June 23, 2021 opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • Colvin v. LeBlanc, 19-30888, appeal from E.D. La.
    • Wiener, J. (Wiener, Elrod, Higginson), § 1983
    • Affirming dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 claim challenging the alleged thirty-year extension of his state sentence; but reversing the dismissal of his § 1983 claim challenging his extradition from Pennsylvania to Louisiana; and remanding for further proceedings.
    • The district court had dismissed plaintiff’s claims as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that a state prisoner seeking monetary damages cannot proceed under § 1983 if success on those claims would “necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement,” including the fact or the duration of that confinement, which are issues the Heck Court held were only actionable by writ of habeas corpus.
    • The Court held first that Heck “does not pose a jurisdictional bar to the assertion of § 1983 claims,” but is only a basis for a failure to state a claim. “Heck discussed the scope of § 1983 claims, not subject matter jurisdiction. It based its holding on the ‘hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments,’ and analyzed when and how a § 1983 cause of action accrues. By its own language, therefore, Heck implicates a plaintiff’s ability to state a claim, not whether the court has jurisdiction over that claim.”
    • Plaintiff’s sentence-enhancement claim was based on a state prison official changing his release date from 2023 to 2052, which plaintiff alternatively argued was a failure to apply good time credit or a failure to apply credit for time served on a federal sentence. In either case, though, the Court held that this was a claim challenging the duration of confinement that was actionable only in habeas.
    • Plaintiff’s extradition claim, however, was whether a Louisiana prison official “violated Colvin’s constitutional rights by returning him to Louisiana without a valid detainer and without complying with federal and state extradition laws.” Where the district court did not review whether this separate claim was barred by Heck in the first instance, the Court remanded for the district court to make that determination. “This question may be deceptively tricky, since it will require consideration not only of whether Heck applies to Colvin’s extradition-based claims, but also of whether these claims, based on alleged violations of rights protected by specific federal and state laws, are actionable under § 1983.”
    • The Court also held that the district court erred in ruling on plaintiff’s claims against two prison officials on the basis of whether they were “persons” capable of being sued under § 1983, which is a defense to suits against them in their official capacities, but failing to undergo a qualified immunity analysis–which was the more appropriate analysis because the officials were sued in their individual capacities. The Court also held that the district court’s absolute immunity ruling was premature because the district court did not first analyze whether the prison official was acting in a judicial, rather than administrative, function.
    • The Court also held that the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely, as the district court had not made a finding as to when plaintiff discovered the alleged invalidity in the detainer.
    • Notably, plaintiff accomplished this result while proceeding pro se.
  • Harness v. Hosemann, 19-60632, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Owen, Jones, Smith, Stewart, Dennis, Elrod, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, Costa, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson), en banc, Fourteenth Amendment, voting rights
    • Vacating panel opinion of Feb. 23, 2021, and ordering en banc rehearing. Panel opinion had affirmed summary judgment dismissing claims of violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment voting rights where plaintiffs had been convicted of crimes delineated by § 241 of the Mississippi constitution as among crimes for which disenfranchisement would result.
  • Guidry v. Lumpkin, 20-70005, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Willett, Ho, Oldham), habeas corpus
    • Withdrawing April 21, 2021 unpublished opinion and substituting new opinion. Original opinion had denied certificate of appealability for federal habeas relief from death sentence after resentencing upon grant of habeas relief for initial sentencing. The panel again denied a certificate of appealability.
    • The Court held that, under AEDPA’s deferential standard, the state court did not commit reversible error in ruling that the petitioner’s statements to his ballistics expert that he had committed the murder at issue were not “fruit of the poisonous tree,” i.e., were not made to the expert only because of his confession that had been made to police officers after he had invoked his right to counsel–a confession that had been held to be inadmissible in the petitioner’s federal habeas proceeding after his first trial. Accordingly, the Court held there was no error in admission of the expert’s testimony at the second trial.
    • The Court also held that the state court did not err in rejecting petitioner’s Batson claim for the strike of a Black prospective juror, where there was facial validity in the prosecutor’s explanation.
    • The Court held that no COA should issue for petitioner’s procedurally defaulted Brady claim, because he cannot show that the State actually suppressed fingerprint evidence that could have been exculpatory, where the record showed that reasonable diligence would have revealed this evidence to petitioner’s counsel and that it was therefore not suppressed.
    • The Court then held that no COA should issue on petitioner’s procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim. First, the Court noted that there is no constitutionally protected right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, so his claims of IAC at the postconviction stage could not hurdle the procedural default. The Court then found that petitioner failed to provide valid cause for the neglect to bring his other IAC claims in state court.

Unpublished

  • J.W. v. Paley, 19-20429, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Jones, Costa), qualified immunity
    • Reversing denial of qualified immunity, and rendering summary judgment in favor of school resource officer defendant who had tased special education student who was trying to leave the school after engaging in disruptive behavior; on holding that there was not clearly established law that this conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
  • U.S. v. Bastida-Carranza, 20-11252, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Stewart, Higginson), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • U.S. v. Espinoza-Naranjo, 20-40567, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Stewart, Higginson), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • Tawani v. Garland, 20-60265, petition for review of BIA order
    • per curiam (Clement, Higginson, Engelhardt), immigration
    • Dismissing in part and denying in part petitioner’s petition for review of BIA order dismissing his appeal from the denial by the Immigration Judge (IJ) of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
  • U.S. v. Killian, 21-30018, appeal from W.D. La.
    • per curiam (Smith, Stewart, Higginson), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.