June 5, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Unpublished decisions

  • Blue Compass RV, L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company, 25-10894, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Willett, Ramirez) (no oral argument), insurance
    • Affirming judgment in favor of insurer in claim on fidelity policy for a loss from financial fraud.
    • Blue Compass RV paid over $1.25 million on a construction invoice using banking information it received through a fraudulent email impersonating its contractor, SPD Construction. It sought full coverage under its crime insurance policy with Twin City, but Twin City invoked Exclusion T(1), which excludes losses resulting from “Deception Fraud” except as covered under a separate Deception Fraud Insuring Agreement capped at $100,000. The central question was whether SPD Construction qualified as a “Vendor”—defined as “a business entity that sells goods or services to the Insured”—thereby bringing the loss within the policy’s definition of “Deception Fraud.” Blue Compass argued that construction work produces a tangible product and therefore does not constitute “services.”
    • The court held that under Texas law, “services” carries a broad, ordinary meaning encompassing “any act performed for the benefit of another under some arrangement or agreement,” and that SPD Construction was plainly a vendor selling services to Blue Compass. Because the policy language was clear and unambiguous, the court declined to construe it in favor of the insured. The court also found that Blue Compass forfeited its argument that SPD Construction was selling real property by failing to adequately develop it before the district court. Finally, the court rejected Blue Compass’s challenge to the district court’s consideration of the proof of loss, finding the document was referenced in the complaint and central to the claims.
  • Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Co. v. Orta, 25-11066, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Higginson, Duncan) (oral argument), insurance
    • Affirming judgment for insurer on declaratory judgment action that it had no duty to defend.
    • Mesa Underwriters (MUSIC) filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a ruling that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Allied Universal, whose subcontractor’s security guard sexually assaulted a minor. The policy contained an exclusion for injuries resulting from assault or battery at “all locations.” Allied Universal and Alicia Orta, suing on behalf of the minor, argued the term “all locations” was ambiguous and should be construed against the insurer.
    • The court affirmed substantially for the reasons given by the district court, holding that MUSIC had no duty to defend or indemnify Allied Universal under the assault-or-battery exclusion.
  • United States v. Cortez Ortiz, 25-20574, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • United States v. Holmes, 25-60352, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • United States v. Milaro, 25-40303, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • Cooper v. PennyMac Loan Services, L.L.C., 25-20114, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Higginson, Duncan) (no oral argument), foreclosure, Fair Debt Collection Processes Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, amendment
    • Affirming dismissal of claims arising from foreclosure on plaintiffs’ home.
    • Sedrick and Marquita Cooper sued PennyMac asserting claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1623, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) arising from the foreclosure of their home. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied leave to amend. On appeal, the Coopers challenged only the dismissal of their FDCPA claims, thereby abandoning their FCRA and § 1623 arguments. They also failed to challenge the district court’s finding that they did not sufficiently allege PennyMac was a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA.
    • The court held the Coopers abandoned their non-FDCPA claims by not briefing them and failed to show error in the dismissal of the FDCPA claims because they did not contest the threshold finding that PennyMac was not adequately alleged to be a debt collector. The court also held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because the proposed amendment would not have corrected the deficiencies identified in the dismissal order, making amendment futile.