June 17, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Louisiana International Marine, L.L.C., 25-30331, appeal from E.D. La.
    • Jones, J. (Jones, Stewart, Willett) (oral argument), maritime law, attorneys’ fees
    • Affirming district court’s finding of valid maritime liens and denial of attorneys’ fees.
    • Louisiana International Marine (“LIM”) provided towage services via two tugboats to barges owned by Trailer Bridge and chartered to a third party, Work Cat. Work Cat paid only a fraction of LIM’s invoices and eventually filed for bankruptcy. The barge charter between Trailer Bridge and Work Cat contained a “no-lien” clause requiring Work Cat to indemnify Trailer Bridge against any liens on the barges. LIM filed notices of maritime lien against the barges; Trailer Bridge sued for a declaration that no lien existed. After a bench trial, the district court found valid liens on both barges and denied attorney’s fees to either side.
    • At issue on appeal were (1) whether LIM held valid maritime liens on the barges under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act (CIMLA), 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a); (2) whether the no-lien clause in the barge charter defeated those liens; (3) whether LIM had a duty of reasonable diligence to discover the no-lien clause; (4) the proper scope and valuation of the liens, including whether fuel and lubricant costs were lienable; and (5) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying attorney’s fees.
    • LIM satisfied all three requirements for a maritime lien under CIMLA: it provided a “necessary” (towage), to a vessel (the barges), on the order of a person authorized by the owner (Work Cat’s agents, who enjoy a statutory presumption of authority under § 31341(a)(4)). Trailer Bridge failed to rebut the strong presumption favoring the lien—invoicing only the charterer is “inadequate to show that a creditor relied solely on such charterer,” and LIM’s corporate representative clarified at trial that LIM did not view Work Cat “as the sole source” of payment.
    • The no-lien clause did not defeat the lien because LIM lacked actual knowledge of it at the time it entered the Tug Charter. Although LIM received the barge charter by email on December 20, 2020, the Tug Charter had already been executed on November 12, 2020, with performance beginning December 11. The court held: “actual knowledge of a no-lien provision must precede the completion of an agreement.” The court also rejected Trailer Bridge’s argument that LIM had an independent duty of reasonable diligence, explaining that Congress’s 1971 amendment eliminated that requirement for all suppliers covered by CIMLA, including providers of towage. As the court put it, Trailer Bridge’s reading of the no-lien clause as independently barring lien formation under § 31342(a) “would vitiate decades of this court’s precedents applying the actual knowledge requirement.”
    • On lien valuation, the court relied on Trico Marine to hold that standby time is lienable alongside transit time when a day-rate charter structure necessarily encompasses both. However, fuel and lubricant costs were properly excluded because CIMLA is applied stricti juris: “If consumable costs for the Tugs constitute necessaries provided to the Barges, then labor or repair costs for tugboats might also qualify,” an outcome that “runs afoul of this court’s practice of strictly limiting necessaries.” On attorneys’ fees, the statute’s use of “may” gives courts broad discretion, and the district court permissibly concluded that the unusual posture of the litigation—where no separate substantive basis for in personam liability existed—made it equitable for each party to bear its own costs.

Unpublished decisions

  • United States v. Palmer, 25-40145, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • United States v. Rubell, 26-10016, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Higginson, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, supervised release
    • Affirming revocation judgment, rejecting argument that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) is unconstitutional under United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634 (2019), because it requires mandatory revocation of supervised release and imprisonment without a jury trial or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as foreclosed by United States v. Garner, 969 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2020).
  • Young v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 25-60518, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Engelhardt, Douglas) (oral argument), insurance
    • Affirming 12(c) dismissal of claims regarding insurance coverage and amounts.
    • At issue on appeal were (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings rather than waiting for summary judgment or class certification; (2) whether State Farm’s demand for appraisal was timely; (3) whether the plaintiff’s acceptance of an appraisal award—without subsequent challenge—barred her breach-of-contract and tort claims; and (4) whether claims for bad faith, declaratory, and injunctive relief survived.
    • The court held that (a) the district court did not abuse its discretion in taking up the 12(c) motion, as the extra-circuit authority Young cited was readily distinguishable; (b) State Farm timely demanded appraisal approximately three months after impasse, and Young identified no clear error in the district court’s factual findings; (c) Young’s unchallenged acceptance of the Appraisal Award—combined with her failure to contest it before the district court—barred her contract claims, relying on Mississippi Supreme Court precedent in Sweet Valley Missionary v. Alfa Insurance Corp., 192 So. 3d 990 (Miss. 2016); and (d) her tort claims were duplicative, and her declaratory/injunctive relief claims failed because the underlying substantive claims had already failed.
  • Borchgrevink v. Sheriff Ed Gonzalez, 25-20457, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Higginson, Duncan) (oral argument), appellate jurisdiction, qualified immunity
    • Affirming denial of qualified immunity dismissal on claims arising from pretrial detainee’s death.
    • At issue on appeal were (1) whether the court had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine over an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage; and (2) whether the facts alleged in the complaint were sufficient to establish a violation of clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights against a sheriff whose policies, customs, and failure to train allegedly caused a pretrial detainee’s death from diabetic ketoacidosis.
    • The court found jurisdiction because Gonzalez did not dispute the factual allegations but rather argued they were legally insufficient—a permissible basis for interlocutory review under Ramirez v. Escaja, 921 F.3d 497 (5th Cir. 2019). On the merits, the court held that Fifth Circuit precedent—citing Colle v. Brazos County, 981 F.2d 237, 246 (5th Cir. 1993)—confirmed the plaintiffs’ case could proceed against Sheriff Gonzalez, and there was no error in the district court’s denial of qualified immunity at this stage.