Take the Fifth: Oct. 15, 2020 opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for Publication

  • Taylor v. McDonald, 18-11572, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • Smith, J. (Smith, Clement, Oldham), prisoner suit, § 1983, qualified immunity
    • Affirming qualified-immunity-based dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 suit for deprivation of due process by keeping him confined to a psychiatric unit without an involuntary commitment proceeding. Prisoner had initially consented to transfer to psychiatric unit, but then was kept there for two months after he withdrew his consent. He had been placed in a special suicide prevention ward by the “Warden’s Committee,” then transferred to normal cells in the psychiatric unit, all without a formal involuntary commitment proceeding. He brought suit against the members of the Warden’s Committee, claiming that his due process rights were violated under the standard in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980), wherein the Court held that “the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections.”
    • In determining what the clearly established right under the Due Process Clause is for purposes of the qualified immunity inquiry, the Court examined Vitek as it had been clarified in the Fifth Circuit in Toney v. Owens, 779 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 2015), and held, “[H]ousing an inmate in a psychiatric unit, without more, does not necessarily trigger a liberty interest clearly established by Jones or its progeny. If the conditions of confinement at the psychiatric unit were, hypothetically, not qualitatively different from the conditions at a typical prison, then there would be no liberty interest in avoiding being housed there.” The Court then observed that it could be the case that, if consent is first given by the prisoner to the transfer (as here) and then withdrawn, and if the level of psychiatric care to which he is subjected is minimal, then there could be a case where the conditions of confinement were not qualitatively different in order to trigger the Due Process violation.
    • But, wrote the Court, “We need not—and do not—decide that issue today. … It is enough that it is not clearly established that an inmate has a liberty interest in being transferred out of a psychiatric unit to which he initially consented to be admitted and where he is not receiving treatment.” (Emphasis added). The Court then held that there is no clearly established precedent that the time spent in the suicide prevention ward subjected the plaintiff to qualitatively different conditions. Because there is not a “clearly established” Due Process right, regardless whether that right could be established, then qualified immunity is triggered.
  • Dierlam v. Trump, 18-20440, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • Willett, J. (Clement, Haynes, Willett), Affordable Care Act, mootness
    • Vacating district court’s dismissal of individual’s challenge to the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), and remanding for district court to make mootness analysis as to prospective relief sought by plaintiff and to allow plaintiff to amend complaint with regard to jurisdictional deficiencies for retrospective relief.
    • Upon learning of the DHH’s implementing regulations for the ACA requiring insurers to provide contraceptive coverage, plaintiff, claiming to be a devout Catholic, refused his employer-provided health insurance and paid the ACA’s “shared-responsibility payment” under its individual mandate. He then brought pro se suit against various government entities under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), various Constitutional provisions, and a provision of the ACA, seeking prospective relief (an injunction of the individual mandate, a declaration that the mandates are unconstitutional, and a simpler exemption process for contraceptive objectors) and retrospective relief (a refund of the shared-responsibility payments he paid prior to their repeal in the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act (“TCJA”)). The district court dismissed his claims.
    • To resolve jurisdictional issues that must be determined before the merits of plaintiff’s claims could be ruled on, the Court laid out the mootness analytical framework. The Court then recognized that the ACA landscape as to the individual mandate and the contraception exemptions had been shifting through the course of the litigation, such that a full mootness analysis of the prospective relief requested by the plaintiff based on the current state of the ACA was not possible at the district court. For example, the TCJA eliminated the shared-responsibility payments after the magistrate recommendation of dismissal but before the hearing at the district court, and the district court did not rule definitively whether the TCJA eliminated the need for that prospective relief. And the Supreme Court only ruled that injunction of the HHS exemption for individuals with moral objections to contraceptive coverage should be dissolved in its opinion in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020). Accordingly, and also in light of factual disputes as to the availability of contraception-free insurance plans to plaintiff, the Court held that the district court’s dismissal as to prospective relief should be vacated and remanded for a full mootness analysis.
    • As to plaintiff’s request for retrospective relief as to his shared responsibility payments for 2014 and 2015, the Court held (and both parties agreed) that the district court’s dismissal should not have been with prejudice, but should have instead allowed plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend his complaint to cure any deficiencies.
  • U.S. v. Madrid, 19-50999, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • Engelhardt, J. (Graves, Costa, Engelhardt), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence of defendant who pled guilty to conspiracy to possess child pornography, and whose sentence included 70 months’ imprisonment, 10 years’ supervised release, $25,000 fine, $100 mandatory special assessment, $5,000 special assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (“JVTA”), and a $5,000 assessment under the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018 (“AVAA”).
    • The Court first held that the appeal breached the appeal-waiver in defendant’s plea agreement, that neither of the two limited exceptions to that appeal-waiver were present here.
    • But the Court then noted that the appeal-waiver did not strip it of jurisdiction, and that it could go further and affirm the sentence on the merits. The Court held that the district court did not err in imposing a special assessment under the AVAA because it was not a restitution to a particular victim. The Court also held that there was no ambiguity or discrepancy with regard to his JVTA assessment, and that there was only one JVTA assessment imposed. Finally the Court held that the district court did not commit plain error in declining to account for the time defendant spent in state custody on a separate, subsequently dropped, state charge for drug possession.

Unpublished opinions

  • U.S. v. Lander, 19-11234, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Clement, Higginson, Engelhardt), criminal, marital communications privilege, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel
    • Affirming conviction on transportation of a minor with intent to engage in sexual activities.
  • Charles v. Child Protective Services, 19-20366, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Willett, Ho, Duncan), habeas corpus, jurisdiction
    • Because notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after judgment, dismissing appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction of judgment dismissing habeas petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
  • U.S. v. Martinez-Guerra, 19-40387, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Higginbotham, Jones, Costa), criminal, guilty plea, sentencing
    • Affirming conviction and sentence.
  • U.S. v. Valdez, 19-40793, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Barksdale, Elrod, Ho), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence that considered as included in quantity of drugs those drugs that were intended for personal use.