June 24, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • Roberts v. KJ Win, Inc., 25-60263, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • Wilson, J. (Southwick, Graves, Wilson) (oral argument), default judgment, service of process, damages, Rule 60
    • Affirming denial of Rule 60(b) relief from default judgment.
    • After a December 2021 multi-vehicle crash on I-20 in Mississippi, Cheryl Roberts and William Chambers sued KJ Win, Inc., a California-incorporated trucking company, alleging its driver negligently parked a tractor-trailer on the interstate shoulder, triggering a chain-reaction collision. Roberts alleged traumatic brain injury and ongoing neurological, orthopedic, and psychological problems; Chambers alleged a fractured sternum, headaches, and PTSD. Plaintiffs could not locate KJ Win’s registered agent at addresses on file, so the district court authorized substituted service through the California Secretary of State. KJ Win never appeared, and the district court entered a $2.8 million default judgment after an evidentiary hearing on damages. Three months later, KJ Win surfaced and moved under Rule 60(b) to set aside the judgment; the district court denied the motion after finding the default was willful.
    • At issue on appeal were (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in finding KJ Win’s default willful under Rule 60(b)(1); (2) whether the default judgment was void under Rule 60(b)(4) for defective service (raised for the first time on appeal); (3) whether challenges to the damages award (Mississippi’s statutory cap and a pro tanto offset) could be raised for the first time on appeal; and (4) whether equity and justice warranted consideration of forfeited arguments.
    • As in Wooten v. McDonald Transit Associates, KJ Win offered “no explanation for what happened” between service and its motion to vacate, and its counsel could not “conjure a supporting affidavit or even affirmatively deny that KJ Win knew of this suit.” The court held that once service is treated as valid, a defendant cannot satisfy Rule 60(b)(1) merely by insisting its nonappearance was unintentional without any evidence showing how the failure to respond occurred. Because “[a] finding of willful default ends the inquiry,” the district court was not required to analyze prejudice or meritorious defenses.
    • On the Rule 60(b)(4) void-judgment argument raised for the first time on appeal, the court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Swaim v. Moltan Co. that personal-jurisdiction challenges to default judgments are forfeited if not raised in a Rule 60(b) motion below. The court found this “fits comfortably with our ordinary forfeiture principles, our treatment of personal jurisdiction as a waivable defense, and our requirement that objections to service of process be raised in a timely fashion.” It also “prevents a defendant from withholding a threshold jurisdictional objection while pursuing other grounds for relief from default, only to revive that omitted objection for the first time on appeal.”
    • The court declined KJ Win’s equity-and-justice argument because the forfeited claims were not “purely legal” matters—the service argument hinged on factual issues regarding manner, timing, and adequacy of service, and the damages arguments were undeveloped below. The court concluded: “Given that KJ Win offered no explanation for its default, its failure to maintain an address for service of process, or its failure to challenge the damages awarded by the district court in its Rule 60 motion, equity and justice do not compel giving KJ Win a do-over now.”
  • VDX Distro, Inc. v. FDA, 24-60537, petition for review of FDA order
    • Wilson, J. (Elrod, Smith, Wilson) (oral argument), major questions doctrine, nondelegation doctrine, administrative law
    • Denying petition for review of FDA order denying application for premarket authorization for menthol-flavored e-cigarette products.
    • VDX Distro, Inc. manufactures nicotine-infused e-cigarette liquids sold to retailers including Vapetastic, LLC. Under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), manufacturers cannot market tobacco products—including e-cigarettes—without FDA premarket authorization. VDX applied for authorization of its “Four Seasons” menthol-flavored e-cigarette products. FDA denied the application under its “comparative-efficacy standard,” which requires non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarette applicants to demonstrate that their product provides a cessation benefit to adult smokers over and above tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes, because non-tobacco flavors pose heightened risks of youth initiation. FDA found VDX’s application “lack[ed] sufficient evidence” that its menthol products’ benefits to adults outweighed the risks to youth.
    • At issue on appeal were (1) whether the major questions (or nondelegation) doctrine bars FDA’s assertion of regulatory authority over e-cigarettes; (2) whether the TCA’s “appropriate for the protection of the public health” (APPH) standard is unconstitutionally vague; (3) whether FDA’s comparative-efficacy standard is a “tobacco product standard” adopted in violation of TCA notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements; and (4) whether FDA’s denial of VDX’s application was arbitrary and capricious.
    • On the nondelegation/major questions challenge, the court held Petitioners’ argument was “on all fours” with Big Time Vapes, Inc. v. FDA, in which the Fifth Circuit held that “Congress plainly limited the authority that it delegated” to FDA under the TCA. The court also clarified the distinction between the two doctrines: the major questions doctrine “guard[s] against unintentional, oblique, or otherwise unlikely delegations,” while the nondelegation doctrine “ensures democratic accountability by preventing Congress from intentionally delegating its legislative powers to unelected officials.” On vagueness, the court held the APPH standard “does not, by itself, prohibit anything”—it is an adjudicatory standard, not conduct-regulating—so it cannot be attacked as vague; “[i]t is perfectly clear what a manufacturer must do to avoid violating the TCA: Do not market e-cigarettes without FDA preapproval.”
    • On the notice-and-comment challenge, the court drew a sharp distinction between “tobacco product standards” under the TCA—which “draw hard-and-fast lines” and categorically ban certain attributes (e.g., flavored cigarettes, pesticide limits)—and the comparative-efficacy standard, which is “a balancing test, not a ban.” The court emphasized that the comparative-efficacy standard “channels the flexible adjudicatory discretion that a tobacco product standard would usurp.” Citing Wages & White Lion, the court noted that “agencies may generally develop regulatory standards through either adjudication or rulemaking,” and FDA had “discretion to work out the meaning of the TCA’s comparative standard when evaluating premarket tobacco product applications.”
    • On arbitrary-and-capricious review, the court rejected claims that FDA relied on stale data, noting FDA was “well aware that youth e-cigarette use had been declining since 2019” but “affirmatively took credit for it” and reasoned that the problem persisted at “worryingly high levels.” It rejected the “population as a whole” argument, explaining the TCA itself directs FDA to consider particular subpopulations—existing users likely to stop and non-users likely to start. And on VDX’s marketing plan, FDA adequately explained that point-of-sale restrictions were insufficient because youths often obtain e-cigarettes from friends, family, or theft, and that only device-level measures like biometric locks had proven effective.