September 13, 2024, opinions

Posted on by tadbartlett

Designated for publication

  • Wilson v. Midland County, 22-50998, appeal from W.D. Tex.
    • Oldham, J. (joined by Richman, Jones, Smith, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt, Wilson, Ramirez); Haynes, J., concurring in part (joined by Stewart, Southwick); Willett, J., dissenting (joined by King, Elrod, Graves, Higginson, Douglas); § 1983
    • Affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for money damages and to challenge constitutionally “tainted” state-law conviction, on basis that the plaintiff had failed to use available state-law avenues to set aside the conviction, expunge her record, or otherwise favorably terminate the criminal proceeding.
    • The Court held that the favorable-termination element of Heck was unconcerned with whether the plaintiff received a custodial sentence or not.
    • The Court concluded, “As cases like this one illustrate, there are real dangers and real abuses in our criminal justice system. That is why our law gives people like Erma Wilson so many opportunities to favorably terminate their criminal proceedings. Some favorable-termination requirements afforded by state law (like the availability of state postconviction review and a gubernatorial pardon) remain available to people like Wilson long after their convictions become final. And if Wilson successfully avails herself of those remedies against her criminal conviction, she will have recourse to still more remedies afforded by civil law—including § 1983—to seek compensation. Those civil remedies are vitally important because crooked, conflicted, and malicious prosecutors should be forced to pay for the damages they inflict on innocent Americans. But it is also important that civil plaintiffs do not put the cart before the horse. Criminal proceedings and criminal judgments require criminal remedies—not civil ones. If and when Ms. Wilson pushes aside her criminal conviction, then but only then can she come back to civil court and ask for money. Until then, her § 1983 suit must be dismissed.”
    • Judge Haynes concurred in the judgment and in the majority opinion in part, “that Wilson’s § 1983 claim is not cognizable because she has not pursued other avenues currently available to challenge her conviction. Specifically, Texas law allows people who are ‘or have been[] on community supervision’ to file an application for state habeas corpus. … Because she has the ability to go to the state of Texas, the notion that Wilson does not have the ability to terminate her conviction is not accurate.”
    • Judge Willett dissented. He began his sweeping critique of applying the Heck bar in this case as follows: “The Constitution’s fair-trial requirement is Con Law 101—a bedrock due-process guarantee. In fact, the Framers cared so much about the sanctity of the criminal jury trial that our Constitution specifically mentions it twice—not only in the Sixth Amendment, but also in Article III. And to underscore they really meant it—that criminal-justice fairness is sacrosanct—the Founding generation doubled down, enshrining a host of procedural non-negotiables in multiple provisions of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, more words are devoted to We the People’s fair-trial right than to any other constitutional guarantee. Safe to say, the Framers were fixated on the adjudication of criminal charges—both the power to bring them and the process for resolving them—and spilled a lot of ink to ensure that the Constitution’s inviolable fair-trial guarantee is no empty promise. During our Second Founding almost a century later, Congress, besides passing the Fourteenth Amendment, also acted statutorily with a sweeping textual command in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that rights-violators ‘shall be liable to the party injured.’ These lofty words, however, are just that—pretty parchment promises—if the judicial fine print of madeup caveats, exceptions, and qualifiers ensures that abuses (and abusers) get a pass, even for the most egregious, conscience-shocking deprivations.” (Internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).

Unpublished

  • U.S. v. Ramirez, 22-40089, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Elrod, Haynes, Duncan), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming 151-month sentence on conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl.
  • U.S. v. Adams, 23-20610, appeal from S.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Haynes, Higginson, Douglas), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming maximum Guidelines sentence on conviction of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers.
  • Santos v. Garland, 23-60166, petition for review of BIA order
    • per curiam (Southwick, Haynes, Douglas), immigration
    • Denying in part and dismissing in part Salvadoran citizen’s petition for review of BIA order affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum and withholding of removal.
  • Rudder v. U.S., 24-10282, appeal from N.D. Tex.
    • per curiam (Jones, Dennis, Southwick), sanctions
    • Affirming dismissal of suit for failure to abide by earlier pre-filing permission sanction.
  • Piliego v. Montgomery, 24-30007, appeal from E.D. La.
    • per curiam (Clement, Duncan, Douglas), § 1983
    • Affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claims.
  • U.S. v. Hines, 24-60172, appeal from N.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Smith, Stewart, Duncan), criminal, sentencing
    • Affirming 46-month sentence on conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
  • Bermudez-Guerrero v. Garland, 24-60206, petition for review of BIA order
    • per curiam (Barksdale, Stewart, Ramirez), immigration
    • Denying Salvadoran citizens’ petition for review of BIA order upholding the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.
  • Okorie v. Chowdhury, 24-60254, appeal from S.D. Miss.
    • per curiam (Smith, Stewart, Duncan), bankruptcy
    • Affirming district court’s affirmance of bankruptcy court’s denial of motion for violation of the automatic stay.