April 2, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • Porch.com v. Gallagher Re, Inc., 25-10489, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • Duncan, J. (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (oral argument), breach of contract, insurance
    • Affirming dismissal of claims under two sections of reinsurance agreement, but reversing dismissal of claim under a third section, and remanding for further proceedings.
    • Porch.com’s subsidiary, Homeowners of America Insurance Co. (HOA), entered into a reinsurance-intermediary-authorization agreement (RIAA) with Gallagher, a reinsurance broker. Gallagher brokered a reinsurance agreement involving Whiterock as insurer and Vesttoo, a reinsurance-finance company. The agreement called for China Construction Bank (CCB) to provide a letter of credit, but HOA received only a collateral letter from Yu Po Finance stating that a CCB letter of credit would “eventually” be provided. Despite this, Gallagher continued to refer to the collateral letter as a “letter of credit” and assured HOA the policy was funded. Based on these assurances, HOA authorized Vesttoo to withdraw $25 million from the reinsurance account. In July 2023, media reports revealed Vesttoo had posted invalid letters of collateral and had filed for bankruptcy; CCB confirmed it had never issued a letter of credit. The Texas Department of Insurance placed HOA under temporary supervision, and Porch had to inject tens of millions of dollars to stabilize HOA.
    • At issue on appeal was whether Porch plausibly alleged breach-of-contract claims under Sections 5 (document retention), 11 (compliance with applicable laws), and 13 (administrative services) of the RIAA.
    • The court held that “retain” means to “hold in possession or under control; to keep and not lose, part with, or dismiss,” and Porch was trying to read into the word an obligation to procure documents Gallagher never possessed. Moreover, even if such an obligation existed, Section 5 requires retention of documents from a “reinsurer,” and CCB is a financial institution, not a reinsurer. As the court noted: “Transforming CCB into a ‘reinsurer’ would read an unwritten obligation into Section 5.”
    • Porch argued that the RIAA’s requirement to comply with “economic or trade sanctions laws” encompassed Texas insurance laws because they are “economic” in nature. The court rejected this, finding Porch “read[s] the term ‘economic’ in isolation,” when in context, it clearly modifies “sanctions laws.” The court quoted Texas precedent: “Courts strive to honor the parties’ agreement and not remake their contract by reading additional provisions into it”.
    • The court found that Porch plausibly alleged post-placement failures, including Gallagher’s failure to recognize the distinction between a collateral letter and a letter of credit, its repeated misrepresentations to HOA that the collateral was valid, and its assurance that HOA could “safely” allow the $25 million withdrawal. The court held Section 13 was, “[a]t a minimum,” ambiguous as to Gallagher’s duties, and that determining what “servicing duties [are] customarily performed” by an intermediary broker is “a fact question inappropriate for resolution by motion to dismiss.”
  • United States v. Weaver, 25-60269, appeal from N.D. Miss.
    • Jones, J. (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (oral argument), criminal, search and seizure, Miranda rights
    • In March 2024, officers executed a search warrant at Weaver’s home in Starkville, Mississippi, recovering methamphetamine, cocaine, firearms, money, and cellphones. The warrant was obtained through an affidavit describing three controlled drug buys using a confidential informant under continuous law enforcement surveillance. The warrant was approved by a municipal court judge via FaceTime, a practice authorized by a Mississippi Supreme Court Emergency Order issued during COVID-19. After his arrest, Weaver was given Miranda warnings, and the officer asked him to sign a form, telling him the signature was “just saying that I read that to you.” The form, however, contained a waiver-of-rights section that the officer did not read aloud and that Weaver appeared not to read. Weaver then spoke cooperatively with officers for about an hour and was subsequently indicted on five drug-trafficking and firearms counts. The district court granted Weaver’s motion to suppress both the physical evidence and his statements.
    • The issues on appeal were (1) whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule saved the evidence obtained under the search warrant, even if the supporting affidavit was arguably deficient; and (2) whether Weaver’s Miranda waiver was valid—either as an express waiver (via the signed form) or as an implied waiver.
    • The court held the affidavit was not a “bare bones” document containing “wholly conclusory statements.” It detailed the timeframes of drug buys, the address, the type of drug, the controlled buy process, a conversation among the CI, Weaver, and a named third individual, and the make and model of a vehicle driven by Weaver. The court distinguished prior bare-bones cases and concluded: “[W]hatever one might conclude in hindsight about the strength of the evidence it recounts, the affidavit is not ‘wholly conclusory.'” The court also rejected the district court’s criticism of the FaceTime warrant procedure, noting that the judge acted under a still-effective state Supreme Court Emergency Order, and adding: “Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”
    • The court agreed with the district court that Weaver’s express waiver was involuntary because he signed the form “under the pretense that it was an acknowledgement that Officer Mittan read his Miranda rights to him,” when in fact the signature constituted a waiver of rights. The court noted that even though the officer claimed no deceptive intent, “the state of mind of the police is irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and voluntariness of [the suspect’s] election to abandon his rights.” However, the court held that the inquiry does not end there because waiver can also be implied through “the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.” Because the district court “neglected to perform an implied waiver analysis,” the panel remanded for that determination and retained jurisdiction pending the outcome.

Unpublished decisions

  • United States v. Justin Lattier, 25-10995, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • United States v. Mario Alonzo Pena-Llanas, 25-40311, c/w 25-40312, 25-40324, 25-40321, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • United States v. Joshua Gene Fulton, 25-11045, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • United States v. Lakee Donae Ealey, 25-10292, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Higginbotham, Higginson, Engelhardt) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • United States v. Carlos Robles, 25-10468, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Duncan, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming 360-month sentence on conviction of interstate travel with intent to engage in a sexual act with a minor.
    • The court held the cross-reference was properly applied because the exchange of explicit videos between Robles and the minor constituted grooming behavior qualifying as relevant conduct “in preparation for” the offense. The § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement was proper because sexual contact undisputedly occurred during Robles’s interstate travel. As to supervised release, the SORNA condition merely directs who may issue compliance instructions and does not impermissibly delegate judicial authority. The plethysmograph-testing challenge was foreclosed by circuit precedent (United States v. Ellis). The sexually-explicit-materials ban was supported by the record showing a nexus between Robles’s interest in legal adult pornography and his sexual interest in minors.
  • United States v. Noel Mercado, 25-40363, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Willett, Wilson, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming 36-month sentence on conviction of transporting an illegal alien.
  • United States v. William Robert Shepherd III, 24-60622, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Affirming conviction of possession of an unregistered firearm (a short-barreled shotgun).
  • Valerie Prevost v. City of Houston, Legal Department Labor and Employment, 25-20264, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), employment discrimination, Title VII, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Americans with Disabilities Act
    • Affirming dismissal of employment discrimination claims.
    • Prevost, a retired City of Houston employee, alleged employment discrimination based on religion, age, and disability under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. The core dispute involved a security policy change at a gated facility that required all vehicle operators dropping off employees to present a driver’s license—a requirement Prevost refused to comply with. She also raised retaliation claims and alleged magistrate-judge bias.
    • The court found that all claims except the gate-access claim were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Prevost’s EEOC charge contained facts relating only to the gate-access issue. On the gate-access claim, Prevost failed to establish a prima facie case under any of the three statutes because every employee was subject to the same security policy, and she voluntarily chose not to comply. Her retaliation claim failed for lack of any causal link, and the bias allegation was found frivolous.
  • Ivy Cook v. Social Security Administration, 25-30503, appeal from E.D. La.
    • per curiam (Willett, Wilson, Douglas) (no oral argument), social security
    • Affirming partial denial of disability benefits.
    • Cook applied for disability-insurance benefits and supplemental security income, principally alleging disability from carpal-tunnel syndrome. An ALJ issued a partially favorable decision finding Cook disabled as of August 2021. Cook contended her disability began six months earlier, in February 2021, and argued the ALJ misapplied agency rulings governing disability onset dates.
    • The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s onset-date determination. Before August 2021, the record did not show serious treatment, objective findings of disabling upper-extremity limitations, or treating-physician opinions indicating Cook could not work. The state-agency medical consultant identified the same inflection point. The ALJ was not required to infer an earlier onset date simply because some symptoms appeared sooner, and earlier diagnoses did not by themselves establish disability.
  • Neil McDougall v. Saudi Arabian Oil Company (d/b/a Saudi Aramco), 25-10619, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Southwick, Haynes) (oral argument), employment, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
    • Affirming summary judgment dismissal of former employee’s fraud claims against employer.
    • McDougall, a former Saudi Aramco employee in Saudi Arabia, sued Saudi Aramco in Texas for fraud arising from the alleged withholding of employment documents needed to pursue a benefits claim. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. McDougall argued the commercial-activity exception and the expropriation exception applied, pointing to commercial activities carried on in the United States by Aramco Services Company (“ASC”), a Saudi Aramco subsidiary based in Houston. McDougall also argued the district court improperly applied a minimum-contacts analysis in light of CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 145 S. Ct. 1572 (2025).
    • The court held that Saudi Aramco is a “foreign state” under the FSIA. However, ASC—the entity conducting the U.S.-based commercial activity—does not qualify as an agency or instrumentality of Saudi Arabia: it is not majority-owned by Saudi Arabia directly (only by Saudi Aramco, a tier removed), and McDougall pleaded no facts showing ASC is an “organ” of Saudi Arabia. Because ASC is not a foreign state, neither the commercial-activity nor the expropriation exception was met. The court also rejected the CC/Devas argument, noting that decision addressed personal jurisdiction under § 1330(b), not subject-matter jurisdiction, and the district court never conducted a minimum-contacts analysis.
  • Janice Brown and Jonathan Brown v. American First National Bank and Henry Wu, 25-20062, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Engelhardt, Summerhays, by designation) (oral argument withdrawn), sec. 1981
    • Affirming summary judgment dismissal of sec. 1981 claims.
    • The Browns, who are African American, alleged racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 after they were initially denied a personal checking account at AFNB’s Katy, Texas branch on October 21, 2022, allegedly accused of fraud, and escorted from the bank with a security guard. An AFNB employee reportedly told the Browns: “We don’t do business with black people. This is an Asian bank. Find another bank.” The district court granted summary judgment for AFNB.
    • The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and found that AFNB articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the initial denial—the Browns’ negative banking history report revealing delinquent accounts closed for “account abuse.” The Browns failed to produce sufficient Rule 56 evidence (e.g., deposition testimony, policy manuals, or banking records) to create a genuine dispute as to whether an Asian or Asian American customer with the same banking history would have been treated differently. The court also noted the Browns ultimately opened an AFNB account on November 4, 2022, and that AFNB took prompt remedial measures upon learning of the race-related comments.
  • Autoficio, L.L.C. and Brian Whiteside v. Cimble Corporation, Alvin Allen, and Paul Barrett, 24-40612, appeal from E.D. Tex.
    • Higginson, J. (Haynes, Higginson, Ho), Haynes, J., concurring in judgment only (no oral argument), fraud, breach of contract, standing
    • Affirming judgment on jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs on fraud and breach of contract claims.
    • Appellants (Cimble, Allen, and Barrett) appealed a jury verdict in favor of Whiteside on claims of statutory fraud, common-law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract under Texas law. The three issues on appeal were: (1) whether Whiteside had standing given that the contracts were signed on behalf of his entity, Kapexia; (2) whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of justifiable reliance; and (3) whether the district court erred in excluding a tape-recorded telephone conversation and its transcript.
    • On standing, the court held Whiteside had both constitutional standing (pocketbook injury from personal funds paid to Cimble) and contractual standing under the fourth Tinsley exception (agent with an interest in the subject matter of the contract), following Perry v. Breland. On reliance, the court found Appellants forfeited the argument by failing to provide record citations in their opening brief and raising new arguments in their reply. On the evidentiary ruling, even assuming error, Appellants failed to show the exclusion affected their substantial rights, especially because the recording could have been used for impeachment.
    • Judge Haynes concurred in the judgment only; no separate opinion was filed.
  • Catina Washington v. Burl Cain et al., 25-60109, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Elrod, Willett, Wilson) (no oral argument), sec. 1983, venue, standing
    • Affirming dismissal of sec. 1983 claim and denial of motion to transfer venue.
    • Washington, a prison case manager, filed a federal civil-rights suit against eleven Mississippi Department of Corrections officials, the Greene County Sheriff, and two prosecutors, alleging they failed to adequately investigate and prosecute a prisoner who attacked her at work. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) and entered partial final judgment with prejudice under Rule 54(b). Washington also challenged the district court’s refusal to transfer venue and the failure to hold a Spears hearing.
    • The court modified the judgment to reflect dismissal without prejudice and otherwise affirmed. Relying on Lefebure v. D’Aquilla and Linda R.S. v. Richard D., the court held that a crime victim lacks Article III standing to sue officials for failing to investigate or prosecute her attacker, whether the remedy sought is injunctive or damages. Because the proper basis for dismissal was lack of standing (not failure to state a claim), the dismissal was required to be without prejudice. The court also held that a Spears hearing was not required because the case was dismissed on the defendants’ motions after Washington had an opportunity to respond, not at the IFP screening stage. The venue-transfer challenge failed because Washington’s sole basis—adverse judicial rulings—did not establish bias.
  • United States v. Jorge Galvan-Martinez, 25-50371, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Higginson, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, search and seizure
    • Affirming conviction of conspiring to transport illegal aliens, upholding denial of motion to suppress.
    • Galvan-Martinez was indicted for conspiring to transport illegal aliens. He moved to suppress all evidence from the stop of his vehicle, arguing the Border Patrol agent lacked reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion, and Galvan-Martinez entered a conditional guilty plea preserving the suppression issue for appeal.
    • Reviewing factual findings for clear error and the legal conclusion of reasonable suspicion de novo, the court held that the totality of the circumstances—including proximity to the border, characteristics of the area, traffic patterns, the agent’s experience, and recent illegal activity—supported the finding of reasonable suspicion under United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and its progeny.