Take the Fifth

Designated for publication

• Langston v. Dallas Commodity Co., 24-10883, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • Higginson, J. (Southwick, Higginson, Wilson) (oral argument), bankruptcy
  • Affirming district court’s holding that bankruptcy court properly sustained creditor’s objection to debtor’s claimed exemption of property from administration by bankruptcy estate, on basis that debtor waived his right to object to the untimeliness of the creditor’s objection to his claimed exemption.
  • In 2019 debtor Joseph F. Langston Jr. filed for Chapter 7 relief and claimed two IRAs as exempt from the estate. A creditor, Dallas Commodity Company, later objected to the exemptions under Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b)(1)—which requires an objection within 30 days after the conclusion of the § 341 meeting of creditors. Langston’s § 341 meeting was held on May 26, 2021, but due to multiple adjournments the trustee never reconvened another meeting after that date nor properly filed the statement required by Bankruptcy Rule 2003(e) announcing a continued meeting date and time. The creditor filed its objection on April 8, 2022—well beyond 30 days of May 26—so Langston argued it was untimely.
  • The Fifth Circuit agreed that the trustee had indeed failed to comply with Rule 2003(e), but rejected Langston’s argument that the failure automatically meant the meeting was “concluded” as of May 26 and thus triggered the 30-day deadline. The court explained that the 2011 amendment to Rule 2003(e) did not transform the earlier case-by-case approach (laid out in Matter of Peres, 530 F.3d 375) into a bright-line rule that a missing statement triggers immediate conclusion of the meeting. Thus the court declined to adopt a per se rule that the meeting ended exactly when the statement wasn’t filed.
  • Instead, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Langston had waived his timeliness objection by agreeing at the May 26 meeting to amend his schedules and provide additional documents, accepting the continuance of the meeting, and negotiating an agreed order with the trustees that contemplated an exemption objection. Because Langston both benefited from and participated in the extension of the meeting, he cannot now claim the objection was untimely. The court thus affirmed the bankruptcy and district courts’ rulings overruling Langston’s objection.

• Royal Street Bistro, L.L.C. v. Arrowhead Capital Finance, Ltd., 24-30732, appeal from E.D. La.
  • Ramirez, J. (Wiener, Douglas, Ramirez) (oral argument), bankruptcy
  • Reversing district court’s dismissal of debtor-affiliate’s appeal of bankruptcy court’s judgment in favor of creditor on claim that debtor was responsible for satisfying judgments against affiliates, and remanding to district court to hear the appeal, on finding that failure of debtor-affiliate to attach a copy of the bankruptcy court’s judgment to its notice of appeal was not a jurisdictional defect.
  • The bankruptcy court had entered a judgment for ~$233,548.51 against Royal Street Bistro and its affiliate on August 29, 2024. The appellants filed a notice of appeal within the 14-day window prescribed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002 but did not attach a copy of the judgment as required by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8003(a)(3)(B). The bankruptcy clerk issued a deficiency notice directing correction by September 9; the corrected notice was filed on September 19. The district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and, alternatively, in its discretion due to the procedural defects.
  • The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. It held that the failure to attach the judgment to the notice of appeal is not a jurisdictional defect—only the timely filing of the notice under Rule 8002 is jurisdictional under 28 U.S.C. § 158. Citing precedent, the court explained that Rule 8003(a)(3)(B)’s attachment requirement is non-jurisdictional, thus the district court did have jurisdiction. On discretion, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the appeal without considering lesser sanctions, especially given the absence of demonstrated prejudice, delaying tactics, or egregious conduct by the appellant. Because the merits—including the bankruptcy court’s subject-matter jurisdiction issue—were not addressed below, the case was remanded for further proceedings.

• Sterling v. City of Jackson, 24-60370, appeal from S.D. Miss.
  • Haynes, J. (Dennis, Haynes, Engelhardt) (oral argument), Dennis, J, dissenting in part (as to qualified immunity analysis), Englehardt, J., dissenting in part (as to everything except the qualified immunity analysis); qualified immunity, Fourteenth Amendment
  • Reversing dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against City arising from lead-contaminated drinking water, holding that plaintiffs plausibly stated a violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily autonomy; affirming dismissal of claims against City officials and personnel on qualified immunity grounds; and remanding for further proceedings.
  • The complaint alleges that the City, through its water-system managers, knowingly contaminated its drinking water with lead, kept distributing it into people’s homes, and misled residents into believing the water was safe. The panel accepts all well-pleaded facts as true at the judgment-on-the-pleadings stage. Jackson’s aging water-infrastructure (lead service lines, acidic source water with low pH far below the recommended 8.5 for corrosion control), and treatment failures led to lead leaching. The claims alleged the City’s decision to switch part of its system from high-pH well water to low-pH surface water, and that the City delayed or failed to take corrective treatment steps. The Plaintiffs allege serious health harms—children and adults exposed to lead from drinking, bathing, cooking etc., with developmental delays, persistent medical issues, and costs for special education, health services, and occupational supports. The district court dismissed the constitutional claims and hesitated to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims; the Fifth Circuit turns to review de novo.
  • The majority opinion reminds that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects fundamental rights “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” The two theories advanced by Plaintiffs here are (i) the right to bodily integrity and (ii) the state-created-danger doctrine. On the bodily integrity claim the majority holds that the right is well-established in Fifth Circuit jurisprudence: the right to control one’s person and avoid involuntary intrusions (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, Ingraham v. Wright, etc.). The court emphasizes that even after Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), the right to bodily integrity remains intact. The majority finds that Plaintiffs plausibly alleged the City’s affirmative conduct violated the right: the City allegedly provided water it knew was dangerous, told residents it was safe, required residents to purchase it (via ordinance) and thereby deprived them of meaningful informed consent to protect their bodily integrity. The majority rejects the City’s argument that physical force is necessary for a bodily-integrity violation, noting the case law recognizes mental coercion or deception can suffice.
  • The majority next addresses the state-created-danger theory. It reasons that while there is no general constitutional duty to provide safe water, the City voluntarily undertook the water-service function, switched sources, treated inadequately, and misled residents. That affirmative conduct (not mere omission) may trigger due‐process scrutiny. The majority then turns to deliberate indifference (“shocks the conscience”)—the standard for state-created-danger and bodily-integrity claims. It holds that the complaint alleges an obvious excessive risk (lead exposure), that the City knew or should have known of the risk (since 2013 or so), that the City consciously disregarded it (by switching sources, delaying notice, misrepresenting safety), and offered no plausible governmental interest to justify providing toxic water and lying about it. These allegations, at the pleading stage, are found sufficient to state a plausible claim.
  • However, while the majority holds that the claims may proceed against the City (municipal liability), the panel affirms the district court’s dismissal of claims against individual officials based on qualified immunity. The majority reasoned that although the rights were plausibly violated, the specific right was not clearly established in this factual context (lead-leaching water system and misrepresentation).
  • Judge Dennis concurs entirely with the majority except for Section III.A.3 (the qualified immunity analysis). In his partial dissent, he argues that the qualified-immunity conclusion (that individual officials are immune) is incorrect. He contends that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct and that the conduct of the officials (misleading residents, delaying notice, switching sources despite warnings) should have put them on notice that their conduct was unconstitutional. Thus, he would have denied qualified immunity and allowed the claims to proceed against the individual defendants.
  • Judge Engelhardt dissents from the majority’s conclusions except for the qualified-immunity analysis (where he concurs with the result but perhaps not the rationale). He argues that the majority errs in finding a cognizable constitutional right in the context of municipal water supply and that the state-created-danger and bodily-integrity frameworks are misapplied. Judge Engelhardt contends that municipalities providing utility services are fundamentally different from coercive state-actions recognized in the traditional bodily-integrity cases, and that the majority’s approach risks constitutionalizing routine service provision. He further argues that the allegations do not meet the deliberate-indifference threshold, or at least that the pleading context does not support holding the City liable under the Due Process Clause.

Unpublished decisions

• U.S. v. Wiley, 25-10261, appeal from N.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Wiener, Willett, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal, guilty plea
  • Affirming guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, rejecting argument that government breached his plea agreement by using information obtained in the post-arrest interview to increase guidelines sentencing range.

• U.S. v. Rodriguez, 25-20029, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Wiener, Willett, Wilson) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Zeng v. UTMB Health Center, 25-40483, appeal from S.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Dennis, Haynes, Ramirez) (no oral argument), § 1983, service of process
  • Affirming dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for failure to timely serve defendants.

• U.S. v. Carranza-Clavel, 25-50100, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Barksdale, Oldham, Douglas) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming imposition of supervised release as part of sentence on conviction of illegal reentry.

• U.S. v. Hernandez, 25-50224, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Elrod, Higginson, Ramirez) (no oral argument), criminal
  • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.

• Ross v. Stephens, 25-50487, appeal from W.D. Tex.
  • per curiam (Davis, Jones, Ho) (no oral argument), jurisdiction, Rooker-Feldman doctrine
  • Affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine of claims challenging state court’s guardianship-related ruling.

• U.S. v. Rawls, 25-60316, appeal from S.D. Miss.
  • per curiam (Davis, Jones, Ho) (no oral argument), criminal, sentencing
  • Affirming 60-month sentence on revocation of supervised release, to run consecutively with 110-month sentence on new conviction.