January 9, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • U.S. v. Quintanilla-Matamoros, 25-20191, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • Clement, J. (Clement, Graves, Ho) (oral argument withdrawn), Ho, J., concurring; criminal, sentencing
    • Vacating sentence on conviction of failing to register as a sex offender, and remanding for resentencing.
    • The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in sentencing Sergio Yovani Quintanilla-Matamoros based on an incorrect sex-offender tier under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). Quintanilla-Matamoros pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender; the presentence report classified him as a tier III offender, yielding a Guidelines range of 18–24 months. On appeal, he contended (and the government conceded) that the district court should have classified him in a lower tier. Applying plain-error review, the court explained the tiering framework under SORNA, which requires comparing the elements of a defendant’s underlying state conviction with defined federal offenses (“categorical approach”). The court found that Texas’s statutory rape offense sweeps more broadly than the federal offenses that define tiers II and III because it covers consensual sexual intercourse with a child under 17 without requiring force or coercion—unlike the federal definitions. As a result, the district court’s tier-III classification was erroneous and affected Quintanilla-Matamoros’s substantial rights, warranting correction.
    • Judge Clement further analyzed whether Quintanilla-Matamoros at least qualified as a tier II offender and concluded he did not, because the Texas statute also encompassed conduct outside the relevant federal definition of “abusive sexual contact” (e.g., differing age thresholds and lacking required age differentials). Because Quintanilla-Matamoros was neither a tier II nor a tier III offender, he must be classified as a tier I offender on remand, with a correspondingly lower Guidelines range.
    • Judge Ho separately concurred. In his concurring opinion, Judge Ho agreed with the result—vacating the defendant’s sentence—because the government and defendant both conceded that the tier III classification was erroneous, and he acknowledged that prosecutorial discretion is a “quintessential prerogative of the Executive Branch.” However, he limited his concurrence strictly to the judgment, expressing a strong prudential objection to issuing a precedential decision based on an uncontested record. Judge Ho stressed that the adversarial process is essential to the judicial function and cautioned against binding future panels on similar legal questions in cases where no party has defended the judgment below.
    • Judge Ho then elaborated at length on the constitutional and prudential foundations for courts to decide disputes even when the immediate issues are uncontested, disputing a line of Fifth Circuit authority (notably Pool v. City of Houston) that bars relief where parties agree. He argued that Article III jurisdiction exists so long as conflicting interests existed at the outset of a case, and that longstanding Supreme Court precedent and practice affirm the power of courts to grant relief when the parties ultimately agree on disposition. Judge Ho remarked that it is “not the lack of party agreement that forecloses jurisdiction—it’s the lack of conflicting interests at the outset,” and emphasized that prudential warnings about precedent should not override such authority.

Unpublished decisions

  • U.S. v. Martinez, 25-10685, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • TMX Finance Corporate Services, Inc. v. Spicher, 24-11087, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Southwick, Higginson, Wilson) (oral argument), banking law, abstention
    • Affirming Younger-abstention-based dismissal of plaintiff’s suit challenging Pennsylvania agency’s enforcement authority and issuance of show-cause order regarding payment of $52 million in monetary sanctions.
  • Bestrenewedoil, L.L.C. v. Pastrana, 25-20021, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • Higginson, J. (Richman, Higginson, Oldham) (oral argument withdrawn), fraud
    • Affirming ~$4 million judgment in favor of plaintiff on investor fraud claims, which was rendered by the bankruptcy court and affirmed by the district court.
  • Phillips v. Enterprise Products Co., 25-30222, appeal from W.D. La.
    • per curiam (Barksdale, Willett, Duncan) (no oral argument), employment discrimination, summary judgment
    • Reversing summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff’s claim that he was fired in retaliation for accusing supervisor of racially discriminatory practices, and remanding for further proceedings. “Here, genuine disputes of material fact persist; facts are contested and motives disputed. And where the evidence admits of competing inferences, the task is the jury’s, not the judge’s. It is jurors who weigh the evidence, assess credibility, and decide what—and whom—to believe.”
  • Marquardt v. City of New Orleans, 24-30802, appeal from E.D. La.
    • per curiam (Elrod, Richman, Willett) (oral argument), taking, attorneys’ fees
    • Remanding for district court to make express that it was issuing a final judgment with regard to plaintiff’s takings-clause challenge to city’s short-term rental regulations.
  • U.S. v. Jimenez-Marquez, 25-50282, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Higginbotham, Engelhardt, Ramirez) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence on conviction of illegal reentry.
  • U.S. v. Seymore, 25-60301, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.