January 8, 2026, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Unpublished decisions

  • Salt and Light Energy Equipment L.L.C. v. Origin Bancorp, Inc., 25-10381, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Southwick, Higginson, Douglas) (oral argument), removal jurisdiction, lender liability
    • Affirming summary judgment for lender defendant on plaintiff’s claims that lender caused plaintiff to be terminated by one of its clients. Also, held that district court did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to remand because there was not a clear and unequivocal waiver of federal jurisdiction in the parties’ agreement.
  • Miller v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 24-10929, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Graves, Rodriguez, by designation) (oral argument), insurance
    • Affirming summary judgment dismissal of challenge to denial of crop insurance claim.
  • U.S. v. Perez-Reyes, 25-20162, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • U.S. v. Martinez-Padilla, 25-20196, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • U.S. v. Cruz-Diaz, 25-20246, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Higginbotham, Engelhardt, Ramirez) (no oral argument), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • Wiley v. Deese, 25-20254, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Higginbotham, Engelhardt, Ramirez) (no oral argument), civil
    • Dismissing appeal in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and affirming dismissal in part.
  • U.S. v. Gladney, 25-30162, appeal from W.D. La.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming 262-month sentence under career-offender guidelines on conviction of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
  • Guerra & Moore Limited, L.L.P. v. Cantu, 25-40142, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett) (no oral argument), sanctions
    • Affirming vexatious-litigant injunction from filing any future lawsuits against law firm.
  • U.S. v. Garcia, 24-40658, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Stewart, Haynes) (oral argument), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming 57-month sentence on conviction of drug-related money laundering offenses.
  • Laird v. Bisignano, 25-50347, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Davis, Wilson, Douglas) (no oral argument), social security
    • Affirming denial of disability benefits.
  • Berryman v. Huffman, 23-60627, appeal from N.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Wiener, Douglas, Ramirez) (oral argument), Douglas, J., dissenting; habeas corpus, speedy trial, Sixth Amendment, AEDPA
    • Granting petition for panel rehearing; withdrawing October 16, 2025 panel opinion (published opinion by Judge Douglas, with Judge Ramirez dissenting) that reversed denial of § 2254 petition and remanded with instructions to issue writ of habeas corpus regarding petitioner’s speedy trial claim arising from the elapsing of 1,233 days between his arrest and his state court trial; and substituting new per curiam opinion with a one-word “Affirmed” opinion with a dissent by Judge Douglas.
    • Judge Douglas dissented, expressing that the record and governing law clearly showed that Berryman’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated with respect to one count of his two-count indictment, and that a constitutional violation on any count should require dismissal of the entire indictment rather than a selective, count-by-count remedy. Judge Douglas detailed the convoluted procedural history in state court—where Berryman waited 1,233 days for trial amidst clerical errors, counsel conflicts, and lost defense witnesses—which resulted in a finding of speedy-trial violation as to Count I (shooting into a dwelling) but not Count II (firearm possession). Judge Douglas explained that the Mississippi trial court and the Mississippi Court of Appeals erred in applying the Barker v. Wingo balancing test separately to each count’s prejudice factor and in dismissing only the count found in violation.
    • Central to Judge Douglas’s dissent was the argument about clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): the Supreme Court in Barker and Strunk v. United States has long held that upon finding a speedy-trial violation, the only constitutionally permissible remedy is dismissal of the indictment. Judge Douglas stressed that although Barker and Strunk arose in single-count contexts, the rule that dismissal is the sole remedy should logically extend to multi-count indictments because the constitutional right is unitary and the charging instrument (the indictment) is indivisible for purposes of remedy once a violation is found. Judge Douglas viewed the majority’s count-by-count approach as an unreasonable narrowing of that “fundamental principle,” one that frustrated the severe but fixed constitutional response mandated for Sixth Amendment violations.
    • Judge Douglas also dissected the AEDPA framework, emphasizing that Supreme Court precedent did not leave room for “fairminded disagreement” on this remedial question: once a violation is conceded, any remedy short of dismissal of the indictment contravenes the established rule. Judge Douglas contended that the Mississippi appellate decision—which justified selective dismissal on the basis that Barker never expressly referenced multi-count indictments—misapplied clearly established law and that the state court’s interpretation was objectively unreasonable under White v. Woodall and related authority.
    • Would you like a short point-form breakdown of the key legal arguments in the dissent?