Take the Fifth

Designated for publication

• Computer Sciences Corp. v. Tata Consulting Services Ltd., 24-10749, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • Higginson, J. (Higginson, Ho, Wilson) (oral argument), trade secrets, injunction
  • Vacating permanent injunction imposed with regard to claimed misappropriation of trade secrets, but otherwise affirming judgment of trade-secret-misappropriation liability on jury verdict, $56 million compensatory damages award, and $112 million exemplary damages award.
  • Computer Sciences Corporation (“CSC”) sued Tata Consulting Services (“TCS”) under the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), alleging that TCS misappropriated CSC’s “confidential information” (labelled as trade secrets by the district court) in order to win a $2.6 billion contract with Transamerica Corporation and to develop its competing software platform, BaNCS. After an eight-day trial (with an advisory jury), the district court found TCS liable, awarded $56 million in compensatory damages and $112 million in exemplary damages, and entered a permanent injunction barring TCS from using CSC’s trade secrets or the BaNCS version developed using them.
  • A key dispute was whether the contracts (between CSC & Transamerica, and between Transamerica & TCS) authorized TCS’s access to CSC’s confidential information. The court held that the third‐party addendum between CSC and Transamerica (which permitted Transamerica to allow consultants to access CSC’s software “on behalf of and solely for the benefit of Transamerica”) did not allow TCS to use CSC’s information for its own benefit (e.g., building BaNCS or competing for other business). The court interpreted “solely for the benefit of Transamerica” to exclude uses that inure to the service‐provider’s independent competitive advantage. Because Transamerica’s agreements did not grant a vendor such broad use, TCS’s acquisition and use of CSC’s information was unauthorized under the DTSA.
  • On the mens rea front, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that TCS acted willfully and maliciously. The record included evidence that TCS deviated from its internal IP-asset procedures, never asked CSC for permission, and that around mid-2018 TCS was aware that CSC believed it was not authorized to use the information. As to the trade-secret definition, although TCS challenged whether CSC had sufficiently specified its trade secrets, the appellate court declined to entertain a new standard on appeal because TCS did not raise that specific argument in the district court.
  • The court affirmed the compensatory and exemplary damages awards (the latter at $112 million). However, it vacated the permanent injunction as entered and remanded for a revised injunction. The reason was that the injunction as phrased extended to non‐parties (for example, former employees) and bundled restrictive conditions (e.g., an 18-month employment restriction, 10-year monitorship) that raised issues of scope and discretion. The court held that while injunctive relief is permissible under the DTSA, a district court must tailor the injunction and avoid overreach.

• T&W Holding Co. v. City of Kemah, 24-40679, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • Higginson, J. (Higginson, Willett, Engelhardt) (oral argument), takings, ripeness
  • On plaintiff’s claims for takings based on city’s permit-alteration and permit-enforcement, and on city’s towing of a food truck, related to plaintiff’s use of its property for operation of a bar and of a food truck on the property, affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s food-truck related challenge, reversing dismissal of claim based on imposition of zero-occupancy, and remanding for further proceedings.
  • The Fifth Circuit examined two distinct regulatory actions: (1) a zero-occupancy notice issued for the plaintiffs’ four-story bar/residential building which allegedly deprived them of “substantially all economic use,” and (2) the towing of a food truck from the same property. The district court had granted the City’s motion to dismiss, finding the takings, due-process, and equal-protection claims related to the zero-occupancy notice unripe—because the City’s appeal process had not fully played out—and also dismissed the food-truck claims for failure to state a claim. The appellate court held that the zero-occupancy claims were in fact ripe, because the City’s issuance of the zero-occupancy notice constituted a “final decision” for ripeness purposes, and so it reversed the dismissal of those claims and remanded for further proceedings. Meanwhile, the food-truck claims were deemed waived on appeal because the plaintiffs failed to adequately brief them, so the dismissal of those claims was affirmed.

• North East Independent School District v. I.M., 24-50833, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • Graves, J. (Dennis, Graves, Duncan) (oral argument), Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act
  • Affirming district court’s judgment under the IDEA that the school district failed to provide the IDEA-appropriate education to an autistic elementary school.
  • The plaintiff-appellant, North East Independent School District (the “School District”), appeals the judgment of the district court that it failed to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to a student, “I.M.”, an autistic elementary-school child with an intellectual disability and severe behavioral challenges, including toileting problems, elopement (running away), and limited communication ability. The student’s mother, “Bianca,” and I.M. raised concerns that the student regressed when school was interrupted (e.g., during breaks or extended vacations) and that the School District’s extended-school-year (ESY) services were insufficient—the district offered only a half-day, six-week summer program rather than full-summer services or year-round supports. The hearing officer, and the district court subsequently, found the School District’s individualized education program (IEP) inadequate and ordered full-summer ESY services and year-round access to a voice-assisted communication device.
  • On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied the standard for IDEA-appropriate IEPs from Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE‑1 (580 U.S. 386) and the Fifth Circuit’s Michael F. factors: (1) individualization, (2) least-restrictive environment, (3) coordinated services, and (4) academic and non‐academic benefits. The panel found no error in the district court’s determinations on the first and fourth factors, which the School District challenged. On the individualization factor, although the IEP included behavioral supports for elopement and toileting, the School District knew the student had a documented history of regression during breaks and did not provide sufficiently robust ESY or other services to prevent it—e.g., the record showed dangerous elopement (including leaving campus and crossing a busy road) in the first weeks of fourth grade despite the six-week ESY program. The Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding the program insufficiently individualized given the student’s extreme behavioral and safety risks.
  • On the fourth factor—academic and non­academic benefit—the Court acknowledged that the student made some academic gains (e.g., mastering some third-grade IEP goals) but found the non-academic regression (toileting incidents, severe elopement during breaks) outweighed those gains in the holistic assessment required under Fifth Circuit precedent. The panel rejected the School District’s argument that the district court improperly prioritized “disability remediation” or treated academic progress as controlling, explaining that the court properly conducted a holistic review of both academic and functional progress and decline, in line with Fifth Circuit precedent.

• U.S. v. Mitchell, 24-60607, appeal from S.D. Miss.
  • Clement, J. (Elrod, Clement, Haynes) (no oral argument), Haynes, J., dissenting; criminal, Second Amendment
  • Reversing denial of motion to dismiss indictment, and vacating conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon predicated on prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance while possessing a firearm, upholding defendant’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge.
  • Appellant Kevin LaMarcus Mitchell pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon‐in‐possession of a firearm) based on a prior conviction under § 922(g)(3) (possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance). The district court denied Mitchell’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which Mitchell asserted a variety of constitutional challenges, including an as‐applied Second Amendment challenge under the framework of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.
  • In her majority opinion for the Fifth Circuit, Judge Clement confirms the standard of review and the legal test to be applied: the motion to dismiss the indictment raising constitutional challenges is subject to de novo review. Judge Clement reiterates the two‐step Bruen framework for Second Amendment challenges: first, whether the “plain text” of the Second Amendment covers the appellant’s conduct (if so, that conduct is presumptively protected); and second, if covered, whether the regulatory provision is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation (through “relevantly similar” analogues). The majority opinion further references prior Fifth Circuit precedent (e.g., United States v. Diaz) that holds that in an as‐applied § 922(g)(1) challenge the relevant inquiry focuses on the predicate felony conviction (one punishable by more than one year) and does not allow the court to consider unrelated misdemeanor history or other conduct beyond that predicate conviction.
  • Proceeding to the first step, the majority concludes that Mitchell’s conduct—possession of a firearm as a convicted felon—is covered by the Amendment’s “plain text,” because the Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” and convicted felons are among “the people.” Thus the burden shifts to the government to justify the regulation under the second step of the Bruen test. On step two (historical‐analogue inquiry), the majority finds that the government failed to carry its burden of showing that § 922(g)(1) as applied to Mitchell is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. The court states that the government’s analogues were too remote: the historical laws relied upon (such as forfeiture laws, capital‐punishment statutes, “going armed” laws) did not sufficiently map onto the “why” and “how” of § 922(g)(1)’s permanent disarmament of a person whose predicate felony was being an unlawful user of a controlled substance (marijuana) while possessing a firearm. The majority emphasizes that Mitchell’s predicate felony was non‐violent, involved marijuana use, and did not include evidence of contemporaneous intoxication at time of gun possession; the historical record does not show a tradition of permanently disarming individuals with that profile.
  • Because the majority holds the government did not present adequate historical analogues, the court concludes that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Mitchell. The opinion notes that it need not reach the facial Second Amendment challenge, vagueness, Commerce Clause, or Equal Protection arguments because the as‐applied holding disposes of the case.
  • In dissent, Judge Haynes contends that Mitchell’s criminal history—including his prior felony conviction under § 922(g)(3) (unlawful user in possession of a firearm) and subsequent violent misconduct while on supervised release—demonstrates a dangerousness that fits within the historical tradition of disarming individuals with improper access to firearms. Judge Haynes contends that the majority places too narrow a burden on the government to show historical analogues, ignores the government’s substantial showing of Mitchell’s risk and status as a felon, and improperly refuses to consider Mitchell’s broader conduct in assessing the regulatory fit.

Unpublished decisions

• U.S. v. Fletcher, 25-10745, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Davis, Wilson, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Affirming conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon.

• Voice of the Experienced v. LeBlanc, 25-30478, appeal from M.D. La.
  • per curiam (Davis, Stewart, Ramirez) (oral argument), prisoner suit, injunction, mootness
  • Dismissing as moot appeal from preliminary injunction against state, which injunction had expired under the Prison Reform Litigation Act, in plaintiff inmates and inmate organization challenged conditions on Angola’s farm hard labor program.
  • The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the appeal brought by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections and the officials of Louisiana State Penitentiary was moot because the preliminary injunctive order from the district court expired by its own terms under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)’s 90-day limit before meaningful appellate relief could be had. Because the injunction no longer had any legal effect, the Court found it lacked Article III jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the appeal.
  • In addition, the panel vacated the district court’s August 2025 Order under the United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. doctrine to prevent the expired injunction from leaving lingering legal consequences. The Court noted that although the underlying case — concerning alleged Eighth Amendment violations relating to inmate labor in extreme heat conditions at Angola’s agricultural “Farm Line” — is still scheduled for a merits trial in February 2026, the interlocutory relief at issue: the threshold for issuing a “Heat Alert” and monitoring intervals, is now moot and the appeal cannot proceed.

• Roper v. Blanton, 25-50384, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), § 1983
  • Affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution based on his arrest for making a terroristic threat.

• Gavidia-Jovel v. Bondi, 25-60138, petition for review of BIA order
  • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho) (no oral argument), immigration
  • Denying Salvadoran citizens’ petition for review of BIA order dismissing appeal from IJ’s decision ordering removal and denying relief.