April 13, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • Alexander v. Arceneaux, 25-30016, appeal from W.D. La.
    • Clement, J. (Clement, Douglas, Ramirez) (oral argument), sec. 1983, Fourth Amendment
    • Affirming summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s sec. 1983 claim alleging Fourth Amendment violations arising from search of residence.
    • Officers with the Lafayette Police Department obtained a warrant to search Albert Alexander’s residence for firearms based on reports from Alexander’s granddaughter, Sharlette, and her girlfriend, Morrison. During those same interviews, the women told officers that Alexander kept stolen electronics and furniture at the house and had bragged about stealing things without getting caught. When officers executed the firearms warrant on January 4, 2011, they found only pellet rifles rather than actual firearms. However, the officers also observed numerous electronics and appliances—including flatscreen televisions, DVD players, stereo systems, and other items—many of which were brand new, unopened in original packaging, wrapped in plastic, covered with pillowcases, or placed on blankets. Officer Strong, based on her experience, believed the quantity and manner of storage were “indicative of . . . how people house stolen property.” She called Morrison, who reaffirmed that Alexander had told her the items were stolen, and the officers then seized the electronics and appliances. Alexander was charged with six counts of possession of stolen property but was ultimately acquitted on the two remaining counts at trial. He filed a § 1983 suit alleging Fourth Amendment violations, and the district court granted summary judgment to the officers on qualified immunity grounds.
    • At issue on appeal is whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing items not listed in the search warrant during the first search; specifically, whether the plain view doctrine justified the warrantless seizures, and whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
    • The court applied the four-part plain view test: (1) officers lawfully entered the residence pursuant to the search warrant; (2) the items were in plain view; (3) the incriminating nature of the items was “immediately apparent”; and (4) the officers had lawful access to the items. The dispute centered on the third element—whether it was immediately apparent the items were stolen. The court emphasized that probable cause under the plain view doctrine “is a flexible, common-sense standard” requiring only “a ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved,” not certainty.
    • Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had pre-existing tips from Sharlette and Morrison about stolen goods, their on-scene observations corroborated those tips, and Officer Strong’s training and experience led her to recognize the manner of storage as consistent with stolen property. The court concluded that “a reasonable officer could have believed that there was a ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that the items in the residence were stolen property.” The court also rejected Alexander’s argument that Officer Strong’s confirmatory phone call to Morrison was an additional investigative step prohibited by Arizona v. Hicks, noting the officers “already had probable cause to believe the items were stolen before Officer Strong called Morrison.”
    • The court distinguished Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985), in which officers impermissibly continued searching after finding the specific items listed in a narrow warrant. Here, the warrant authorized a broader search for “[a]ny and all firearms, ammunition,” etc., so finding only pellet rifles did not satisfy the warrant’s objective—officers still had reason to believe other firearms might be present. Additionally, unlike in Creamer, the officers here had independent tips about stolen goods and on-scene observations corroborating those tips, giving them “a stronger indication that the items were stolen.”

Unpublished decisions

  • Allen v. Navy Federal Credit Union, 25-10306, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Haynes, Oldham) (no oral argument), prisoner suit
    • Dismissing as frivolous appeal from dismissal of Texas state prisoner’s suit.
  • U.S. v. Sanders, 25-10931, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • U.S. v. Coleman, 25-11068, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Davis, Jones, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Affirming revocation of supervised release.
  • Northside Pharmacy, L.L.C. v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 25-20200, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Duncan, Oldham) (no oral argument), administrative law
    • Affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with the DEA’s suspension of plaintiff’s Certification of Registration.
  • U.S. v. Watts, 25-30148, appeal from E.D. La.
    • per curiam (Wiener, Willett, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming conviction and 10-year sentence for possession of a machinegun.
  • U.S. v. Rodgers, 25-30377, appeal from W.D. La.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal, search and seizure
    • Affirming conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon, upholding denial of motion to suppress with regard to investigatory stop.