April 20, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • Carter v. Dupuy, 25-30213, appeal from M.D. La.
    • Ho, J. (Clement, Graves, Ho) (oral argument), Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity
    • Reversing denial of summary judgment to defendants in excessive force claims.
    • Amanda Carter’s minor daughter attended Live Oak High School. In February 2022, a Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services agent visited the Carters’ home to investigate a report of child abuse, after which the Carters drove to the school to pick up their daughter. The agent contacted the school and instructed it not to release the girl; the school locked its doors and summoned Deputy Chad Dupuy, the school resource officer. Carter entered the front office, became angry, and used profanity; Dupuy asked her to step outside, but she refused to leave without her daughter. Dupuy then grasped Carter’s arm, pulled her toward the door, and briefly pushed her through the doorway—using force for, at most, four seconds. Carter sued Dupuy under the Fourth Amendment and brought Louisiana state law claims for negligence, assault, and battery against Dupuy, along with a respondeat superior claim against Sheriff Ard. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
    • At issue in appeal was whether Dupuy’s use of force was de minimis and therefore insufficient to sustain a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, and whether Dupuy and Sheriff Ard were entitled to qualified immunity; also whether Carter’s Louisiana state law claims should be dismissed.
    • The court emphasized that “‘[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment,'” quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Applying the Graham factors—severity of the crime, threat posed, and active resistance—the court found Dupuy knew the Department was investigating potential child abuse, Carter was visibly upset and non-compliant, and he ceased all force as soon as she was outside.
      • Because the force consisted only of grasping Carter’s arm and briefly pushing her a few inches through a doorway over approximately four seconds, the court concluded it was de minimis for constitutional purposes. Reviewing surveillance footage, the court noted it was “‘not bound to adopt the non-moving party’s version of the facts if it is contradicted by the record, but rather should view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.'”
      • The court exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction over the state law claims, finding that under Louisiana law, Dupuy’s force was not “clearly excessive” and therefore could not constitute actionable negligence, assault, or battery.
  • United States v. Lezama-Ramirez, 23-30721, appeal from E.D. La.
    • per curiam (Southwick, Oldham, Ramirez) (no oral argument), Oldham, J., concurring; Southwick, J., dissenting; criminal, sentencing, supervised release, rule of orderliness
    • On granting rehearing as a panel rehearing, affirming in part and vacating in part supervised release special conditions in sentence, remanding for conforming written judgment of special conditions with orally pronounced special conditions.
    • Lezama-Ramirez, a previously removed alien, pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release. The presentence report (“PSR”) listed thirteen standard conditions and two special conditions of supervised release; defense counsel confirmed he had no objections to the PSR. At sentencing, the district court did not read the conditions aloud but ordered the defendant to “comply with all other standard conditions of supervised release” and two special conditions; the written judgment’s conditions matched the PSR. Lezama-Ramirez challenged discrepancies between the conditions imposed orally and those in the written judgment.
    • At issue on appeal were (1) whether the district court was required to read aloud supervised-release conditions already disclosed in the PSR, reviewed under plain-error standard; (2) whether discrepancies between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment as to Special Condition 2 and Standard Condition 10 required vacatur, reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    • The court affirmed the imposition of Standard Conditions 2–9, 11–13, and Special Condition 1, finding no plain error. It vacated Special Condition 2 and remanded for conformity with the oral pronouncement, because the written judgment added a 72-hour reporting requirement not orally pronounced. It affirmed Standard Condition 10, finding only an ambiguity—not a conflict—between the oral and written versions.
    • The court held that a district court “need not” read conditions aloud when they are disclosed in the PSR, citing Grogan, Molina-Alonso, and the en banc decision in Diggles. It drew “reasonable inferences from court documents, the defendant’s statements, and counsel’s statements” to conclude the defendant had an opportunity to review the PSR with counsel. The PSR “was the centerpiece of sentencing,” and at no point did Lezama-Ramirez express that he had not reviewed it.
    • Regarding Special Condition 2, the written judgment added a requirement to report to a U.S. Probation Office within 72 hours of reentry—an “additional burden” not orally pronounced—so the court vacated and remanded that condition. As to Standard Condition 10, the difference between “shall be prohibited from possessing” (oral) and “must not own, possess, or have access to” (written) was “best described as an ambiguity rather than a conflict,” where the written judgment merely “defines [the] scope” of the oral condition.
    • Judge Oldham concurred, writing separately to critique the court’s “rule of orderliness” and horizontal stare decisis in the Fifth Circuit. He characterized the rehearing as disproportionate, noting that the original per curiam opinion was “utterly unremarkable” and that the six-month rehearing period yielded only a modest revision—replacing “need not confirm” with “decline . . . to specifically ask” whether the defendant read the PSR. In a particularly pithy passage, he wrote: the rule of orderliness “requires us to take as gospel every jot, tittle, and footnote in every published opinion and then religiously apply them as if Moses brought them down from Mount Sinai.” He submitted the case as “Exhibit A” for his view that panels should not be forced to treat their own opinions “as if they were statutes passed by Congress.”
    • Judge Southwick dissented, contending that the defendant had a Fifth Amendment right to be told the conditions of supervised release and that the district court failed to ensure Lezama-Ramirez reviewed those conditions with counsel, as required by the en banc decision in Diggles. He stressed that under Diggles, the proper procedure is to (1) confirm review with the defendant, (2) expressly adopt specified conditions, and (3) allow time for objections. He noted pointedly that the defendant, “a Spanish speaker who required a translator in court,” was never asked whether he had reviewed the English-language PSR. Judge Southwick warned: “Following precedent is difficult at times, but not following it would be chaotic at all times,” and cautioned that “[t]he absence of ‘judicial hierarchy’ would lead to ‘judicial anarchy.'” He would have excised Standard Conditions 2–9, 11–13, and Special Condition 1 from the written judgment.

Unpublished decisions

  • United States v. David Manuel Garcia, 25-50247, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal, Commerce Clause
    • Affirming conviction for engaging in illicit sexual conduct in a foreign place.
    • At issue was whether 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. He relied on United States v. Morrison and United States v. Lopez, but conceded the issue was one of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. Because his constitutional challenge was not raised on the same grounds in the district court, the court reviewed only for plain error, affirming, holding that Garcia could not establish plain error because his argument required extending existing precedent to § 2423(c), which does not satisfy the plain-error standard under United States v. Vargas-Soto.
  • Harris v. Louisiana, 25-30535, appeal from E.D. La.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), § 1983
    • Affirming dismissal of claims arising from a state condemnation proceeding.
    • The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, rejected all claims as frivolous and meritless. On appeal, appellants argued (1) the district court lacked original jurisdiction, depriving them of due process, and (2) the court’s holdings were a “radical departure” from Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment precedent. The court found both arguments meritless—appellants’ reliance on Pettit v. Penn was misplaced because that case concerned Louisiana liquor-license jurisdiction, not federal jurisdiction or due process. The appellants’ remaining arguments cited irrelevant authorities (including the Vienna Convention) and failed to engage with the district court’s reasoning.
    • The court found the arguments “nonsensical” even under a liberal pro se construction and held that the appellants forfeited any substantive challenge by failing to address the merits of the district court’s opinion.
  • United States v. Joshua Ryan Burns, 26-60033, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal, Second Amendment, Commerce Clause
    • Affirming conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon.
    • Burns raised three challenges: (1) § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment test from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen; (2) § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him under the same framework; and (3) § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Burns conceded all claims were foreclosed, and the government filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance.
    • The court granted the government’s motion for summary affirmance and affirmed the conviction, citing United States v. Diaz (rejecting facial challenge), United States v. Schnur (rejecting as-applied challenge), and United States v. Alcantar (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge).