September 16, 2025, opinions

Designated for publication

  • U.S. v. Esquivel-Bataz, 25-20198, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • Duncan, J. (Dennis, Graves, Duncan), Dennis, J., dissenting; criminal, pretrial detention, immigration
    • Affirming denial of motion for pretrial detention.
    • The majority affirmed the district court’s denial of Celia Ignacia Esquivel-Bataz’s motion for pretrial release, rejecting her argument that the district court improperly relied on an immigration detainer to find her a flight risk. Esquivel-Bataz, a Mexican national previously deported following a felony fraud conviction, was indicted for unlawful reentry after being discovered at an illegal gambling parlor in 2025. Although a magistrate judge initially granted her release, the district court revoked it, citing her prior deportation, criminal history, unlawful presence, and immigration status. On appeal, the majority held that while an ICE detainer alone cannot justify detention, the district court conducted the required individualized assessment under the Bail Reform Act and reasonably determined no conditions would ensure her appearance.
    • Judge Dennis “respectfully but emphatically dissent[ed].” He contends that the Bail Reform Act presumes pretrial release and requires the Government to prove flight risk by a preponderance, and that an ICE detainer or the possibility of involuntary removal cannot lawfully factor into that analysis. Unlike cases where courts explicitly set the detainer aside and grounded detention in independent § 3142(g) findings, the district court here let the detainer dominate the proceedings, never conducted a genuine § 3142(g) analysis, and even incorporated the detainer into its written order to support nonappearance. The dissent rejects the majority’s view that the court didn’t rely on the detainer for flight risk, noting the record shows the opposite.
    • On the facts, Celia Ignacia Esquivel-Bataz is a longtime Houston resident with family ties, one old non-violent fraud conviction (2011), a 2012 deportation, and a subsequent § 1326 charge after ICE encountered her in 2025. A magistrate judge ordered release, finding no flight risk but for the detainer; the district court revoked release after an ICE agent testified she would be immediately taken into custody and removed if released. Because the court applied the wrong legal standard, the dissent would vacate and remand for a proper § 3142(g) assessment—and adds that the record arguably compels release, since the detainer itself eliminates any risk of voluntary flight.
  • WorldVue Connect Global, L.L.C. v. Szuch, 24-20571, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • Richman, J. (Smith, Dennis, Richman), Dennis, J., dissenting; preliminary injunction, breach of contract, non-compete, non-solicitation
    • Affirming preliminary injunction entered by district court in case seeking enforcement of non-compete and non-solicitation provisions, with modification of injunction’s definition of confidential information.
    • The dispute between WorldVue and the Szuch Parties arose from a 2022 transaction in which WorldVue purchased the assets of Szuch’s domestic hospitality WiFi business for $9.45 million. Szuch received a minority stake in WorldVue Global and became CEO of the combined entity. However, the relationship soured, and in 2024 WorldVue bought out Szuch’s interest and entered into settlement and separation agreements with Szuch, his companies, and Shan Griffin. These contracts contained one-year noncompete, nonsolicitation, and confidentiality covenants, enforceable by injunctive relief given the risk of irreparable harm. Shortly after signing the agreements, the Szuch Parties began recruiting WorldVue employees, planning compensation, and concealing their efforts from WorldVue—evidence later confirmed through emails.
    • WorldVue sued in Texas state court in November 2024 for breach of contract and tortious interference, obtaining a temporary restraining order. After removal to federal court, the district court extended the TRO and ultimately granted a preliminary injunction. It found that the Szuch Parties breached their agreements by soliciting independent contractors and employees performing work in the Restricted Area, even if those workers resided outside it, and by using WorldVue’s confidential information. The injunction barred the Szuch Parties from recruiting WorldVue’s workers, hiring eleven identified contractors, and using or disclosing WorldVue’s confidential information. The Szuch Parties appealed.
    • On appeal, the Szuch Parties argued three main errors: that the district court misinterpreted the geographic scope of the noncompete to cover workers living outside the Restricted Area; that customer service agents employed by staffing agencies were not covered as “employees or independent contractors”; and that the court wrongly found use of confidential information that Szuch had known prior to the WorldVue acquisition. The appellate court rejected the first two arguments. The contract’s language and purpose supported applying the nonsolicitation covenant to workers performing services in the Restricted Area, regardless of residence. Further, the customer service agents could simultaneously be employees of staffing firms and independent contractors of WorldVue, making them subject to the covenant.
    • The appellate court agreed in part with the third argument. While WorldVue had purchased confidential information and goodwill with Szuch’s domestic business, Szuch’s longstanding personal knowledge of his former employees—their identities, compensation, and skills—was not confidential information subject to restriction. This knowledge, developed before WorldVue’s purchase, could not be deemed transferred as confidential information. However, information generated by WorldVue after the acquisition, such as its assessments of employees’ value or internal records, was confidential. Therefore, the court modified the injunction to clarify that “confidential information” does not include Szuch’s personal knowledge of personnel identity.
    • As to the remaining injunction factors, the appellate court found strong evidence of irreparable harm. Recruiting trained call center staff threatened WorldVue’s ability to maintain its reputation, contracts, and customer goodwill—harms not easily quantified in money damages. The Szuch Parties themselves predicted WorldVue would collapse within a year after losing key personnel, showing knowledge of the likely harm. The court also determined that the balance of harms favored WorldVue, since the Szuch Parties’ obligations arose from freely negotiated agreements, and enforcement served the public interest in upholding reasonable noncompete and confidentiality covenants. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the preliminary injunction but modified it to exclude Szuch’s personal knowledge from the definition of confidential information.
    • Judge Dennis dissented, contending that the district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction because it relied solely on a contractual stipulation to find irreparable injury, without making any independent evidentiary findings. Under Winter v. NRDC, courts must evaluate evidence to determine irreparable harm, and sister circuits have held that stipulations alone are insufficient. The dissent criticizes the majority for filling in the factual gaps by pointing to evidence in the record that the district court never analyzed, which improperly shifts factfinding to the appellate level. Because appellate review for abuse of discretion requires an actual exercise of judgment by the trial court, the dissent maintains that there is nothing to defer to here. Upholding the injunction would collapse abuse-of-discretion review into de novo review and undermine the trial court’s role. The proper course, according to the dissent, is to vacate the injunction and remand for the district court to conduct the necessary evidentiary analysis and exercise its discretion.
  • Yarbrough v. SlashSupport, Inc., 24-40421, appeal from E.D. Tex.
    • Smith, J. (King, Smith, Douglas), employment discrimination
    • Vacating summary judgment dismissal of some of plaintiff’s retaliation/discrimination claims, but affirming dismissal (by summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law, or new trial) of all remaining claims by employee plaintiffs.
    • The plaintiffs, all but one of whom were Black, sued their former employer Glow Networks and its parent SlashSupport under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation for opposing discrimination. They claimed Glow denied promotions, imposed harsher work rules, forced them into monitored rooms, and singled them out for discipline. A jury initially awarded nine plaintiffs $3 million in emotional distress damages and $4 million in punitive damages each. However, the district court set aside much of that verdict, granting judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) for Glow and SlashSupport, excluding some testimony, and ordering new trials in part. The Fifth Circuit affirmed nearly all of the district court’s rulings, except where summary judgment had relied on since-abrogated precedent limiting discrimination claims to “ultimate employment decisions.”
    • The appellate court vacated and remanded discrimination claims brought by Green, Vicks, Samuels, Price, and Ologban, as well as Samuels’s retaliation claim, because of the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Hamilton v. Dallas County, which broadened the scope of actionable adverse employment actions. The court otherwise affirmed summary judgment against the hostile work environment claims, finding no competent evidence linking Glow’s workplace policies to race and deeming plaintiffs’ assertions conclusory. Similarly, it upheld JMOL against constructive discharge claims by Yarbrough and Lofland, noting Glow’s reassignment decisions stemmed from neutral project needs without pay cuts or harassment sufficient to compel resignation. For other discrimination claims, the court found insufficient evidence of disparate treatment or pretext, rejecting anecdotal accounts and subjective beliefs as inadequate to support the jury’s verdict.
    • The court further upheld JMOL against retaliation claims by Lofland and Paul Tijani because neither engaged in protected activity connected to race discrimination, as their complaints concerned management style or unrelated grievances. It affirmed new trials for retaliation claims by Peter Tijani and Aigheyisi, citing overwhelming evidence of poor performance and misconduct. SlashSupport was dismissed as a defendant because it was not an “integrated enterprise” with Glow, and the exclusion of four witnesses was proper to prevent cumulative testimony. In sum, the Fifth Circuit remanded only some of the discrimination and retaliation claims under outdated precedent, affirming the district court’s rulings in all other respects.
  • Ballentine v. Broxton, 24-50876, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • Graves, J. (Jones, Graves, Rodriguez, by designation), prisoner suit, qualified immunity, Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, due process
    • Affirming summary judgment dismissal of constitutional claims by recent parolee against prison officials arising from their restriction of plaintiff’s access to a program that had the potential of ending his administrative segregation assignment.
    • Garland Ballentine, a Texas inmate and recent parolee, brought a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials, claiming violations of his Fifth, First, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Ballentine spent sixteen years in solitary confinement after being classified as a high-ranking member of the Aryan Circle, a designated security threat group. His only pathway out of segregation was the Gang Renouncement and Disassociation program (GRAD), which required inmates to renounce gang ties and undergo an investigation. When Ballentine attempted to participate, officials demanded that he provide potentially self-incriminating information about criminal activities in prison. After refusing, his GRAD application was terminated, and he remained in solitary until his parole in 2025. Ballentine sought damages for alleged constitutional violations, including compelled self-incrimination, compelled speech, retaliation, and denial of due process.
    • On appeal, the Fifth Circuit analyzed his constitutional claims through the lens of qualified immunity. Regarding the Fifth Amendment, the court concluded that Ballentine failed to identify clearly established precedent showing that conditioning GRAD participation on providing incriminating information was unlawful. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham and McKune v. Lile did not clearly resolve whether continued solitary confinement constitutes unconstitutional compulsion. Similarly, his First Amendment compelled speech and retaliation claims failed because the cases he relied upon—though protective of the right to refrain from speaking—were either too general, unrelated to the prison context, or non-binding out-of-circuit authority. Because Ballentine could not show that officials violated clearly established law, the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on both his Fifth and First Amendment claims.
    • As to his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, Ballentine argued that sixteen years in solitary confinement implicated a liberty interest and that grievance denials deprived him of fair process. The court assumed, without deciding, that a liberty interest existed but held that Texas’s system of periodic classification reviews satisfied the minimum procedural due process requirements. Citing precedent involving inmates in similar circumstances, the court emphasized that periodic reviews—where inmates can present evidence and be heard—are constitutionally adequate. Concluding that no constitutional violation was established, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the prison officials.

Unpublished decisions

  • U.S. v. Lewis, 25-10202, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Wiener, Willett, Wilson), criminal, compassionate release
    • Affirming denial of motion for compassionate release.
  • U.S. v. Wells, 25-10425, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett), criminal, supervised release
    • Affirming revocation of supervised release.
  • U.S. v. Ledesma, 25-10473, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • U.S. v. Livesay, 25-10547, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Duncan, Douglas), criminal, supervised release
    • Affirming revocation of supervised release.
  • U.S. v. Ochoa-Cortez, 24-11001, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • U.S. v. Hall, 24-30377, c/w U.S. v. Conner, 24-30427, appeal from E.D. La.
    • per curiam (Haynes, Ho, Oldham), criminal, search and seizure
    • Affirming convictions of possession of a firearm by a felon, upholding denial of motions to suppress.
  • U.S. v. Villareal, 24-30765, appeal from M.D. La.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming sentence on conviction of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and heroin and unlawful use of communication facilities.
  • U.S. v. Howe, 24-40340, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • Graves, J. (Elrod, King, Graves), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming district court’s imposition of a sentencing enhancement of 5 levels under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) and the assignment of criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), for a 720-month sentence on conviction of distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography.
  • U.S. v. Diaz-Segoviano, 25-50149, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • U.S. v. Smith, 24-50622, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon.
  • Brooks v. Bondi, 25-60026, petition for review of BIA order
    • per curiam (King, Haynes, Ho), immigration
    • Denying Nigerian citizen’s petition for review of BIA order denying her motion to reconsider as untimely and, alternately, meritless.
  • U.S. v. Morgan, 24-60249, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Richman, Southwick, Willett), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.