Take the Fifth

Designated for publication

• Collins v. Yellen, 17-20364, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (joined by Owen, Jones, Smith, Elrod, Southwick, Higginson, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson, JJ.); Haynes, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, Dennis, Graves, Costa, JJ.); separation of powers
  • After partial vacatur and remand by U.S. Supreme Court of en banc decision at 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2020), the Court remanded to the district court for determination of whether and what compensable harms could have been caused by an unconstitutional restriction on a President’s power to remove the director of the FHFA.
  • Judge Haynes dissented, noting that nothing in the U.S. Supreme Court’s remand order precluded the Court from deciding the harm issue, and that, “[i]ndeed, we could easily do so in light of our previous conclusion that ‘the President, acting through the Secretary of the Treasury, could have stopped [the Net Worth Sweep] but did not.'”

• Duarte v. Mayorkas, 18-20784, c/w Isaula v. Mayorkas, 19-20046, c/w Jezek v. Mayorkas, 19-20168, c/w Cruz v. Mayorkas, 19-20213, appeals from S.D. Tex.
  • Dennis, J. (Dennis, Graves, Willett), Willett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; immigration
  • Reversing the district courts’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of three of the consolidated appellants’ challenges to USCIS’s decisions administratively closing their applications to adjust their immigration status to Lawful Permanent Residence upon their return from travel abroad on advance parole while under Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”), which administrative closures were on the basis that they were not “arriving aliens” entitled to application for an adjustment of immigration status. The district courts in those three instances had held that they lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ challenges were indirectly attacking their respective deportation orders, and the Court reversed. BUT affirming the district court’s dismissal on the merits, holding that the USCIS was correct that the plaintiffs were not “arriving aliens” within the meaning of the relevant regulation.
  • “[W]e determine that USCIS erred by characterizing the Appellants’ travel and reentry as advance parole because Congress has statutorily provided that TPS beneficiaries returning from authorized travel abroad must be admitted into the country in the same immigration status they held prior to departure. Because the Appellants were not parolees waiting for their applications to be processed prior to departing the country, their statuses could not be converted to those of paroled aliens upon their return. Rather, the Appellants were fully admitted into the country upon their return and thus were not arriving aliens when they submitted their applications for adjustment of status. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Government.”
  • Judge Willett concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs’ claims should have been dismissed, though he opined that the district courts lacked jurisdiction over any of the claims because they were collateral challenges to deportation orders, and that, if the district courts had jurisdiction, a plain-language reading of the statute would prevent TPS recipients returning from travel abroad to qualify for Lawful Permanent Resident status. He was concerned that the majority’s analysis unnecessarily called into question the Attorney General’s authority to permit TPS recipients to travel abroad in the future.

• U.S. v. Crittenden, 18-50635, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (en banc court); criminal, new trial
  • Ordering en banc rehearing of decision affirming district court’s grant of new trial to defendant on the basis that, though the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, a cautious reweighing of the evidence preponderated heavily against defendant’s guilt.

• U.S. v. Dubin, 19-50912, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (joined by Owen, Smith, Barksdale, Stewart, Dennis, Southwick, Graves, Higginson, Ho, JJ.); Owen, C.J., concurring, joined by Smith, Barksdale, Higginson, Ho, JJ.; Oldham, J., concurring, joined by Smith, Barksdale, Higginson, Ho, JJ.; Elrod, J., dissenting, joined by Jones, Costa, Willett, Duncan, Engelhardt, Wilson, JJ.; Haynes, J., dissenting; Costa, J., dissenting, joined by Jones, Elrod, Willett, Duncan, Engelhardt, Wilson, JJ.; criminal, sufficiency of evidence
  • Affirming district court’s judgment of conviction of Medicaid fraud, affirming that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for the reasons set forth in the panel majority’s opinion at 982 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2020).
  • Chief Judge Owen concurred to emphasize that the dissenters’ discussion of the meaning of the phrase “identity theft” was irrelevant because neither “identity theft” nor “theft” are in the text of the statute. “Dubin’s conviction must be affirmed based on the text of § 1028A(a)(1). Nor is § 1028A(a)(1)’s scope ‘breathtaking’ when applied to health care fraud like that committed by Dubin. Neither Medicaid beneficiaries nor taxpayers who are the actual victims of Medicaid fraud would find it shocking or unreasonable to impose an additional sentence of two years of imprisonment when health care providers use unique Medicaid identifying numbers and Medicaid patients’ names to submit fraudulent claims that result in billions of dollars of losses to the health care system each year.”
  • Judge Oldham separately concurred. He would hold that the issue of whether sufficient evidence supported the “use” element of the sentencing enhancement was not properly preserved by the defendant, such that only plain-error review would apply.
  • Judge Elrod dissented, arguing that the majority assigned a “breathtaking” scope to the statute, rather than a reasonable, narrower scope.
  • Judge Haynes dissented to join in two parts of Judge Elrod’s dissent.
  • Judge Costa, in what Judge Elrod termed a “superb dissent,” wrote that “the majority allows every single act of provider-payment health care fraud involving a real patient to also count as aggravated identity theft.”

• Thomas v. Hughes, 20-50671, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • Wilson, J. (Clement, Haynes, Wilson), trade secrets, fraudulent transfer, breach of fiduciary duty, attorneys fees
  • Modifying judgment to prevent possibility of double-recovery, but otherwise affirming judgment on jury verdict finding that Lou Ann Hughes fraudulently transferred assets, that she and Performance Probiotics, LLC misappropriated trade secrets from James Pearcy regarding probiotic formulations for livestock supplements, that Hughes was personally liable for the actions of Performance Probiotics through corporate veil-piercing, and that Hughes breached her fiduciary duty as an attorney, awarding $1.4 million in compensatory damages, $1.2 million in exemplary damages, injunction from continuing to misappropriate trade secrets, disgorgement of compensation, and attorneys’ fees.
  • The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting as hearsay Hughes’ testimony about what foreign authorities had communicated to her, which she claimed showed her motive for switching the sales from the entity she had purchased from Pearcy and for which she owed him royalties, PPI, to a new entity that she created, Performance Probiotics, because she was allowed to testify generally to these motives. The Court also held the district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Hughes from testifying about issues that were already litigated in prior state court litigation.
  • The Court held that the district court did not err in denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law, because sufficient evidence supported the verdict that she misappropriated Pearcy’s trade secrets, and supporting the measure of compensatory damages.
  • The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of breach of fiduciary duty and the fee forfeiture award. “[T]here was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have concluded that Hughes engaged in a self-dealing transaction with PPI, meaning that the presumption of unfairness attached. Although Hughes disputes this evidence, she relies almost entirely on her own testimony, which the jury was entitled to discredit.” (Internal citation omitted).
  • The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of actual-fraud-based fraudulent transfer. “[T]here was evidence that Performance Probiotics used PPI’s intangible assets as PPI ceased operations. A jury could logically conclude from this that the requisite ‘parting’ of assets occurred. We conclude, as we did above with respect to Thomas’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Hughes caused PPI to transfer its intangible assets to Performance Probiotics.” The Court enumerated “at least five of the ‘badges of fraud’ present. … Under our precedent, the presence of (at least) these five badges of fraud is a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that Hughes transferred PPI’s assets with fraudulent intent.”
  • The Court held that evidence was sufficient to support a verdict piercing Performance Probiotics’ corporate veil, because of (1) the evidence that Hughes fraudulently transferred PPI’s assets, and (2) evidence supporting that the transfer was for Hughes’s direct personal benefit.
  • The Court found that the district court’s judgment, read literally, could leave open the possibility of double-recovery. “The jury awarded Pearcy ‘[t]he current amount due under the Comal County judgment’ as compensatory damages for misappropriation. The district court then confirmed that award in its judgment. However, the court went on to state later in the judgment that: ‘Lou Ann Hughes and Performance Probiotics, LLC are jointly and severally liable for: a) all relief granted herein against Lou Ann Hughes and Performance Probiotics, LLC; and b) all amounts due and payable under the [Comal County] judgment ….’ (Emphasis added.). We agree with Hughes that, read literally, the district court’s summation of the defendants’ liability for the relief awarded using the conjunctive ‘and’ between ‘a) all relief granted herein …,’ and ‘b) … the [Comal County] judgment’ raises the possibility of double recovery. Therefore, we modify the district court’s judgment to clarify that if Hughes satisfies ‘[t]he current amount due under the Comal County judgment’—i.e., $1,442,580.06 plus post-judgment interest—no further compensatory damages for misappropriation of trade secrets are owed.”
  • Finally, the Court held there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination of the amount of attorneys’ fees, including that court’s determination that segregation of fees between recoverable and unrecoverable fees was not possible.

• Thomas v. Hughes, 20-50827, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • Wilson, J. (Higginbotham, Stewart, Wilson), fraudulent transfer
  • In a companion appeal to 20-50671, affirming the district court’s post-judgment order charging Hughes’s membership interest in a single-member LLC she had created and requiring Hughes and the LLC to obtain leave of court before transferring assets to third parties.

• Buehler v. Dear, 20-50822, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • Willett, J. (Clement, Southwick, Willett), First Amendment, qualified immunity, excessive force
  • Affirming district court’s summary judgment dismissal of First Amendment claims on qualified immunity grounds, and of false-arrest claims and bystander- and municipal-liability claims; and reversing denial of summary judgment on excessive force claims, arising from Austin police officers’ arrest of police-accountability activist who was filming their interactions with citizens.
  • The plaintiff had been filming the police officers from less-than-arm’s-length distance, ignoring repeated directives to conduct his filming from a greater distance so as to not interfere with the officers’ attempts to monitor the crowds or to engage with other people. After several warnings, he was arrested, with four officer bringing him to the ground while restraining him.
  • The Court held that there the record showed no genuine dispute of material facts on the excessive force claim. While the Court found “that Buehler’s injuries, while minor, are not so minor that his excessive-force claim necessarily fails as a matter of law,” it held “that Buehler’s injuries are properly characterized as ‘minor’ for purposes of excessive-force analysis.” Accordingly, the Court held that this supported that the amount of force used was not unreasonable. Weighing in the other direction, the Court held that the offense of interfering with public duties was only a minor offense for purposes of the reasonableness inquiry. The Court then held that the plaintiff’s movements to back away from the officers during the arrest qualified as resisting arrest, “albeit mildly.” The Court then held that the plaintiff’s “relentless[]” following of the officers “for hours” and disobedience of their directives allowed for a measured and escalating resort to force. The Court then held that, as a matter of law, the use of force by each of the arresting officers was reasonable, entitling them to qualified immunity. “Ultimately, we conclude that the Officers stayed not only within the bounds of ‘clearly established law,’ but also within those of the Fourth Amendment. Looking beyond our circuit, there is a wealth of appellate cases where comparable force by arresting officers under similar circumstances was held not violative of the Fourth Amendment. In case after case, courts upheld officers’ use of takedowns to gain control of suspects who had disregarded lawful police orders or mildly resisted arrest, even when arrestees were suspected of minor offenses and the force employed appeared greater than necessary in retrospect—at least when officers’ tactics caused arrestees only minimal injuries.”
  • Because this underlying constitutional claim is unsuccessful, the Court upheld the dismissal of the bystander- and municipal-liability claims.
  • The Court then held that the dismissal of the plaintiff’s false-arrest claims was in line with the Circuit’s reliance on the independent-intermediary doctrine, but that, even without that doctrine, there was probable cause to support the plaintiff’s arrest for interference with public duties. “[E]ven were we to discard the independent-intermediary doctrine, or to accept Buehler’s argument that the arrest warrant was tainted by false statements in Garibay’s affidavit, the result would simply be that we would decide ourselves whether Buehler’s arrest for interference with official duties was supported by probable cause. It obviously was. We have held, based on caselaw from Texas courts interpreting the relevant provision, that conduct extremely similar to that in which Buehler was engaged—that is, refusing to obey police officers’ repeated and unambiguous warnings to step back so as not to interfere with officers’ official duties—establishes probable cause to arrest for a violation of Texas Penal Code § 38.15(a)(1).”
  • The Court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims on qualified immunity grounds because, while the right to publicly film police, subject to reasonable exceptions, is protected by the First Amendment, that right was not clearly established at the time of the arrest in 2015.

• Gregorio-Osorio v. Garland, 20-60478, petition for review of BIA order
  • per curiam (Davis, Jones, Elrod), immigration
  • Granting in part Guatemalan citizen’s petition for review of BIA order, granting review of the stop-time issue under Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021); but denying his petition for review of all other issues.

• Martinez-Guevara v. Garland, 20-060624, petition for review of BIA order
  • Smith, J. (Smith, Elrod, Oldham), immigration
  • Denying Salvadoran citizen’s petition for review of BIA order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings, to grant asylum and related relief on the basis that conditions in her home country had significantly worsened since her entry into the country in 2006.
  • The Court held that it did have jurisdiction over the petitioner’s arguments that the BIA abused its discretion by neglecting evidence and misapplying the law, despite the petitioner not moving the BIA to reconsider its ruling. “In short, to classify a claim, we ask whether the Board had a chance to consider it. The Board need not actually decide or consider the issue; what matters is whether the petitioner presented it.”
  • The Court then held that the BIA did not abuse its “vast discretion” in denying the motion to reopen. “The Board need not acknowledge every piece of evidence that a petitioner presents. It need only show that it considered the petitioner’s claim, supported its view with some evidence, and did not ignore facts that would render its decision entirely unreasonable. The BIA easily satisfies that low bar.”

• Morales v. Garland, 20-60919, petition for review of BIA order
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), immigration
  • Denying Guatemalan citizen’s petition for review of BIA order upholding IJ’s finding that petitioner was not entitled to cancellation of removal.
  • Petitioner overstayed an H-2B visa in 2000. In the intervening time he had a son, now a teenager, to whom he provides financial support each month. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence on the record to support the IJ’s finding that the hardship to family members by the petitioner’s removal was no greater than any “regularly faced by families having a member removed.”

Unpublished

• Valdez-De Martinez v. Garland, 18-60738, petition for review of BIA order
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), immigration
  • Denying Salvadoran citizen’s petition for review of BIA order dismissing her appeal from the denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal.

• U.S. v. Gutierrez-Ramos, 19-11343, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Jolly, Willett, Engelhardt), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Centeno-Santiago v. Garland, 19-60898, petition for review of BIA order
  • per curiam (King, Costa, Ho), immigration
  • Vacating BIA’s denial of petitioner’ motion to reopen her removal proceedings in light of Rodriguez v. Garland, 15 F.4th 351 (5th Cir. 2021).

• U.S. v. Barajas, 20-10573, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Hill, 20-10771, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal, First Step Act
  • Affirming denial of motion for sentence reduction under the First Step Act.

• U.S. v. Barrett, 20-11206, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal, First Step Act
  • Affirming denial of motion for sentence reduction under the First Step Act.

• Bonner v. Pace, 20-40424, appeal from E.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Engelhardt), prisoner suit
  • Dismissing appeal from dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 claim in part for lack of jurisdiction and in part as frivolous.

• Peters v. Texas, 20-40583, appeal from E.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Engelhardt), prisoner suit
  • Dismissing as frivolous appeal from dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 claims.

• Hooghe v. Shaw, 20-60350, appeal from S.D. Miss.
  • per curiam (Davis, Jones, Elrod), prisoner suit
  • Affirming dismissal of prisoner’s suit.

• Tegwi v. Garland, 20-60709, petition for review of BIA order
  • per curiam (Barksdale, Costa, Oldham), immigration
  • Dismissing in part and denying in part Cameroonian citizen’s petition for review of BIA order dismissing her appeal from the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.

• Djoumaha v. Garland, 20-61228, petition for review of BIA order
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), immigration
  • Dismissing in part and denying in part Cameroonian citizen’s petition for review of BIA order dismissing her appeal from the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.

• U.S. v. Williams, 21-10015, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Wiener, Dennis, Haynes), criminal, supervised release
  • Affirming imposition of conditions of supervised release upon conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

• U.S. v. Reyes, 21-10056, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Hunt, 21-10505, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Jolly, Willett, Engelhardt), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Quezada, 21-10569, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Engelhardt), habeas corpus
  • Dismissing for lack of jurisdiction appeal from denial of § 2255 petition.

• U.S. v. Garcia, 21-10572, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Smith, Stewart, Graves), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Garcia v. Filley, 21-10614, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Smith, Higginson, Willett), prisoner suit
  • Dismissing as frivolous appeal from dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 action.

• U.S. v. Ghoston, 21-10621, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Murphy, 21-10685, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Lozano-Villa, 21-10689, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. James, 21-10697, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Medina-Fuerte, 21-10767, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Kates, 21-10828, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham Wilson), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming 11-month sentence on revocation of supervised release.

• U.S. v. Nieblas, 21-10834, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Davis, Jones, Elrod), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Burns, 21-10869, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Smith, Stewart, Graves), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Flores, 21-10891, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Graves, Costa), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Villegas, 21-10894, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Galarza, 21-10971, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (King, Costa, Ho), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Penn v. Army & Air Force Exchange Service, 21-11116, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Clement, Ho, Oldham), § 1983
  • Affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim.

• Hu v. NewRez, L.L.C., 21-20112, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Clement, Ho, Oldham), foreclosure
  • Affirming judgment arising from foreclosure dispute.

• Bissonnet v. Westmont International Development, Inc., 21-20434, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Wiener, Graves, Ho), motion to quash
  • Affirming granting of motion to quash.

• Shaw v. American Bankers Insurance Co. of Florida, 21-20455, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Clement, Ho, Oldham), insurance
  • Affirming judgment in favor of insurer on homeowner’s claim after Hurricane Harvey flood damage.

• U.S., ex rel. Jacobs v. Walgreen Co., 21-20463, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Clement, Ho, Oldham), qui tam
  • Affirming dismissal of False Claims Act claim by pharmacist against pharmacy company.

• U.S. v. Sub-Botzoc, 21-20485, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Davis, Jones, Elrod), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Johnson v. Holliday, 21-30108, appeal from M.D. La.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), sufficiency of evidence
  • Affirming judgment on jury verdict in favor of inmate in suite against corrections officer for sexual assault.

• Wightman v. Ameritas Life Insurance Corp., 21-30148, appeal from E.D. La.
  • per curiam (Wiener, Graves, Ho), insurance
  • Certifying to Louisiana Supreme Court question: “Are claims arising under the Louisiana’s Preferred Provider Organization Act, La. R.S. 40:2203.1, delictual or contractual for prescriptive purposes?”

• U.S. v. Richard, 21-30213, appeal from W.D. La.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal, search and seizure
  • Affirming conviction of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, upholding district court’s denial of motion to suppress.

• Millican v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 21-40151, appeal from E.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), prisoner suit
  • Affirming dismissal of prisoner’s suit arising from alleged defects in medical care.

• U.S. v. Shkambi, 21-40386, appeal from E.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal, compassionate release
  • Affirming denial of motion for compassionate release.

• U.S. v. Bowman, 21-40467, appeal from E.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (King, Costa, Ho), criminal, sentencing, Armed Career Criminal Act
  • Affirming 210-month sentence on conviction of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction.

• U.S. v. Villarreal, 21-40555, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming 20-month sentence on conviction of one count of conspiracy to transport an illegal alien within the United States and three counts of transporting illegal aliens within the United States for private financial gain.

• U.S. v. Dominguez-Noyola, 21-40632, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Gloria V. v. Wimberly Independent School District, 21-50349, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (King, Graves, Ho), Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
  • Affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ IDEA claims.

• U.S. v. Roland, 21-50764, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Jolly, Willett, Engelhardt), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Sanchez-Quintero, 21-50835, c/w 21-50847, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Davis, Jones, Elrod), criminal, sentencing
  • Granting summary affirmance of conviction and sentence for illegal reentry and revocation of supervised release.

• U.S. v. Morris, 21-50885, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Smith, Higginson, Willett), criminal
  • Dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to specify judgment appealing from in notice of appeal.

• U.S. v. Campbell, 21-60234, appeal from S.D. Miss.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• U.S. v. Varnado, 21-60682, appeal from S.D. Miss.
  • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Wilson), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming sentence of 11 months imprisonment and 25 months supervised release for revocation of supervised release.

• National Labor Relations Board v. Southwest Displays and Events, 21-60032, application for summary entry of NLRB Judgment
  • per curiam (Smith, Higginson, Willett), National Labor Relations Act
  • Granting NLRB’s application for summary entry of its judgment against company arising from its withdrawal of recognition of union.