July 1, 2025, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • TitleMax of Texas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 21-11170, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • Richman, J. (Wiener, Richman, Willett), Willett, J., dissenting; due process
    • Affirming denial of preliminary injunction to plaintiff in plaintiff’s challenge to city ordinance regulating short-term lending.
    • In this case, TitleMax of Texas challenged an amendment to a City of Dallas ordinance that expanded local regulation of short-term lending. The amendment extended prior rules governing Credit Access Businesses (CABs) to also apply to Credit Services Organizations (CSOs) and imposed new restrictions on fees and repayment structures. TitleMax claimed the Amending Ordinance made its business model financially unviable, leading to layoffs and store closures, and sought a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the injunction, finding TitleMax had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on its claims, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
    • The court examined TitleMax’s arguments that the Amending Ordinance was preempted by state law and violated TitleMax’s due course of law rights under the Texas Constitution. Regarding preemption, the court held that although state law regulates short-term lending, it does not expressly or implicitly preclude municipalities from imposing additional regulations. Unlike other cases where local ordinances were found to effectively prohibit entire industries, TitleMax’s evidence only demonstrated that its specific business model became unprofitable—not that the ordinance barred all CABs or CSOs from operating. Therefore, the ordinance did not conflict with state law.
    • On the due course of law claim, the court concluded that TitleMax had no constitutionally protected property or liberty interest in conducting business free from new regulation. Licenses and registrations to operate as a CAB or CSO are privileges, not vested rights, and the state’s longstanding tradition of regulating lending undermined TitleMax’s claim to constitutional protection for its business model. The court also found the ordinance was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest—protecting low-income borrowers from predatory lending practices. Because TitleMax failed to show a likelihood of success on either of its legal theories, the denial of the preliminary injunction was upheld.
    • Judge Willett dissented. In a partial dissent, he agreed with the majority that TitleMax’s due-course-of-law claim under the Texas Constitution failed, but disagreed on the preemption issue. Judge Willett opined that TitleMax presented unrefuted evidence showing the Amending Ordinance effectively made it impossible to operate its unsecured-loans business profitably in Dallas. Drawing from the Texas appellate case Murphy v. Wright, Judge Willett emphasized that even regulations that stop short of an outright ban can be void if they function as a “virtual prohibition” on a business authorized by state law. TitleMax submitted sworn declarations stating that the ordinance’s 0.1% per day fee cap left no viable business path, and the City offered no evidence to rebut this claim or show other businesses could still operate under the new rules.
    • The dissent further argued that while TitleMax’s evidence might not resolve the entire case, it was enough at this preliminary stage to show a prima facie case of preemption, warranting a different result. Judge Willett criticized the City’s reliance on the Ordinance’s formal permissibility while failing to counter TitleMax’s substantive argument that it could not profitably operate. Because the district court never analyzed the remaining elements required for a preliminary injunction—such as the balance of harms or public interest—Judge Willett would have remanded the case for further proceedings. He concluded that TitleMax had shown a sufficient likelihood of success on the preemption claim to survive this early stage and deserved a fuller judicial review.

Unpublished decisions

  • U.S. v. Crawford, 24-10747, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Smith, Stewart, Duncan), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming order that 48-month sentence for escape from a halfway house would run consecutively, rather than concurrently, with any sentence in a related state criminal proceeding.
  • U.S. v. Ezukanma, 24-11061, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Stewart, Southwick, Higginson), criminal, coram nobis
    • Dismissing appeal of dismissal of petition for writ of coram nobis.
  • U.S. v. Rios-Salazar, 24-20567, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Graves, Willett, Wilson), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • U.S. v. Juarez, 23-50588, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Richman, Douglas, Ramirez), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • U.S. v. Martinez-Montes, 24-50907, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Graves, Willett), criminal
    • Granting Anders motion to withdraw, and dismissing appeal.
  • Vega-Solis v. Bondi, 24-60544, petition for review of BIA order
    • per curiam (Barksdale, Stewart, Ramirez), immigration
    • Denying Mexican citizen’s petition for review of BIA order dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ’s) order of removal and denial of cancellation of removal.