Take the Fifth

Designated for publication

• Hayes v. GStek, Incorporated, 25-30392, appeal from W.D. La.
  • Jones, J. (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), Americans with Disabilities Act
  • Affirming dismissal of ADA claims.
  • Albert Hayes worked as an IT systems administrator for Army contractor GStek at Fort Polk. After COVID-era telework ended and he was required to return to the office, Hayes was diagnosed with Autism, Major Depressive Disorder, and Social Anxiety Disorder. He requested full-time telework as a reasonable accommodation. The Army determined that allowing full-time telework was not in its best interests, but GStek allowed Hayes to work from home two to three days per week. After Hayes had a mental breakdown and missed work, GStek terminated him for absenteeism.
  • At issue was whether Hayes stated a prima facie case under the ADA for (1) failure to accommodate, (2) disability discrimination, and (3) retaliation.
  • The court held that in-person attendance was an essential function of Hayes’s job, noting “[t]here is general consensus among courts, including ours, that regular work-site attendance is an essential function of most jobs.” The court emphasized that COVID-era telework arrangements did not permanently alter essential job functions: “the fact that Hayes’s employer permitted him to telework while temporary COVID policies were in place does not transform the essential functions of his job.”
    • GStek satisfied its statutory obligation by offering Hayes two to three days per week of telework. The court noted: “That GStek did not provide Hayes with his preferred accommodation is not a violation of the ADA.” Because Hayes could not perform the essential functions of his job even with this accommodation, he was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA.
    • Hayes’s discrimination claim failed because he was not qualified for the job, and his retaliation claim failed both because three months of temporal proximity was insufficient to show causation and because “his inability to perform the essential functions of his job defeats his ability to prove causation.” The court cited E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., noting that without being a qualified individual, “his request for accommodation was doomed, and that failed request cannot be the basis for a retaliation claim.”

• Trojan Battery Company, L.L.C. v. Golf Carts of Cypress, L.L.C.; Trojan EV, L.L.C., 25-20243, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • Stewart, J. (Jones, Barksdale, Stewart) (oral argument), trademark infringement
  • Affirming liability judgment on trademark infringement claim and award of disgorgement of profits, but vacating permanent injunction and remanding for further proceedings.
  • Trojan Battery has manufactured deep-cycle batteries under the TROJAN® brand since 1925 and holds 80% of the OEM market and 50% of the aftermarket for golf-cart batteries. Federico Nell founded Golf Carts of Cypress (GCC) in 2019 and Trojan EV in 2020 to sell golf carts under the “Trojan-EV” brand. After a bench trial, the district court found trademark infringement and unfair competition, awarded disgorgement of profits ($1.3 million from Trojan EV and $3.4 million from GCC), and issued a permanent injunction.
  • At issue on appeal were (1) whether the district court clearly erred in finding likelihood of confusion; (2) whether disgorgement of profits was properly awarded; and (3) whether the permanent injunction was overbroad.
  • On likelihood of confusion, the court found no clear error. Five of the eight “digits of confusion” weighed in favor of confusion, including the strength of the TROJAN® mark, high similarity between the marks, relatedness of the products (batteries and golf carts in the same industry), overlapping retail outlets, and defendants’ intent. The court noted the district court found Nell “was not being truthful in testifying that he did not know of TROJAN® batteries at the time he organized Trojan EV,” which was “strong evidence of intent to deceive.” However, the court found the district court clearly erred on actual confusion, holding that five instances of confusion over two and a half years of concurrent sales running into the millions of dollars was “insufficient to sustain a finding of likelihood of confusion.”
  • On disgorgement, the court held the district court properly applied the Lanham Act’s burden-shifting framework: the plaintiff proved defendants’ sales, and the burden shifted to defendants to prove costs and deductions, which they failed to do. The court distinguished Texas Pig Stands because here, unlike in that case, there was considerable goodwill in the TROJAN® brand upon which defendants could trade.
  • On the permanent injunction, the court found it overbroad because it prohibited defendants from using “TROJAN” on any good or service, covering “products that are unrelated to golf carts and golf-cart batteries in outside markets where confusion is unlikely.” The court vacated and remanded for an injunction properly tailored to the golf industry where confusion was demonstrated.

• Busby v. Guerrero, 26-70004, c/w In re Edward Lee Busby, 26-10354, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Richman, Graves, Higginson) (no oral argument), Higginson, J., concurring in stay; Richman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; habeas corpus
  • Granting order of temporary stay of 5/14/2026 execution pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamm v. Smith.
  • Edward Lee Busby was convicted and sentenced to death for the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of a 78-year-old woman. He has long pursued an Atkins v. Virginia claim asserting intellectual disability renders him ineligible for execution. The federal district court previously denied habeas relief and denied funding for an expert to evaluate his intellectual disability claim. After the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Ayestas v. Davis overruled the circuit’s “substantial need” standard for funding, the state court granted Busby funding. Both Busby’s expert (Dr. Martinez) and the state’s expert (Dr. McGarrahan) concluded Busby is intellectually disabled, and the state submitted proposed findings recommending a life sentence—but the state trial judge rejected those findings and denied relief. The TCCA adopted the trial court’s denial. Busby then filed a Rule 60(b) motion in federal court; the district court treated it as a successive habeas petition and denied it. Busby had moved for a certificate of appealability from the Court of Appeals and for a stay of execution.
  • At issue on appeal are (1) whether Busby’s Rule 60(b) motion constituted a successive habeas petition; (2) whether a temporary stay of execution should issue pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamm v. Smith (concerning evaluation of multiple IQ scores in Atkins claims); and (3) whether the state court’s denial of Busby’s intellectual disability claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts under AEDPA.
  • The Court ordered that the execution be TEMPORARILY STAYED pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamm v. Smith. Judge Graves would grant habeas relief; Judge Higginson joined the stay pending Hamm; Judge Richman would deny the stay and deny habeas relief.
  • Judge Higginson concurred in the temporary stay because Hamm v. Smith is expected to clarify “the constitutional rule we must apply in capital cases like this one to determinations of intellectual disability.” He noted that “Busby’s circumstance closely parallels the Petitioner’s in Hamm” and that “in a matter of life and death, we must be certain that we apply the proper constitutional rule.” He declined to reach the merits dispute between his colleagues while Hamm remains pending.
  • Judge Richman concurred in part and dissented in part. She would grant a COA and proceed to the merits but deny the stay and deny habeas relief. She concluded that even assuming the Rule 60(b) motion is not successive, Busby’s Atkins claim fails under AEDPA because the state court’s factual determinations were not unreasonable. She found the state court’s refusal to apply the Flynn Effect was not unreasonable (noting it is “controversial” and no court has mandated its application), and that the state court’s weighing of conflicting adaptive-behavior evidence—including its own credibility determinations—was entitled to substantial deference.
  • Judge Graves also concurred in part and dissented in part, but he would grant habeas relief. He emphasized that “every intellectual disability expert to have offered an opinion in this matter has concluded that Busby is intellectually disabled” and that the state itself “properly attempted to concede the issue.” He argued the trial court and Judge Richman are “diminishing the force of the medical community’s consensus” in violation of Moore v. Texas, which instructed that courts cannot “give courts leave to diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus.” He sharply criticized the state trial court for relying on “his own ‘recollections'” from a trial twenty years earlier rather than expert evidence, stating: “There is no support for such a proposition.”

Unpublished decisions

• Williams v. Voorhies, 24-30804, appeal from M.D. La.
  • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (oral argument withdrawn), Douglas, J., dissenting; qualified immunity
  • Reversing denial of qualified immunity dismissal of state inmate’s excessive force claims against prison guards, and rendering judgment dismissing claims.
  • Alvin Williams, a prisoner at Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola), was “high” in his cell and requested mental-health assistance from Captain Voorhies and Lieutenant Walker. After an argument over whether Williams needed such assistance, Voorhies observed plastic from Williams’s mattress tied around the cell door and his waist and ordered Williams to remove it. Williams complied and was handcuffed; Walker then sprayed him with a chemical agent. While being escorted to the showers, Williams—still blinded by the spray—claims Voorhies led him into a wall, causing a busted lip, then pinned him against the wall and pressed on his restrained right hand, allegedly causing a stress fracture. Medical records revealed only a swollen hand days later, and no fracture or break was ever confirmed.
  • At issue on appeal was whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on Williams’s Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim (against Voorhies) and failure-to-intervene claim (against Walker).
  • The court resolved the case on the “clearly established law” prong of the qualified-immunity analysis. Williams cited several precedents involving force against restrained prisoners, but the court found each case “factually distinguishable.” The sole case relied on by the magistrate judge—Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2016)—involved a prisoner who was savagely beaten by a swarm of officers, lost consciousness, and suffered contusions, a neck sprain, and a ruptured eardrum. The court stated: “What purportedly happened to Williams is worlds apart from what happened to Cowart. He alleges Voorhies led him into a wall and pressed his hands against the wall, causing pain for a few seconds.” Because Williams’s other cited cases similarly involved “brutal, gratuitous prisoner beatings resulting in serious injuries,” none could “squarely govern” the facts here, and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
  • Judge Douglas dissented as to the excessive-force claim, arguing that “officers may not use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has already been subdued or incapacitated” and that Williams was undisputedly restrained when force was deployed. She emphasized that Williams “called out for help while suffering a drug-induced mental health episode” and “[i]nstead of help . . . was met with the spray of a chemical agent, while restrained.” Judge Douglas criticized the majority’s approach, writing: “To say that Williams’s claim cannot proceed past the summary judgment stage because he was not ‘savagely beaten,’ like the plaintiff in Cowart, misunderstands our court’s precedent,” noting the Supreme Court’s holding in Hudson v. McMillian that “[t]he absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it.” She concluded: “Appellants wrongfully and gratuitously deployed force when they sprayed an already-restrained Appellee with a chemical agent and led him into a wall while he was suffering from a mental health episode.”

• Fleming v. Black Diamond Capital Management, 24-30291, appeal from E.D. La.
  • per curiam (Graves, Higginson, Wilson) (oral argument), Higginson, J., dissenting; WARN Act
  • Affirming judgment on bench trial in favor of defendant private equity firm on WARN Act claims arising from plaintiffs’ layoffs from company controlled by defendant.
  • In September 2019, Bayou Steel terminated approximately 300 employees at its LaPlace, Louisiana steel mill without providing the 60-day notice required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, then filed for bankruptcy the next day. The terminated employees sued Black Diamond Capital Management (BDCM), a private equity firm that owned Bayou Steel through a subsidiary, arguing the two constituted a “single employer” under the WARN Act. On a prior appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment for Black Diamond and remanded for the district court to determine whether BDCM “specifically directed” the plant’s closure without proper notice. After a bench trial, the district court found for Black Diamond.
  • At issue on appeal was whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Black Diamond did not exercise de facto control over the decision to close the Bayou Steel plant, under the Department of Labor’s five-factor “single employer” test (20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2)).
  • The court found that “there is no direct evidence showing who made the . . . decision” to close the plant—every Black Diamond director and two of three independent directors denied knowledge of who directed the closure. The district court reasonably inferred that the plant’s closure “was inevitable without further loans, which neither Black Diamond nor [other lenders] were willing or required to provide,” and that “the independent directors . . . apparently made the ultimate decision to close the plant.” The court acknowledged that “Black Diamond might be the likeliest culprit” and that it was “bizarre” that Bayou Steel’s own officers denied knowing who ordered the closure, but concluded: “Plaintiffs’ burden was to deliver fire, but they offer only smoke. Without direct evidence, the district court sifted through the circumstantial evidence and found it lacking.” Finally, the court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the panel from reexamining the prior panel’s reduction of the de facto control inquiry to “whether Black Diamond specifically directed the plant’s closing.”
  • After the 9-page per curiam affirmance, Judge Higginson issued a 40-page dissent, contending that the remand instruction to determine “who specifically directed” the closure inadvertently shifted WARN Act jurisprudence away from the required “functional assessment of the amount of control involved,” rendering it “nearly impossible for plaintiffs to show de facto control absent the culpable party specifically admitting fault.” He detailed “overwhelming evidence” that BDCM micromanaged Bayou Steel’s operations, personnel, and finances—including that BDCM employees installed the BDCF loan without board approval, excluded independent directors from information and decision-making, and directed bankruptcy counsel and the HR director in preparing layoff notices.
  • Judge Higginson emphasized that the “specific direction” standard must not be reduced to identifying who personally gave an order: “By that interpretation, a ‘specific direction’ requires finding the singular spark that started the fire—when proving as much may be an impossible task. Instead, ‘specific direction’ includes control sufficient to compel the subsidiary company to act.” He concluded that “Bayou Steel was so controlled by BDCM that it lacked the ability to make any decisions, including the layoff decision, independently,” and that the totality of BDCM’s conduct—including “the equity distribution, the non-arm’s length lending relationship, control of Bayou Steel’s finances, operations and personnel, withholding of information from the Independent Board Members, . . . and direction of outside counsel and the HR manager”—constituted functional integration warranting WARN Act liability.

• United States v. Henderson, 25-11155, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Duncan, 25-11231, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Smith, Higginson, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Affirming revocation of superised release.
  • Duncan challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), arguing it requires revocation of supervised release and imprisonment without a jury trial or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on United States v. Haymond. The court granted the government’s unopposed motion for summary affirmance and affirmed the judgment, finding Duncan’s challenge foreclosed by United States v. Garner, 969 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2020).

• United States v. Rios, 25-10909, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Smith, Higginson, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 25-40680, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Ander motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Peoples, 25-11016, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Wiener, Willett, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Williams v. Richardson Independent School District, 25-11049, affirming N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Clement, Southwick, Oldham) (no oral argument), civil
  • Affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s suit, with no description of nature of suit or issues on appeal.

• Allyn-Feuer v. John Doe, U.S. Border Patrol Agents, 25-40204, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (oral argument withdrawn), Oldham, J., concurring in judgment only (w/o op.); Federal Tort Claims Act
  • Affirming dismissal of FTCA claims.
  • Plaintiff was stopped at a Border Patrol checkpoint, detained, and his car searched. He brought Bivens claims for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation and FTCA claims for false imprisonment, assault and battery, negligence, conversion, and property loss. The court analyzed (1) whether the FTCA’s intentional-tort exception’s law-enforcement proviso overrides the customs-duty exception, and (2) whether the district court properly dismissed the Bivens claim sua sponte.
  • The court held that while plaintiff’s intentional-tort claims survived the FTCA’s intentional-tort exception via the law-enforcement proviso, the customs-duty exception independently barred all FTCA claims because they arose out of the detention and search of plaintiff’s vehicle at a checkpoint. The court also held the sua sponte dismissal of the Bivens claim without prejudice was procedurally fair.

• United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 25-40362, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Vernon v. Lark, 25-30717, appeal from W.D. La.
  • per curiam (Higginbotham, Engelhardt, Ramirez) (no oral argument), prisoner suit
  • Affirming dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction a California state prisoner’s suit related to late father’s Louisiana succession.

• United States v. Hicks, 25-30376, appeal from W.D. La.
  • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming life sentence on conviction of multiple child sexual exploitation and child pornography offenses.
  • The court found that the within-guidelines sentence was presumptively reasonable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.

• United States v. Gomez, 25-10967, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Smith, Higginson, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Miranda, 25-10658, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Mitchell v. Conroe Independent School District, 25-20401, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), § 1983, Title VI, Americans with Disabilities Act, amendment
  • Affirming dismissal of civil rights and disability claims, and denial of motion to amend.
  • Tanita Mitchell, as next friend of her minor child J.M., brought claims of (1) Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process under § 1983, (2) Title VI race-based student-on-student harassment, and (3) disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA against a school district after J.M. was attacked by another student. The court also considered the denial of leave to amend.
  • The court found that Mitchell forfeited her equal protection and due process arguments by not raising them on appeal. Her Title VI claim failed because she did not challenge the district court’s finding that she failed to plead actual knowledge by the school district. Her Section 504/ADA claims failed because harassment was alleged based on race, not disability, and the failure-to-accommodate theory also failed for lack of actual knowledge. The court upheld the denial of leave to amend, finding Mitchell had already pleaded her best case.

• United States v. Wooley, 25-30672, appeal from M.D. La.
  • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Farris, 25-11257, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Wiener, Willett, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, supervised release, sentencing
  • Affirming sentence on revocation of supervised release.

• United States v. Reyes, 25-11334, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming enhanced sentence on conviction of illegal reentry.

• United States v. Kelly, 25-11296, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Williams, 25-10981, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Moreno v. Dealer Integrated Services, L.L.C., 25-20470, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), Title VII, pregnancy discrimination, Family and Medical Leave Act, employment discrimination
  • Affirming summary judgment for employer on various employment discrimination claims.
  • Moreno alleged (1) pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, (2) FMLA retaliation, (3) FMLA interference, and (4) failure to provide individualized FMLA notice after she was terminated while pregnant. She argued her boss’s statement referencing her upcoming leave was direct evidence of discrimination and that she presented sufficient circumstantial evidence under McDonnell Douglas.
  • The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer on all claims. On Title VII, the boss’s reference to leave was not direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination, and Moreno failed to rebut DIS’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons (refusal to communicate with coworkers, toxic environment, coworkers threatening to resign) or show pregnancy was a motivating factor. On FMLA retaliation, the court assumed without deciding that the mixed-motive framework applies but found DIS met its burden to show it would have fired Moreno regardless of any retaliatory motive. On FMLA interference and notice, the court held that Moreno could not show prejudice because she was legitimately discharged before her leave commenced.

• Areizaga v. TForce Freight, Inc., 25-11255, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Clement, Southwick, Oldham) (no oral argument), civil
  • Affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s suit, with no description of claims or appellate issues.

• United States v. Padilla-Saldana, 25-50764, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Smith, Higginson, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming enhanced sentence on conviction of illegal reentry.

• United States v. Villegas-Castro, 25-50796, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Stinson, 25-60371, appeal from N.D. Miss.
  • per curiam (Barksdale, Graves, Duncan) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming vulnerable-victim sentencing enhancement.
  • At issue on appeal were (1) whether the district court erred in applying a two-level vulnerable-victim sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1); and (2) whether the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) by using conditional sentencing language when addressing disputed portions of the presentence investigation report.
  • On the vulnerable-victim enhancement, the court found no clear error because the district court relied on a psychological and cognitive assessment showing the minor victim scored in the fifth percentile for adaptive behavior, and unrebutted evidence showed Stinson communicated with the victim for months and met her twice in person. On the Rule 32(i)(3)(B) claim, reviewed only for plain error because it was not preserved below, the court held Stinson failed to cite any precedent supporting his position and therefore could not show clear-or-obvious error.

• United States v. Renovato, 25-50119, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Cardiel, 25-50276, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Ortiz-De Leon, 24-50854, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Wiener, Willett, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• United States v. Moore, 25-50692, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming 24-month sentence on revocation of supervised release.
  • At issue on appeal was whether the district court improperly relied on retribution and rehabilitation—factors not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) for revocation sentences—when imposing a 24-month sentence upon revocation of supervised release.
  • Reviewing for plain error, the court held that none of the district court’s statements demonstrated “express” or “unmistakable” reliance on retributive factors under § 3553(a)(2)(A), citing Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 203 (2025). The court found the district court was responding to Moore’s pattern of noncompliance and seeking to deter breaches of trust, and that the longer prison term was imposed to avoid another term of supervised release (as defense counsel requested), not to promote rehabilitation in violation of Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 334–35 (2011).

• Divinity v. Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Co., 25-60586, appeal from S.D. Miss.
  • per curiam (Davis, Wilson, Douglas) (no oral argument), workers’ compensation
  • Affirming summary judgment dismissal of claims for failure to pay workers’ compoensation benefits.
  • At issue on appeal were (1) whether the district court improperly redesignated a defendant’s legal name; and (2) whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment before holding a pretrial conference, thereby depriving the pro se plaintiff of the opportunity to present evidence of bad faith refusal to pay workers’ compensation benefits.
  • The court held that correcting “Summit Holdings” to “Summit Consulting, LLC” was merely a correction of the entity’s legal name with no effect on the parties or the merits. On the procedural argument, the court explained that summary judgment evidence must be presented in opposition briefing, not at a pretrial conference, and the plaintiff failed to summarize what evidence she would have offered or how it would have changed the outcome. The court concluded the plaintiff was impermissibly seeking to undermine the state court judgment that determined she had received all benefits due under the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act.