February 18-19, 2026, opinions

Designated for publication

  • Fletcher v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 25-20086, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • Elrod, C.J. (Elrod, Smith, Wilson) (oral argument withdrawn), artificial intelligence, sanctions
    • After unpublished per curiam opinion entered January 6, 2026, vacating sanctions order against plaintiff on Fair Credit Reporting Act claim, the Court of Appeals issued an order for the plaintiff’s counsel to show cause why the Court of Appeals should not issue sanctions for inaccurate citations in her reply brief. This opinion issues monetary sanctions upon consideration of counsel’s response.
    • The Fifth Circuit observed that the reply brief contained multiple “fabricated quotations and assertions … not supported by the underlying case law,” suspecting the substantial use of generative artificial intelligence without verification. The opinion detailed how counsel had cited cases for propositions they did not support, and directed counsel to explain her verification process, emphasizing that using AI “without ensuring that the legal propositions and authority generated are trustworthy … abdicate[s] one’s duty, waste[s] legal resources, and lower[s] the public’s respect for the legal profession and judicial proceedings.”
    • Ultimately, while the panel vacated the district court’s sanctions awards and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Fifth Circuit standards, it underscored the judiciary’s concern about accuracy in filings and proper attorney conduct. The opinion illustrates that counsel must both conduct reasonable pre-suit investigation and ensure the accuracy of cited authority, especially when employing AI tools: “If it were ever an excuse to plead ignorance … it is certainly no longer so.” The Court issued a sanction of $2,500.00.
  • Trader Joe’s Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 24-60367, petition for review of NLRB order
    • Douglas, J. (Dennis, Oldham, Douglas) (oral argument), Oldham, J., dissenting; labor law
    • Denying Trader Joe’s petition to review NLRB order that found that Trader Joe’s violated the National Labor Relations Act in its treatment of employees who had opposed the grocery chain’s responses to the COVID-19 pandemic., and granting the NLRB’s cross-petition to enforce.
    • The dispute centers on whether Trader Joe’s unlawfully disciplined and ultimately terminated a longtime employee, Jill Groeschel, in retaliation for her engaging in concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) and then the NLRB found multiple violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) of the NLRA, concluding that the company’s actions were motivated, at least in part, by animosity toward Groeschel’s protected conduct. The Board ordered reinstatement and recompense for losses, triggering the current judicial review.
    • Judge Douglas articulated the applicable standards: the court must uphold the NLRB’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence in the record and review legal conclusions de novo. On factual issues, the court may not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility; substantial evidence requires only that a reasonable mind could accept the Board’s evidentiary basis. On legal questions, the court independently determines correctness.
    • The majority agreed with the Board that Trader Joe’s violated Section 8(a)(1) when it issued a written warning to Groeschel, and Sections 8(a)(4) and 8(a)(1) when it suspended and later discharged her. These actions were tied to Groeschel’s engagement in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection of her fellow workers—specifically raising health and safety concerns during the COVID-19 pandemic. Judge Douglas explained that the Board properly applied established frameworks (e.g., Wright Line) to find that protected conduct was a motivating factor in the company’s disciplinary responses. She further rejected Trader Joe’s arguments challenging those determinations, holding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s assessment of motive and animus.
    • The opinion detailed the circumstantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding of animus—such as atypical management involvement in discipline, unusual reporting practices, and disciplinary actions closely tied to protected activity. Judge Douglas noted that several contemporaneous entries in the company’s records connected to Groeschel’s safety advocacy differed from normal practice and disproportionately influenced managerial decisions. Trader Joe’s attempts to prove its actions were justified (e.g., by comparator discipline) were rejected because the record did not demonstrate truly analogous situations for comparison. This reinforced the Board’s conclusion that protected conduct influenced adverse actions.
    • Having upheld the Board’s findings of violations regarding the written warning, suspension, and termination, the majority denied Trader Joe’s petition for review and granted enforcement of the Board’s order. Judge Douglas also clarified that the court lacked jurisdiction to evaluate the legality of the specific remedial Thryv doctrine relief ordered by the Board at this stage. Thus, the judgment affirmed the NLRB’s substantive conclusions and left the compensatory remedy framework intact for later implementation.
    • Judge Oldham dissented. He begins by framing the case as a stark example of administrative overreach, emphasizing that the employee at issue, Jill Groeschel, engaged in repeated abusive, aggressive, and unsafe conduct toward coworkers and customers—behavior entirely consistent with termination under Trader Joe’s at-will employment policy. Judge Oldham argues the majority misapplied the NLRA by deferring far too heavily to the Board’s findings and rubber-stamping its conclusion that the company’s decision to fire Groeschel was motivated by impermissible animus toward her COVID-related safety concerns. He faults the “Wright Line” mixed-motives framework adopted from the NLRB, asserting it lacks grounding in the NLRA’s text, imposes illogical burdens on employers, and effectively eliminates meaningful judicial review by insulating agency fact-finding from scrutiny.
    • Judge Oldham then dissects the two steps of the Wright Line test, contending both are fundamentally flawed: the first step permits the Board to assert improper motivation based on indeterminate standards and deference that amounts to no review, and the second step wrongly treats the employer’s effort to prove it would have acted regardless as an affirmative defense at odds with statutory burdens. Applying these criticisms to the case, Judge Oldham maintains Trader Joe’s had ample legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to terminate Groeschel based on her documented misconduct, and that the Board’s contrary inferences were unreasonable. Judge Oldham concludes that the majority’s approach empowers the Board to second-guess ordinary employer decisions and undermines the proper balance between judicial oversight and administrative enforcement of labor laws.
  • Sterling v. City of Jackson, 24-60370, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (en banc) (oral argument at panel stage), qualified immunity, Fourteenth Amendment, en banc
    • Ordering en banc rehearing of November 17, 2025, panel decision (Dennis, Haynes, Engelhardt; Dennis, J., dissenting in part; Engelhardt, J., dissenting in part) reversing dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against City arising from lead-contaminated drinking water, holding that plaintiffs plausibly stated a violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily autonomy; and affirming dismissal of claims against City officials and personnel on qualified immunity grounds.

Unpublished decisions

  • Greenlee v. Beasley, 25-10401, c/w Beasley v. Greenlee, 25-10411, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), RICO
    • Affirming dismissal of RICO counter-claim.
  • Goodson v. City of Dallas, 25-10612, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Higginbotham, Engelhardt, Ramirez) (no oral argument), § 1983
    • Affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim as Heck barred.
  • U.S. v. Simmons, 25-10722, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Affirming conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon.
  • Arabzadegan v. Ramsey, 25-20137, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), § 1983
    • Affirming dismissal of deliberate indifference claims against prison medical staff.
  • Springstun v. American International Group, Inc., 25-20211, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), insurance, removal jurisdiction
    • Affirming denial of motion to remand, and judgment in favor of insurer on claims-handling dispute.
  • Alvarez v. NES Global, L.L.C., 24-20480, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Higginson, Oldham) (oral argument), Fair Labor Standards Act
    • Affirming summary judgment for class plaintiffs on claims that defendant employer’s compensation scheme violated the FLSA, but that defendant did not willfully violate the FLSA.
  • U.S. v. Menocal-Lobo, 25-50457, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming conviction and sentence for illegal reentry.
  • Spinks v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles, 25-50561, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Graves, Oldham) (no oral argument), prisoner suit
    • Affirming dismissal of Texas state prisoner’s § 1983 claims.
  • U.S. v. Torres-Viera, 25-50677, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming conviction and sentence for illegal reentry.