leave to amend, or the decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the sole federal claim was dismissed.