Take the Fifth

Designated for publication

• United States v. Padilla, 25-30500, appeal from W.D. La.
  • per curiam (King, Smith, Ramirez) (oral argument), criminal, restitution
  • Affirming restitution award on misdemeanor depravation of rights conviction.
  • Luis Enrique Padilla, the former chief of the Sunset Police Department in Sunset, Louisiana, used excessive force against a handcuffed individual, R.A., during a hit-and-run investigation in December 2023. Padilla “warned ‘let me show you how bad I am’ and proceeded to forcefully twist [R.A.’s] left thumb and wrist,” spraining it. Padilla pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law) and was sentenced to five years of probation. The district court ordered $3,500 in restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) for the victim’s future therapy after a psychologist testified R.A. suffered PTSD from the incident.
  • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the MVRA applies to a misdemeanor § 242 conviction, given Fifth Circuit precedent holding that a misdemeanor § 242 offense is not a “crime of violence”; and (2) whether the restitution award for future psychological care was legally and factually supportable.
  • Because Padilla did not preserve his argument that the MVRA does not apply to a misdemeanor § 242 conviction, the court reviewed for plain error. Even assuming the first three prongs of plain error were met, the court declined to exercise its discretion under the fourth prong, stating: “If a defendant need only show statutory non-compliance to obtain plain-error relief, correction would be automatic in every case involving statutory error. Our precedent makes clear that plain-error correction ‘is not automatic'”. The court distinguished United States v. Hankton, where the government had conceded error and three co-defendants faced a $1.6 million joint restitution order.
  • Padilla conceded the district court could have imposed discretionary restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) even if the MVRA did not apply. Given that the district court found the psychologist’s testimony credible, ordered restitution for therapy in an amount quantified by that testimony, and identified Padilla’s abuse of his position as undermining “public confidence in law enforcement,” Padilla failed to show the fourth prong of plain error was satisfied.
  • On the merits, the court held the MVRA permits restitution for “future psychological care” under United States v. Serrata and that the district court’s credibility findings supporting the victim’s need for treatment were not clearly erroneous.

• Adams v. Guerrero, 25-40117, appeal from E.D. Tex.
  • Oldham, J. (Duncan, Oldham, Wilson) (oral argument), habeas corpus
  • Affirming denial of habeas relief.
  • Michael Kevin Adams was convicted of capital murder under Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2) for killing his former fiancée, N.L., in September 2013, in retaliation for her cooperation with a pending sexual assault prosecution against him. Six months before the murder, Adams had drugged, sexually assaulted, handcuffed, and hogtied N.L.. He subsequently made repeated death threats (“You better not testify or I’ll kill you, bitch”) and stalked her. No direct evidence of guilt—such as a confession or video—existed, but circumstantial evidence included Adams’s touch DNA on a condom found in fresh trash at the crime scene, GPS searches for coordinates near N.L.’s home on Adams’s work computer, erratic phone use, photos of .22-caliber firearms with suppressors matching the murder weapon type, and no confirmed alibi. Adams was sentenced to mandatory life without parole.
  • At issue on appeal was whether the Texas state appellate court unreasonably applied Jackson v. Virginia‘s sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard within the framework of AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
  • The court explained that habeas petitioners challenging factual sufficiency face “twin hurdles”: AEDPA’s relitigation bar and Jackson‘s deferential standard. Together, these mean “a petitioner must show that every rational jurist would agree that every rational juror would not have found him guilty.”
  • The state appellate court identified fifteen pieces of circumstantial evidence pointing to Adams’s guilt, including DNA at the scene, repeated death threats, ongoing stalking, photographs of .22-caliber firearms with suppressors, and lack of alibi. Because the Supreme Court has “never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction,” the state court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable.
  • The court rejected Adams’s legal argument that AEDPA should never apply to Jackson claims, noting that nothing in AEDPA’s text excepts sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims and that Adams could “point[] to no Supreme Court decision that has ever granted habeas relief on a factual-sufficiency claim under AEDPA”.

• United States v. Tampico, 24-20462, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • Engelhardt, J. (Clement, Southwick, Engelhardt) (oral argument withdrawn), criminal, supervised release, interest
  • Affirming modification of supervised release conditions, and imposition of accrued interest on fine.
  • In 1999, Tampico was convicted of possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography and sentenced to the statutory maximum of 360 months’ imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. After his release in March 2024, a probation officer requested additional conditions due to concerns about Tampico’s failure to internalize sex offender treatment. The district court modified his supervised release conditions to include GPS monitoring and home detention for six months, and beyond that period until Tampico successfully completed the sex offender treatment program. The court also found $1,992.86 in accrued interest on the $5,000 fine was due and ordered monthly payments of $200.
  • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court’s imposition of home detention as a modified condition of supervised release constituted an illegal sentence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(19) and 3583(e)(4)—which authorize home detention “only as an alternative to incarceration”—given that Tampico had already served the statutory maximum prison term; and (2) whether accrued interest on the fine was still owed despite the BOP’s representation to Tampico that his fine balance was zero.
  • The court distinguished the cases Tampico relied on—United States v. Ferguson and United States v. Hall—which involved home detention stacked on top of revocation imprisonment that, combined, exceeded the statutory maximum. Unlike those defendants, Tampico’s supervised release was not revoked and no new term of imprisonment was imposed; instead, the home detention was added by modification under § 3583(e)(2) to address “contemporary concerns” about his progress in treatment. The court noted that the home detention was essentially “an adequate substitute for revocation imprisonment,” not an addition to it.
  • The court found Tampico’s reading unpersuasive, reasoning that “if Congress intended to restrict district courts’ authority in the manner, and to the extent, suggested by Tampico, it would have done so in much clearer terms.” The court pointed to other provisions where Congress explicitly limited judicial authority (e.g., supervised release extensions limited to cases where “less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed”) as evidence that the absence of such language here was deliberate.
  • On the interest issue, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f) mandates interest on criminal fines unless the court finds the defendant unable to pay—which never occurred here. Although the BOP erroneously told Tampico his balance was zero, the district court rejected the estoppel argument, reasoning that the statute of limitations does not run against the Government.

Unpublished decisions

• Basil Brown v. Gateway Mortgage Group, L.L.C.; Michael J. Schroeder, 25-10694, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Smith, Southwick, Oldham) (no oral argument), foreclosure
  • Affirming dismissal of suit challenging foreclosure.
  • The Browns had filed a civil suit challenging aspects of a foreclosure; the district court dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Browns appealed, also seeking an order directing entry of default against Schroeder (construed by the court as a mandamus petition).
  • At issue on appeal was whether Schroeder was properly served (and thus in default), whether the district court properly vacated a clerk’s entry of default against Gateway, whether the fraud and COVID-forbearance claims were properly dismissed, whether a contract-breach theory raised for the first time in a reply brief could be considered, and whether dismissal with prejudice was appropriate.
  • The court held that Schroeder was never properly served because the Browns’ amended complaint was filed without required consent or leave of court and was therefore legally ineffective; that Gateway was not in default because it had appeared and opposed a temporary restraining order motion, satisfying the requirement to “otherwise defend”; that the fraud claim failed the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) and that the COVID-19 moratorium had already expired by the relevant time; that the belatedly raised contract-breach argument was forfeited; and that dismissal with prejudice was proper because the Browns had already pleaded their best case.

• Plaquemines Parish v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 24-30747, appeal from E.D. La.
  • per curiam (Elrod, Richman, Ramirez) (oral argument withdrawn), federal officer jurisdiction, environmental law
  • Remanding to district court to consider issue of federal officer jurisdiction in light of U.S. Supreme Court decision in related case.
  • The central issue was how the case should proceed in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, 608 U.S. —, 146 S. Ct. 1052 (2026).
  • The Fifth Circuit’s holding was narrow: it remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion, citing its own related decision in Plaquemines Parish v. BP American Production Co., 176 F.4th 850 (5th Cir. 2026).

• Texas v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; Philip Morris, Incorporated, 25-40233, appeal from E.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Oldham) (oral argument), breach of contract, settlement agreement
  • Reversing district court’s judgment for state in action to enforce settlement agreement, and remanding.
  • This appeal, arising from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (No. 5:96-CV-91), stems from Texas’s 1998 tobacco settlement agreement, under which participating tobacco companies make annual payments tied to smoking-related healthcare costs. The dispute, triggered by a 2018 reduction in the maximum federal corporate income tax rate, centers on how to calculate “Base Net Operating Profit” under subparagraphs (B)(ii) and (C) of Appendix A to the 2001 Stipulation of Amendment to the settlement agreement — specifically, whether that figure is fixed at roughly $3.115 billion (adjusted only for inflation) or must be recalculated each year using the then-current maximum corporate tax rate. The district court had sided with Texas, ruling the agreement unambiguous and fixing the base figure, then allocated additional underpayment liability among the tobacco companies.
  • Applying Texas contract-law principles (de novo review of an unambiguous contract, giving effect to defined terms, and reading provisions as a whole), the Fifth Circuit concluded that the agreement’s definition of “Applicable Year” — tied to the calendar year in which each payment comes due — requires that both “Base” and “Actual” Net Operating Profit be recalculated annually using the current year’s maximum corporate tax rate, not a rate frozen in 1997 or 2001. The court rejected Texas’s arguments that the $3.115 billion figure was fixed for all time and that this reading would create an absurdity, invoking the “last antecedent” canon of construction to limit the scope of certain contractual language.
  • The court reversed the district court’s finding of liability against the tobacco companies and remanded the case, and because it reversed on liability, it did not reach the cross-appeal issues concerning allocation of liability among the companies or prejudgment interest.

• United States v. Jordan Ashton, 25-40415, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Haynes, Graves, Ramirez) (no oral argument), criminal, sufficiency of evidence
  • Affirming conviction of aiding and abetting interference with commerce through robbery and for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, resulting in an 84-month, below-guidelines sentence.
  • Ashton argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to establish he had the requisite intent for the aiding-and-abetting robbery conviction; because he did not raise this argument below, the court reviewed only for a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” The court held that trial evidence showing Ashton acted as a lookout and getaway driver was sufficient to sustain the conviction under this deferential standard, and it affirmed the judgment of the district court. No concurring or dissenting opinions were filed.

• St. Charles-Guillot Investment, L.L.C.; Luling Living Center, L.L.C. v. One Source Roofing, Incorporated; Jasper Contractors, Incorporated; Roofclaim.com, L.L.C.; GAF Materials, L.L.C., 25-30326, appeal from E.D. La.
  • per curiam (Richman, Ducan, Oldham) (oral argument), construction law
  • Affirming summary judgment in favor of roofing defendants on plaintiff’s claims of defective roof materials/installation.
  • The nursing home’s owner, Luling Living Center, had hired One Source Roofing to install a new roof using materials purchased from GAF Materials; before issuing a “Guarantee” against leaks, GAF’s employee performed a limited inspection focused only on whether the roof met minimum requirements for that warranty. Four months later, Hurricane Ida allegedly caused the roof to detach due to installation defects, and Luling sued GAF (among others), eventually alleging that GAF’s inspector failed to catch One Source’s installation errors.
  • The central legal issue was whether GAF, under Louisiana law, assumed a duty to protect Luling from One Source’s faulty installation by virtue of conducting the pre-Guarantee inspection. Applying the Louisiana Supreme Court’s framework from Pickard v. Amazon.com — which looks at the scope of a defendant’s involvement, its authority to remediate, and its underlying intent — the court found that GAF’s inspection was narrow, mediated entirely through One Source without Luling’s knowledge, limited to assessing leak risk, and unaccompanied by any authority to compel repairs, distinguishing cases like Crane v. Exxon and Malta v. Herbert S. Hiller where inspectors had supervisory or certifying roles.
  • The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for GAF, holding that GAF assumed no duty to protect Luling from the roof’s failure and declining to recognize such a duty under Louisiana law.

• United States v. L. C. Gipson, 24-10260, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Jones, Southwick, Willett) (oral argument withdrawn), criminal, compassionate release
  • Affirming denial of motion for compassionate release.
  • Gipson was convicted in 1993 of multiple Hobbs Act robbery offenses and three counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); under the sentencing law then in effect (as construed in Deal v. United States), his multiple § 924(c) convictions were “stacked,” yielding a combined 750-month sentence.
  • Gipson later sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that (1) the First Step Act’s 2018 amendment eliminating this stacking for same-case convictions, though non-retroactive, created “extraordinary and compelling” grounds for relief, and (2) the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in United States v. Taylor — holding attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a valid § 924(c) predicate — undermined one of his three firearm convictions.
  • The Fifth Circuit held that both theories were foreclosed by intervening Supreme Court precedent: Rutherford v. United States held that a non-retroactive statutory change to § 924(c), alone or combined with other factors, cannot support compassionate release, and Fernandez v. United States held that a prisoner effectively challenging the validity of a conviction (as opposed to merely its sentence) must proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not through a compassionate-release motion.