July 10, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • United States v. Payne, 24-60583, appeal from N.D. Miss.
    • Clement, J. (Jones, Clement, Richman) (oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming 180-month sentence on conviction of selling methamphetamine that was based on a criminal history score that included an expunged state conviction.
    • Juan Payne pleaded guilty to selling methamphetamine (461.9 grams in two transactions) under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). While his federal indictment was pending, Payne petitioned a Mississippi state court and obtained an expungement of a 2006 felony conviction for selling marijuana under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-71. The state court granted the expungement without holding a hearing and without any finding of rehabilitation. The district court counted the marijuana conviction toward Payne’s criminal history score, calculated a Guidelines range of 262–327 months, and then varied downward to 180 months’ imprisonment plus five years of supervised release.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether a conviction expunged under Mississippi’s § 99-19-71 qualifies as “expunged” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j), such that it cannot be counted toward a defendant’s criminal history score; (2) whether any error was harmless.
    • The court held that the district court did not err in counting Payne’s expunged marijuana conviction because an expungement under Mississippi’s statute is not an “expungement” within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. Even if it were error, it was harmless because the district court explicitly stated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless.
    • Under Application Note 10 to § 4A1.2, convictions “set aside” for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law—such as restoring civil rights or removing stigma—must still be counted; only convictions expunged due to innocence or legal error are excluded. The court held that the label a state legislature uses (“expunged,” “set aside,” “pardoned”) is legally irrelevant; what matters is the “true basis” for the expungement. Allowing state nomenclature to control “would frustrate ‘the goal of uniformity’ in federal sentencing.”
    • Mississippi’s § 99-19-71 does not require the petitioner to establish innocence or identify a legal error; it authorizes expungement five years after successful completion of a sentence if the court finds rehabilitation. The statute does not limit use of the expunged conviction in sentencing, prohibits physical destruction of records, preserves nonpublic records for law enforcement, and requires disclosure in certain proceedings—all confirming that its “central aim is to restore a defendant’s civil rights and remove any stigma attached to the conviction.”
    • The court concluded: “Expungement is ‘an act of legislative grace.’ … In Mississippi, it exists ‘to promote rehabilitation and allow rehabilitated persons to move on with their lives—not to prevent sentencing enhancements.'” And: “[A]n expungement may play an important role in helping defendants overcome legal barriers and successfully reintegrate into society, [but] it does not shield them from the consequences of their recidivism.”
  • Rodriguez v. Ortega, 26-50183; c/w Angel v. Mullin, 26-50219; c/w Gomez Alvarado v. Vergara, 26-50221; appeals from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (en banc) (oral argument at original panel); immigration, due process, en banc
    • Sua sponte ordering en banc rehearing of July 2, 2026, panel opinion (Southwick, Graves, Wilson; Graves, specially concurring; Wilson, dissenting) that affirmed that immigrants’ due process rights were violated by detention more than 90 days without bond hearings.

Unpublished decisions

  • United States v. Reshon Lamont Scott, 24-40715, appeal from E.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Higginson, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming 60-month revocation sentence.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the district court impermissibly considered the retributive factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing a 60-month revocation sentence.
    • Because Scott did not preserve the issue below and failed to provide any plain-error analysis on appeal—offering no argument that the district court clearly or obviously erred and failing to address the third and fourth prongs of plain error—the court held that Scott waived the issues by inadequate briefing and did not meet his burden under the plain-error standard.
  • United States v. Darren Tramaine Jackson, 25-40150, appeal from E.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Davis, Wilson, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, sufficiency of evidence, 404(b)
    • Affirming convictions of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) sufficiency of the evidence to sustain convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine; and (2) whether the district court plainly erred by admitting evidence of a prior drug conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
    • On Count 1 (conspiracy), the Government presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of a knowing agreement to distribute. On Count 2 (possession with intent to distribute), the evidence was sufficient to show Jackson had knowledge of and access to the drugs. On the 404(b) issue, Jackson failed to show plain error where his intent and knowledge were central issues and the court gave a limiting instruction.
  • United States v. Mario Ramirez-Martinez, 26-40020, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Wiener, Stewart, Richman) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • Ayika v. United States, 26-50061, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), habeas corpus
    • Affirming dismissal of sec. 2241 petition.
    • At issue on appeal was whether a federal prisoner convicted of unlawful distribution of hydrocodone under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) may obtain habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 based on the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450 (2022), by invoking the “savings clause” of § 2255(e).
    • The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023), abrogated the Fifth Circuit’s prior Reyes-Requena framework and forecloses a prisoner asserting an intervening change in statutory interpretation from circumventing restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions by filing a § 2241 petition.
  • United States v. Jason Michael Schubert, 24-50787, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Duncan, Oldham, Wilson) (no oral argument), habeas corpus, ineffective assistance of counsel
    • Affirming denial of sec. 2255 petition.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in denying a § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object to an inapplicable two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3). The key question was whether the erroneous Guidelines calculation was prejudicial under Strickland v. Washington. Schubert argued that Molina-Martinez v. United States creates a presumption of prejudice whenever a sentence is imposed under an incorrect Guidelines range, and that this presumption applies equally in the collateral-attack context.
    • Even assuming Molina-Martinez‘s presumption could apply on collateral review, the presumption was rebutted because the record clearly showed the district court imposed Schubert’s 70-month sentence—below even the correct Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months—independent of the Guidelines calculation. The district court itself stated it “rendered its sentence independent of the Guideline range,” and the same judge who sentenced Schubert also denied the § 2255 petition, giving sizable weight to that representation. Schubert therefore failed to show a reasonable probability that the proceedings would have yielded a different result.
  • United States v. Tristan Barber, 25-30430, appeal from W.D. La.
    • per curiam (Duncan, Oldham, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court clearly erred in applying the felon-in-possession cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) by finding that Barber used his firearm in connection with the attempted murder of two rival gang members; and (2) whether the three-level bodily-injury enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(b)(1)(C) was appropriate.
    • On the cross reference, the court found that the PSR contained detailed, mutually reinforcing circumstantial evidence—including ballistic matches, geolocation data, surveillance footage, text messages, and social-media posts—linking Barber’s Glock to the attempted murder, and Barber offered no rebuttal evidence. The court also rejected arguments that absence of direct evidence, the temporal/geographic gap between the shooting and arrest, and alleged lack of malice aforethought barred the cross reference. On the injury enhancement, the district court reasonably placed the victims’ injuries—multiple gunshot wounds requiring trauma transfer, multi-day hospitalization, and surgery—in the middle category between “serious bodily injury” and “permanent or life-threatening bodily injury.”
  • United States v. John Earl Edwards, 25-40234, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Richman, Duncan) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • United States v. Terrence Taylor, Sr., 25-30733, appeal from W.D. La.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming in part and dismissing in part appeal from sentence on possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court clearly erred by inferring that unseized, untested methamphetamine attributed to defendant qualified as “ice” based on purity levels of seized methamphetamine; (2) substantive reasonableness of a within-guidelines sentence; and (3) Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge.
    • On drug quantity, the district court did not clearly err because the PSR’s findings bore sufficient indicia of reliability, defendant offered no rebuttal, and it was reasonable to infer that untested methamphetamine from the same co-defendant source had a similar purity level to tested samples. The substantive-reasonableness challenge was dismissed because Taylor waived the right to challenge a within-guidelines sentence in his plea agreement, and he failed to contest the waiver’s validity. The Eighth Amendment claim, raised for the first time on appeal, failed under plain-error review as conclusory.
  • United States v. Billy D. Cooper, 25-60701, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal, sentence reduction
    • Affirming denial of motion to reconsider denial of motion for sentence reduction.
    • At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in denying reconsideration of a sentence-reduction order under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), where defendant argued his life-without-release sentence for carjacking resulting in death should have been reduced along with his other counts under a retroactive Guidelines amendment.
    • The life sentence was imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3594 based on the jury’s unanimous recommendation—not based on any Guidelines range—so a retroactive Guidelines amendment could not reach it. The Double Jeopardy argument failed because conspiracy and the underlying offense are separate offenses. Cooper’s claim that counsel failed to consult him before filing a sentence-reduction motion was meritless because the district court acted on its own motion.
  • United States v. Sealed Appellant, 25-30466, appeal from W.D. La.
    • per curiam (Richman, Higginson, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence.
    • At issue on appeal was (1) whether the district court erred by granting a § 5K1.1 substantial-assistance motion yet imposing a within-guidelines sentence rather than departing below the original range; (2) whether the court improperly relied on non-assistance-related factors (criminal history, drug quantity) in determining the extent of a § 5K1.1 departure; and (3) whether the court failed to conduct an independent inquiry into the nature of defendant’s assistance.
    • On issue (1), the court acknowledged that under United States v. Hashimoto, granting a § 5K1.1 motion without actually departing below the guidelines range is clear and obvious error. However, as in Hashimoto, the error did not require vacatur because the district court clearly recognized its authority to depart and rendered an unambiguous sentence within its discretion. On issues (2) and (3), even assuming error, the appellant could not show it affected the outcome because the district court expressly stated it would impose the same sentence regardless of the guideline determinations, and the record showed the court did conduct an independent assessment of the § 5K1.1 motion.
  • United States v. John Anthony Castro, 24-11000, c/w 26-10428, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Duncan, Oldham, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, Brady violation, Confrontation Clause, sentencing
    • Affirming in part conviction and sentence, and dismissing appeal in part.
    • At issue on appeal was whether (1) jurisdiction over post-notice motions (motion to correct trial transcripts and motion for new trial) under the “one-court-at-a-time” rule and Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(3); (2) Brady-based motion for new trial; (3) Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause waiver via stipulations; (4) four-level leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a); (5) two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; and (6) bail pending appeal.
    • Jurisdiction: The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the challenge to the trial-transcript correction order because it was a post-judgment order requiring a separate notice of appeal. The court held it did have jurisdiction over the new-trial motion because Rule 4(b)(3) tolled the effectiveness of the notice of appeal; the Government forfeited any timeliness objection to the Rule 33 motion by failing to raise it below, and Rule 4(b)(3) is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule.
    • Brady: Castro’s Brady claims failed. Evidence of the witness’s husband’s tax lien was cumulative impeachment of an already-impeached witness and therefore immaterial; the witness’s marital status was not actually suppressed (Castro knew it at trial); and his claim of a verbal immunity agreement was wholly conclusory. No evidentiary hearing was required.
    • Confrontation Clause: Castro waived his confrontation rights because he agreed in writing to the stipulations, did not dissent at trial, and the stipulations were part of a legitimate trial strategy of narrowing the issues to willfulness.
    • Leadership Enhancement (§ 3B1.1(a)): Affirmed because, regardless of whether five criminally responsible participants were involved, the scheme was “otherwise extensive”—it involved family members, attorneys, and a CPA whose contributions were essential to the enterprise, resulting in over $15 million in estimated tax loss.
    • Obstruction Enhancement (§ 3C1.1): Affirmed. The record showed Castro filed multiple lawsuits against the investigating IRS agent and others, sent threatening communications, and his behavior made witnesses hesitant to testify—sufficient to support Application Note 4(A) (threatening or intimidating a witness).
    • Bail Pending Appeal (No. 26-10428): Dismissed as moot because the court previously denied bail.